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A. "What therefore God has put together, let not man put asunder."
B. "A Divorce... must be grounded on a legal fault within the grounds enu-
merated in the statutes .... It is not for this court to do what it deems best
for the parties."
C. "Legislative divorce policy of an era before Nebraska became a state...
may not reflect her modem mood."
D. "Dissolution of marriage shall mean the termination of a marriage by decree
of a court of competent jurisdiction upon a finding that the marriage is irre-
trievably broken."
1. Does the Irretrievable Breakdown Standard Reduce the Animos-
ity of Divorce?
2. How Closely Are Marriages Scrutinized in Order to Determine
Whether They Are Irretrievably Broken?
3. Does No Fault Divorce Permit Divorce by Consent?
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E. "No decree shall be entered. . unless the court finds that every reasonable
effort to effect reconciliation has been made."
1. Waiting Periods
2. Reconciliation Attempts
F. "It is the intent of the legislature that a spouse who has been handicapped
socially or economically by his or her contribution to a marriage shall be
compensated for such contribution at the termination of the marriage ....
VII. CONCLUSION
Purpose (1) It is the intent of the legislature to emphasize
the present and future needs of the parties to actions affecting
marriage and of their children, if any; to move away from as-
signing blame for a marriage failure; and to promote the set-
tlement of financial and custodial issues in a way which will
meet the real needs of all concerned persons as nearly as pos-
sible.
(4) This act is not intended to make a divorce, annulment
or legal separation easier to obtain.
-1977 Wisconsin Assembly Bill 1001
I. INTRODUCTION
With the addition of Wisconsin in February, 1978, there are now
seventeen American jurisdictions2 that permit a marriage to be
dissolved exclusively because the marriage has become irretriev-
ably broken,3 because irreconcilable differences have caused the
irremedial breakdown of the marriage,4 or because the legitimate
objects of matrimony have been destroyed and there remains no
reasonable likelihood that the marriage can be preserved.5 Fifteen
other states have added similar "no fault" grounds to pre-existing
fault bases for divorce.6
1. Act of Oct. 15, 1977, ch. 105, § 1, 1977 Wis. Laws 560.
2. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-312(3) (Supp. 1977); CAL. CrV. CODE § 4506 (West 1970)
(incurable insanity is a second ground); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-
106(1) (a) (1) (1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1505 (Supp. 1977) (a period of
separation must be shown to prove breakdown); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.052(1)
(West Supp. 1978) (mental incompetence is a second ground); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 598.17 (West Supp. 1978); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.140(1) (c) (Baldwin
1973); MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 552.6(1) (Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 518.06 (West Supp. 1978) (breakdown is proven by showing the existence of
more traditional grounds); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.305 (Vernon 1977) & Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 452.320 (Vernon Supp. 1978) (if contested, breakdown can be found
only by showing the respondent to be at fault or that the parties lived apart
for a prescribed period); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 48-316(1) (b) (Cum. Supp.
1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-347(1) (Reissue 1974); OI. REV. STAT. § 107.025(1)
(1977); V. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 104 (Supp. 1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.09.030 (Supp. 1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 247.07(2) (West Supp. 1978); WYo.
STAT. § 20-2-104 (Interim Supp. 1977) (incurable insanity is a second ground).
See also UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DiVORCE ACT § 302.
3. E.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-347(l) (Reissue 1974).
4. E.g., CAI. Civ. CODE § 4506 (West 1970).
5. E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.17 (West Supp. 1978).
6. AI.A. CODE tit. 34, § 20(a) (9) (Supp. 1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46-32(c)
(West 1978); GA. CODE ANN. § 30-102(13) (Supp. 1978); HAw. REV. STAT. § 580-
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When, in 1972, the Nebraska Legislature passed L.B. 820, "an act
... to provide procedures for the dissolution of marriage,' 7 Ne-
braska became one of the first states to adopt an exclusively no
fault divorce proceeding.8 Previously a divorce was ostensibly
available only to a party who could prove that his or her spouse
had committed acts ranging from adultery to extreme mental cru-
elty,9 provided that the complaining spouse had not himself or her-
41 (1976); IDAHo CODE § 32-616 (Supp. 1978); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-3
(Supp. 1978); ME. REV. STAr. tit. 19, § 691 (Supp. 1977); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 208, § 1 (West Supp. 1978); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-2 (Supp. 1977); N.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 458:7-a (Supp. 1977); ND. CENT. CODE § 14-05-09.1 (1971);
Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3105.61 to .65 (Page Supp. 1977); R.L GEN. LAWS § 15-
5-3.1 (Supp. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-801(11) (Supp. 1978); TEXAS FAm.
CODE ANN. § 3.01 (Vernon 1975).
7. Act of April 8, 1972, LB. 820, 1972 Neb. Laws 246 (effective July 6, 1972) (codi-
fied at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 42-347 to 379 (Reissue 1974)).
8. The first was California in 1969. The law became operative on January 1,1970.
Family Law Act, ch. 1608, § 8,1969 Cal. Stats. 3314 (codified at CAL. Civ. CODE
§§ 4000-5138 (West 1970)).
9. Divorce; grounds. A divorce from the bonds of matrimony may be
decreed by the district court of the county where the parties, or one
of them, reside, on application by the petition of the aggrieved party,
(1) when adultery has been committed by any husband or wife; (2)
when one of the parties was physically incompetent at the time of
the marriage; (3) when one of the parties has been sentenced to im-
prisonment in any prison, jail or house of correction for three years
or more; and no pardon granted, after a divorce for that cause, shall
restore such party to his or her conjugal rights; (4) when either party
shall willfully abandon the other without just cause for the term of
two years; (5) when the husband or wife shall have become an habit-
ual drunkard, (6) when either party shall be sentenced to imprison-
ment for life, and no pardon shall affect a decree of divorce for that
cause rendered, or (7) when one of the parties is incurably insane
and has been legally confined in a hospital or asylum for the insane
for a period of at least five years immediately preceding the date of
the filing of the petition for divorce, and this ground shall be avail-
able where the insanity existed wholly or partially before the pas-
sage of this act as well as where it accrues entirely subsequent
thereto.
Act of April 12, 1945, ch. 101, § 1, 1945 Neb. Laws 329 (most recently codified at
NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-301 (Reissue 1968)) (repealed 1972).
Divorce; grounds, extreme cruelty. A divorce from the bonds of mat-
rimony, or from bed and board, may be decreed for the cause of ex-
treme cruelty, whether practiced by using personal violence, or by
other means; or for utter desertion of either party for the term of two
years. A like divorce may be decreed, on complaint of the wife, when
the husband, being of sufficient ability to provide suitable mainte-
nance for her, shall grossly or wantonly and cruelly refuse or neglect
so to do.
Act of Jan. 26, 1856, ch. 52, § 7, 1856 Neb. Laws 277 (most recently codified at
NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-302 (Reissue 1968)) (repealed 1972).
The previous law was not entirely fault based. A divorce could be granted
if one of the parties was incurably insane, a fact which had to be attested to
by three court-appointed physicians. Act of April 12, 1945, ch. 101, § 3, 1945
Neb. Laws 329 (most recently codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-302.01 (Reissue
19781
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self engaged in similar misconduct.'0 Under the new law a
marriage dissolution would be attainable by anyone who could
show that his or her marriage was irretrievably broken" and that
"every reasonable effort to effect reconciliation ha[d] been
made.' 2
In repealing its previous law, Nebraska was rejecting the tradi-
tional conceptualization of marriage as a permanent, lifelong rela-
tionship, dissolvable only when morally justified, i.e., only in
extraordinary situations in which a person needed protection from
the wrongdoings of his or her spouse. In its stead the state em-
braced the view that
[w] hen a personal relationship with another under the institution of mar-
riage has deteriorated to the point that the parties can no longer live to-
gether and provide our society with the sort of stable socio-economic unit
on which this country so depends, it is time to ... dissolve it without acri-
mony, moral judgments or benedictions. 1 3
While this new approach has been warmly praised for dealing
effectively with the realities of the matrimonial experience, it is
not without its critics. Specifically Nebraska's no fault divorce law
has been accused of being "an enticement to divorce, an encour-
agement to the destruction of marriage as both a personal commit-
ment and a civil institution, and a provision for rewarding those
who injure others.' 14
Aided by an analysis of Nebraska divorce statistics over an
eight-year span and a survey of the state's district court judges,' 5
1968)) (repealed 1972). This begrudging exception to the general notion that
one could not be deprived of the benefits of marriage unless he or she en-
gaged in some specified misconduct was one of the earliest types of no fault
divorce, having first been made a ground in Wisconsin in the 1800's. Freed &
Foster, Economic Effects of Divorce, 7 F.m. L.Q. 275, 276 & n.3 (1973).
10. "No divorce shall be decreed in any case where it shall appear that.., the
party complaining shall be guilty of the same crime or misconduct charged
against the respondent." Act of Jan. 26, 1856, ch. 52, § 9, 1856 Neb. laws 277
(most recently codified at NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-304 (Reissue 1968)) (repealed
1972).
11. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-347 (Reissue 1974).
12. Id. § 42-360.
13. Henderson, Practice and Problems Under Nebraska's New Divorce Laws, 52
NEB. I REv. 1, 23 (1972).
14. Brief for Appellant at 75, Dewey v. Dewey, 192 Neb. 676, 223 N.W.2d 826 (1974),
supplemental opinion, 193 Neb. 236, 226 N.W.2d 751 (1975). See also Tran-
script of Debate on L.B. 820, 82d Neb. Leg. Sess. 6215-16 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Transcript] (comments of Senator Fred W. Carstens).
15. Judges' Questionnaire on Nebraska's Dissolution of Marriage Law (Novem-
ber 1977) (results on fe with Alan Frank, College of Law, University of Ne-
braska) [hereinafter cited as Judges' Questionnaire]. Questionnaires were
sent to all 45 Nebraska district court judges. Thirty-four replies were re-
ceived, but one was so incomplete that it was not usable, while three others
were letters from judges from the Fourth Judicial District, sitting in Omaha,
indicating that they had never been assigned to the domestic relations dock-
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this article will examine Nebraska's first four and a half years of no
fault divorce. In particular, it will explore, in the words of Wiscon-
sin Assembly Bill 100,16 whether the Nebraska legislation, in mov-
ing away from assigning blame for a marriage failure, has suc-
ceeded in emphasizing the present and future needs of the parties
and their children while not making divorce easier to obtaim 17
IL THE DIVORCE RATE
Raw statistics have provided the critics of no fault divorce with
impressive support for their claim that modern divorce reforms
have made marriages far easier to dissolve and concomitantly
caused the divorce rate to skyrocket. In the United States,18 the
rate of divorces and annulments has soared from 3.5 divorces per
thousand population in 1970, when California's no fault law be-
came effective, to 5.1 per thousand in 1977,19 an increase of more
et. The judges were asked to respond to questions concerning their experi-
ence with Nebraska's dissolution law during the last 12 month period in
which they heard such cases. During that period, the 30 reporting judges
heard roughly 10,000 dissolution cases. A copy of the questionnaire and a
compilation of the replies can be found in the appendix to this article.
16. Act of Oct. 15, 1977, ch. 105, § 1, 1977 Wis. Laws 560. See text accompanying
note 1 supra.
17. The importance of investigating the effects of divorce reform legislation was
stressed by Professor Homer H. Clark, Jr.:
It is ... important, if [divorce reforms] are enacted, that continuing
studies of their impact be made, so that we can judge their success or
failure on the basis of fact rather than the blind emotion and
prejudice which provide so much heat and so little light in the aver-
age public discussion of divorce reform.
Clark, Divorce Policy and Divorce Reform, 42 U. Cowo. L. REV. 403,418 (1971).
18. The U.S. divorce rate has consistently exceeded that of any other country.
Data regarding divorces in countries with relatively high 1976 divorce rates
are collected in Table I.
TABLE I
Rates of Divorce per Thousand Total Population:
Selected Countries, 1976
Country Rate
United States 5.0
Australia 4.3
USSR 3A
Sweden 2.7
Denmark 2.5
Canada (1975) 2.2
Finland 2.1
Egypt 2.0
Glick & Norton, Marrying, Divorcing, and Living Together in the U.S. Today,
32 PoPuLATION BULL., Oct., 1977, at 4.
19. U.S. BUREAU or CENSUS, DEP'T or COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNTrED STATES 1977, tbL 74, at 55 (1977) [hereinafter cited as STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT 1977]; 26 U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, MONTHLY Vi-
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than forty-five percent.20 In California the number of divorces
jumped forty-six percent in the first year under that state's new
law.2 ' The increase in divorces in Nebraska, while not as swift as
in California, has been equally pronounced. In the six years since
1971, the last full year under the fault system, the number of di-
vorces in Nebraska has increased by more than fifty-three per-
cent,22 while the divorce rate per thousand estimated population
has increased fifty percent.23 In England, too, a conversion to a
system which ostensibly allows a marriage to be dissolved when it
has broken down irretrievably has been accompanied by a rapid
increase in the number of divorce decrees. During the first two
years that the Divorce Reform Act of 1969 was in operation, the
number of English divorces more than doubled.24
As dramatic as these figures are, other data should be consid-
ered before concluding that replacing the concept of fault with that
of irretrievable breakdown is the sole or even the primary reason
for the current high incidence of divorce. 25 Nationally the recent
TAL STATISTICS REPORT, No. 12, at 12 (Mar. 13, 1978) [hereinafter cited as 26
MONTHLY VrrAL STATISTICS REPORT, No. 12].
20. The increase in absolute numbers of divorces and annulments from 1970 to
1977 was slightly less than 55%. Data extrapolated from STATISTICAL AB-
sTRAcT 1977, supra note 19, tbl. 74, at 55, and 26 MONTHLY VrrAL STATISTICS
REPORT, No. 12, supra note 19, at 12.
21. Data extrapolated from U.S. PUBuc HEALTH SERVICE, DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDU-
CATION & WELFARE, VrrAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 1970: VOLUME
rnI-MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, tbls. 2-2 & 2-3, at 2-6 & 2-7 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as U.S. VrrAL STATISTICS 1970].
22. Data extrapolated from BUREAU OF VrrAL STATISTICS, NEB. DEP'T OF HEALTH,
STATISTICAL REPORT 1977, at 2 [hereinafter cited as NEB. STATISTICAL REPORT
1977]. There were 3,946 divorces in Nebraska in 1971 and 6,047 in 1977. Id.
23. Data extrapolated from id. The divorce rate was 2.6 per 1000 estimated popu-
lation in 1971 and 3.9 per 1000 estimated population in 1977. Id.
24. Till Divorce Do Us Part, Hongkong Standard, April 12, 1974, at 10, col. 5. In
1970, 57,421 divorce decrees were granted in England. In 1972 the number was
118,253. Id. The Divorce Reform Act became effective January 1, 1971. See
also Rosenbaum, Divorce Reform in England- The Decline of the Matrimonial
Offense, 12 J. FAm. L 365, 387-88 (1972-1973).
25. What is not disputable is that, until very recently, the divorce rate has been
climbing at what some consider an alarming rate. In addition to the data
presented at notes 18-24 & accompanying text supra, the following should be
noted.
In 1973 when only 12% of the women in their late sixties or early seventies
had ended a marriage in divorce, it was estimated that 18-21% of the women
then in their forties or early fifties and 25-29% of those in their late twenties
or early thirties were likely to be divorced sometime in their lives. Glick &
Norton, Perspectives on the Recent Upturn in Divorce and Remarriage, 10 DE-
MOGRAPHY 301, 308 (1973). In 1977 these projections were revised upward to
estimate that approximately 40% of all marriages among women then in their
late twenties could well end in divorce. Glick & Norton, supra note 18, at 18.
The number of children under 18 involved in divorce doubled between
1960 and 1970 even though the birthrate had declined. W. JOHNSON, MARITAL
DISSOLUTION AND THE ADOPTION OF NO-FAULT LEGISLATION 28 (1975).
[VOL. 58:1
1978] NO FAULT DIVORCE 7
upswing in divorce began in the late 1960's, more than three years
before California's initial no fault law.26 Similarly, in Nebraska,
In recent months, however, the divorce rate appears to be leveling offi In
the 26 months through May, 1978 (the latest data available at this writing),
the 12-month divorce rate has changed very little. 27 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH,
EnUCATION & WELFARE, MoNTHLY VrrAL STATISTICS REPORT, No. 5, at 3 (Aug.
11, 1978). In California the divorce rate actually has dropped, falling to 6 per
thousand in 1977 from 6.2 in 1976. Divorce Rate Is Leveling Off and May Even
Fall Population Experts Say; Reasons Are Unclear, Wall St. J., June 27,1978,
at 40, coL 1. One reason for this might be the drop in the marriage rate, which
has fallen 10% from its 1972 peak. Thus there are fewer vulnerable young
marriages potentially subject to dissolution. Another explanation is that peo-
ple are more aware of the expense, bitterness, and depression that often ac-
company divorce and are proceeding more cautiously. Id.
26. 'The divorce rate more than tripled between the Civil War and 1910, when it
reached about one per thousand population. Then it rose to around 2.2 by
1960, stayed more or less level until 1967, and now has increased sharply
again, attaining a level of 4.0 in 1972." C. FOOTE, . LEVY & F. SANDER, CASES
AND MATERiALS ON F nLY LAw 1074 (2d ed. 1976).
Data regarding divorces in the United States since 1960 are collected in
Table IL
TABLE II
Estimated Number of Divorces and Annulments and Rates
With Percent Changes From Preceding Year.
United States 1960-1977
Percent Rate Per
change 1000 Percent
in total change
Year Number number population in rate
1977 1,097,000 +1.9 5.1 +2.0
1976 1,077,000 +5.0 5.0 +4.2
1975 1,026,000 +5.0 4.8 +4.3
1974 977,000 +6.2 4.6 +4.5
1973 915,000 +8.3 4.4 +7.3
1972 845,000 +9.3 4.1 +10.8
1971 773,000 +9.2 3.7 +5.7
1970 708,000 +10.8 3.5 +9.4
1969 639,000 +9.4 3.2 +10.3
1968 584,000 +11.7 2.9 +11.5
1967 523,000 +4.8 2.6 +4.0
1966 499,000 +4.2 2.5 -
1965 479,000 +6A 2.5 +4.2
1964 450,000 +5.1 2.4 +4.3
1963 428,000 +3.6 2.3 +4.5
1962 413,000 -0.2 2.2 -4.3
1961 414,000 +5.3 2.3 +4.5
1960 393,000 - 2.2 -
Data extrapolated from U.S. VrrAL STATISTICS 1970, supra note 21, tbL 2-1, at 2-
5; STATISTICAL _ABsTRAC 1977, supra note 19, tbL 74, at 55; 26 MONTHLY VrrAL
STATISTICS REPORT, No. 12, supra note 19, at 2.
Part of the increase in 1967 and 1968 probably can be attributed to New
York's adding, as of September 1, 1967, cruelty, abandonment, and separation
grounds to the law which previously had made adultery the sole ground for
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the divorce rate started to climb significantly well before the 1972
no fault legislation was enacted and has continued to rise steadily
ever since.27 Furthermore, the increase in divorce has not been a
phenomenon restricted solely to states that have adopted a break-
down standard. For instance, from 1970 to 1974 divorces climbed at
a greater rate in Arkansas, Mississippi, Rhode Island, and South
Dakota, none of which made major changes in their divorce stat-
utes, than in Nebraska, which adopted the irretrievable breakdown
divorce. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 170 (McKinney 1977). However, excluding
New York entirely, the number of divorces and annulments still increased by
more than 10% in 1968. Data extrapolated from U.S. VrrAL STATISTICS 1970,
supra note 21, tbls. 2-1 & 2-2, at 2-5 & 2-6.
27. TABLE III
Number of Divorces and Rates
With Percent Changes From Preceding Year
Nebraska 1965-1976
Percent Rate per
change 1000 Percent
in total change
Year Number number population in rate
1977 6,047 +4.5 3.9 +5.4
1976 5,788 +5.2 3.7 +2.8
1975 5,504 +7.6 3.6 +9.1
1974 5,114 +5.5 3.3 +6.5
1973 4,849 +12.0 3.1 +10.7
1972 4,326 +9.6 2.8 +7.7
1971 3,946 +8.7 2.6 +8.3
1970 3,629 +13.6 2.4 +9.1
1969 3,194 +8.6 2.2 +10.0
1968 2,940 +4.0 2.0 -
1967 2,825 +11.6 2.0 +17.6
1966 2,531 +3.4 1.7 -
1965 2,448 -0.3 1.7 -
1964 2,455 - 1.7 -
Data extrapolated from NEB. STATISTICAL REPORT 1977, supra note 22, at 2.
Consistent with the national trend, see note 25 supra, figures from Lancas-
ter County (Lincoln) indicate a leveling off in the divorce rate after 1976, as
Table IV shows.
TABLE IV
Number of Marriage Dissolutions:
Third Judicial District, Nebraska,
January-June, 1970-1978
Year Number Year Number
1978 451 1973 424
1977 479 1972 397
1976 491 1971 297
1975 418 1970 300
1974 341
Data obtained from Clerk of Court, Third Judicial District, Lincoln, Nebraska.
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standard in 1972.28
Taken as a whole these statistics are inconclusive, neither sup-
porting nor refuting the hypothesis that removing fault as a crite-
rion for the awarding of a divorce is a major factor in the mounting
divorce rate. Whether the hypothesis is true, as no fault's critics
maintain,29 or whether the increase is better attributable to other
factors,30 as others contend,31 is a question in need of systematic
assessment.
Before undertaking such an assessment by more closely exam-
ining Nebraska divorce statistics, one important caveat should be
28. TABLE V
Number of Divorces and Rates
With Percent Changes from 1970 to 1974:
Nebraska, Arkansas, Mississippi, Rhode Island, & South Dakota
Percent Rate per Percent
change in 1000 total change
State Year Number number population in rate
Nebraska 1974 3,700 +41 3A +36
1970 5,200 - 2.5 -
Arkansas 1974 15,800 +70 7.7 +60
1970 9,300 - 4.8 -
Mississippi 1974 11,900 +45 5.1 +38
1970 8,200 - 3.7 -
Rhode Island 1974 2,500 +47 2.7 +50
1970 1,700 - 1.8 -
South Dakota 1974 2,000 +43 3.0 +50
1970 1,400 - 2.0 -
Data extrapolated from STATiTICAL ABsTRAcT 1977, supra note 19, tbL 113, at
77.
In 1972, Rhode Island reduced from 10 to 5 years the length of time the
parties needed to live separate and apart from each other in order to get a
divorce decree. Act of May 4, 1972, ch. 214, § 1, 1972 IL Pub. Laws 869. Subse-
quent to 1974 it was reduced again to three years. Act of June 5, 1976, ch. 338,
§ 1, 1976 RI. Pub. Laws 1536 (codified at RI. GEN. LAws § 15-5-3 (Supp. 1977)).
Considering the long separation period it is doubtful that many divorces were
granted on this ground. See note 180 infra. In 1973 South Dakota abolished
the defense of recrimination. Act of Mar. 13, 1973, ch. 161, 1973 S.D. Sess.
Laws 221 (codified at S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. § 25-4-19 (1976)).
Subsequent to 1974, Mississippi and Rhode Island, in addition to their
other grounds, made irreconcilable differences a basis for divorce under cer-
tain conditions. Act of May 20, 1976, ch. 451, § 1, 1976 Miss. Laws 704 (codified
at MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-2 (Supp. 1977)); Act of May 22, 1975, ch. 287, § 1, 1975
RI.L Pub. Laws 708 (codified at RI. GEN. LAws § 15-5-3.1 (Supp. 1977)).
29. "It surely is impossible to argue that a divorce law based on consent, or 'mar-
riage breakdown,' or voluntary separation, would do other than increase the
number of divorces." Turner, Retreat from "Fault"?: An English Lawyer's
View, 46 NEB. L, REV. 64,75 (1967). See also Wheeler, Book Review, 71 MIcH.
L REV. 607, 611 (1973).
30. For a discussion of what these other factors might be, see notes 90-110 & ac-
companying text infra.
31. Judge Lawrence Krell of Nebraska's Fourth Judicial District, which sits in
Omaha, thinks "the rise here is merely part of a national trend." Divorce Rate
Spurts; Is No-Fault at Fault?, Omaha World-Herald, Feb. 17, 1974, § B, at 1,
col. 6. In the opinion of University of Nebraska at Omaha sociology professor
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noted. The data cited above,32 as well as the interrupted time se-
ries analysis presented below, 33 concern divorce. They do not pur-
port to measure family stability. It is the breakdown of a marriage
which actually is the "social evil" that is so often and passionately
denounced for splitting homes and imperiling children. Divorce is
merely the law's recognition that the marriage has broken down,
34
and the law's restoration to the parties of the right to enter into
new socially respectable and legally effective marital relation-
ships.3
While the law obviously can have an enormous effect on the in-
cidence of divorce-a state could abolish divorce, then the divorce
rate would be zero36-its effects on marriage stability are harder to
gauge and are considered by many to be marginal at most.37 An
Merlin Hofstetter the increase in the divorce rate does not have "much to do
with no-fault It's influenced by a multitude of different factors." Id.
32. See notes 18-28 & accompanying text supra.
33. See notes 42-76 & accompanying text infra.
34. Whether every marriage is broken in fact when a couple or one of the part-
ners decides to ask for a divorce depends to a large degree on how one de-
fines breakdown. From the subjective viewpoint of one or both of the
spouses, breakdown undoubtedly has occurred, except in the freak case in
which a divorce is sought for tax or other financial advantages. See, e.g., Man
Divorces His Sick Wife So Medicaid Will Pay Bills, Lincoln J., Feb. 21, 1973, at
3, col. 1. Viewed more objectively the marriage really might not be broken
and the subsequent divorce might be deeply regretted one day. See
Bodenheimer, Book Review, 7 FAm. L.Q. 112, 120 (1973).
35. M. RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABnxry, DIVORCE, AND THE LAw, passim (1972).
36. Id. at 262.
37. 'It is... apparent that the legal limitations in the possibilities to dissolve a
marriage have no more than marginal position effects on family stability,
while on the other hand it is clear that they cause significant difficulties with
divorce." Sage, Dissolution of the Family Under Swedish Law, 9 FAm. L.Q.
375, 379 n.21 (1975) (quoting 41 SWEDISH GOVERNMENT OffiCIAL REPORTS 105-06
(1972)).
A rather dramatic, although doubtlessly unauthentic, demonstration of
the divergence between divorce and marital breakdown and the inability of
the law to control the latter appeared in the June 11, 1825, issue of the Niles'
Register, quoted in N. BLAKE, THE ROAD TO RENO 80-81 (1962):
The following inscription is written in large characters over the
principal gate in the city of Agra in Hindostan: "In the first year of the
reign of king Julief, two thousand married couples were separated,
by the magistrates, with their own consent. The emperor was so in-
dignant, on learning these particulars, that he abolished the privilege
of divorce. In the course of the following year, the number of mar-
riages in Agra was less than before by three thousand; the number of
adulteries was greater by seven thousand; three hundred women
were burned alive for poisoning their husbands; seventy-five men
were burned for the murder of their wives; and the quantity of furni-
ture broken and destroyed, in the interior of private families,
amounted to the value of three million of rupees. The emperor re-
established the privilege of divorce."
Less homicidal, but equally licentious, were the citizens of South Carolina
in those years prior to 1949 when divorces were unobtainable under the state
constitution. Members of the South Carolina bar alleged that there were
more people living in adultery or practicing bigamy in South Carolina than in
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increase in the frequency of divorce which might accompany a
change in a state's marriage dissolution law could be a reflection of
nothing more than the state legally recognizing and sanctioning
marital breakdown that always had existed, but of which the state
previously had refused to take cognizance.
Those for whom divorce or annulment38 was unobtainable for
either legal or economic39 reasons could continue to live together
in conditions varying from mere disharmony to violent hostility,
perhaps clandestinely looking for love and affection from other
sources; they could live apart divorced in all but name, or one
could desert the other, disappearing to start a new life elsewhere.40
all the other states. P. JACOBSON, AMEmCAN MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 111
(1959).
38. Marriages which end in annulment represent marital breakdowns which
might not be reflected in divorce statistics. Despite their historical and theo-
retical differences, the majority of annulments are probably merely substi-
tutes for divorces. Where the divorce law is particularly unattractive
annulments may be proportionally high. In 1958, two states accounted for
73% of all reported annulments. In California, where remarriage was unavail-
able for one year following a divorce decree, annulments represented almost
12% of all marital dissolutions. In New York, where divorces could only be
obtained for adultery and where stringent remarriage prohibitions were im-
posed on a guilty party after a divorce, annulments represented almost 40%
of total dissolutions. C. FooTE, R. LEVY & F. SANDER, supra note 26, at 572-73.
In California annulments were reduced from 10.1% of that state's total
marital dissolutions in 1969 to 5% in 1970, after its divorce reform which, in
addition to abolishing fault as grounds for divorce, reduced the interlocutory
period to six months. U.S. VrrAL STATISTICS 1970, supra note 21, tbL 2-3, at 2-7.
After New York added fault and separation grounds to its divorce law, effec-
tive September 1, 1968, annulments decreased from 35.4% of its total marital
dissolutions in 1967 to 21.8% in 1968, 10.3% in 1969, and 8% in 1970. Id.
39. The sheer cost of a divorce can be an enormous impediment to a legal disso-
lution for people of limited means. A partial explanation for the current in-
crease in divorce can be found in the more widespread provision of free legal
services for the poor, as well as the Supreme Court's decision in Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), that court fees and process costs cannot be
allowed to prevent those unable to afford them from dissolving their mar-
riages.
England's high divorce rate has been attributed in part to the low cost at
which many forms of dissolution can be obtained in that country. Hongkong
Standard, supra note 24. For instance the mail-in divorce of Princess Mar-
garet and the Earl of Snowden cost only $29. MARR. & DIVORCE TODAY, June 5,
1978, at 4. Iowa's no fault law and its attendant increase in divorce was ac-
companied by the establishment of legal aid societies in the state's major cit-
ies. Sass, The Iowa No-Fault Dissolution of Marriage Law in Action, 18 S.D.
". REV. 629, 639 (1973).
The real economic burden in obtaining a divorce now might be on those of
the lower middle class who cannot meet legal service agencies' income guide-
lines. However, divorce is an area which seems particularly well suited to
price competition in the wake of the Supreme Court's lifting of bans on attor-
ney advertising in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
40. Desertion, often called "poor man's divorce," is an extra-legal remedy widely
invoked by those on the lower end of the economic ladder, although statistics
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If financially able, one or both spouses could go to a state with less
restrictive divorce laws and obtain a dissolution which, it would be
hoped, would gain either real or apparent legal recognition in their
home state.4 1 While none of these cases would appear in the local
divorce statistics, neither do they represent the kind of stable fam-
flies one might hope to preserve.
III. AN INTERRUPTED TIME SERIES ANALYSIS OF
NEBRASKA DIVORCES42
The 1972 change in Nebraska's divorce law, from a system em-
indicate that deserters come from all socio-economic strata. Brody, Califor-
nia's Divorce Reform: Its Sociological Implications, 1 PAc. UJ. 223,228 (1970).
See generally Foster, Common Law Divorce, 46 MrNN. L REV. 43 (1961); Jor-
don, The Doctrine of Common Law Divorce, 14 U. FLA. L. REV. 264 (1961).
In 1976. the number of "separated" persons in the United States
was only about half as large as the number of divorced persons (3.8
million versus 7.2 million)....
During recent years, the number of divorced persons has in-
creased more rapidly than the number of separated persons. This
suggests that more of those with serious marital conflicts are resolv-
ing them through a divorce decree which they can now afford to ob-
tain--or is more easily obtainable-and which frees them for
possible remarriage to a (hopefully) more suitable partner.
Glick & Norton, supra note 18, at 15.
41. Max Rheinstein's "Gresham's Law of Divorce" states that
whenever it is possible for divorce seekers to obtain divorces with
some difficulty in one place and with greater ease or speed in an-
other, cases tend to accumulate in the place of easy, and to dry up in
the place of hard divorce. This law of experience can, of course, oper-
ate only where the effect df the divorce, i.e., the divorce seeker's res-
toration to the freedom of the marriage market, takes place in the
hard divorce district even though the divorce was granted in the easy
district.
Rheinstein, The Law of Divorce and the Problem of Marriage Stability, 9
VAN]. L Rnv. 633, 641 (1956).
Nevada, Mexico, and other "divorce mills" have been only too willing to let
this "law" work to their economic advantage. They have been aided and abet-
ted by courts frustrated by restrictive divorce laws and unwilling to render
illegal those relationships which have sprung up in reliance on migratory di-
vorces. Accordingly, courts have distorted jurisdictional notions to the point
that "settled family relationships may be destroyed by a procedure that we
would not recognize if the suit were one to collect a grocery bill." Williams v.
North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 316 (1942) (Jackson, J., dissenting). See also Wil-
liams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343
(1948); Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E.2d 709, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86
(1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 971 (1966).
Part of the increase in the California divorce rate that accompanied its
new dissolution law can be explained by couples opting to stay home and get
California divorces instead of migratory ones. In 1970, the new law's first
year, Nevada divorces decreased by more than 16%. Extrapolated from U.S.
VrrAL STATisTics 1970, supra note 21, tbL 2-2, at 2-6.
42. For a more technical analysis examining the effect of Nebraska's no fault
legislation through 1974, see Mazur-Hart & Berman, Changing From Fault to
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ploying traditional fault concepts to one authorizing dissolutions
when marriages .are found to be irretrievably broken, provides an
opportunity to test the hypothesis that the introduction of a no
fault marriage dissolution scheme leads to an increase in divorce.
The effects of law reform on human behavior are hard to assess. 4 3
Where a political unit enacts legislation which is put into effect
across the entire unit, no group is available as a control and the
only base of comparison is the record of observations taken in the
previous months and years. 44 In such situations it has been rec-
ommended that an interrupted time series quasi-experimental de-
sign be used.45 Such a design was employed in the present
research to test the effects, of Nebraska's no fault dissolution law
on the frequency of divorce.
A. Subgroups
In addition to examining the state's overall divorce rate, sepa-
rate analyses were conducted on the rates of selected subgroups of
Nebraska's population in order to determine whether the change
in-the divorce law had a greater impact on some segments of soci-
ety than on others. The subgroups selected, for the reasons de-
scribed below, were (a) residents of urban counties and residents
of rural counties; (b) husbands and wives under thirty years of
age, between thirty and fifty years, and over fifty years of age; and
(c) black couples and white couples.
Studies of divorce in Nebraska and elsewhere have concluded
that the urban/rural differential is the single most important factor
affecting the rate of divorce.4 6 The higher divorce rates in urban
No-Fault Divorce: An Interrupted Time Series Analysis, 7 J. APPLIED SOCIAL
PSYCH. 300 (1977).
43. See Lempert, Strategies of Research Design in the Legal Impact Study, 1 LAw
& Soc'y REV. 111 (1966).
44. Campbell, Reforms as Experiments, 24 A.m. PSYCHOLOGIST 409, 413 (1969).
45. D. CAMPBELL & J. STANLEY, ExPERuiENTAL AND QUAs-ExPERmENTAL DE-
SIGNiS FOR RESEARCH 37-43 (1966). The term "time series analysis" refers to
any analysis of multiple assessments of some unit (e.g., group, person, state,
etc.) on some measure of interest (e.g., crime rates, gross national product,
etc.). An "interrupted time series analysis" is a research design in which one
tests the hypothesis that some sudden event has affected the measure which*
is being repeatedly assessed.
46. K. CANNON, AN ANALYSIS OF DIVORCE IN NEBRASKA (U. of Neb. College of Ag-
riculture, Agricultural Experiment Station, Research Bull. No. 174) (1954);
Cannon, Marriage and Divorce in Iowa 1940-1947, 9 MAnn. & FAM. LIVING 81
(1947); Lillywhite, Rural-Urban Differentials in Divorce, 17 RuRAL Soc. 348
(1952).
An urban county is one which contains either a city greater than 50,000 in
population or the immediate suburbs of such a city. STATSTIAL ABSTRACT
1977, supra note 19, at 923. Two of Nebraska's four urban counties-Douglas
(with 5.0 divorces per 1000 population) and Lancaster (5.3)-were among
those with the highest divorce rates in Nebraska in 1977, although Hall (5.5)
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areas have been attributed, in part, to the lessening in importance
of traditional values-a reduction which is directly related to ur-
banization.4 7 Thus it might be anticipated that rural people-more
traditional and less vulnerable to the mercurial nature of modern
society-would be wedded to the notion of the sanctity of marriage
and hence less affected by changes in divorce procedures.
Typically, among marriage partners of approximately the same
age, the lowest divorce rates are among couples between the ages
of thirty and fifty years. The divorce rates for both older and
younger couples normally are higher. One reason offered for this
U-shaped distribution is that those in the middle age group, in ad-
dition to their greater economic stability, often have a number of
minor children in their care.4 If it is true that the parties' concern
for their minor children is a significant factor in this group's com-
parative reluctance to seek divorce, one would suspect that any ef-
fect the new law has on the divorce rate would be felt less by this
age category. As for those couples over fifty years of age, there
might well be many who over the years desired a divorce, but were
unable or reluctant to secure one under the old law. To the extent
that the no fault law removed these impediments, it can be antici-
pated that the divorce rate would increase for the over-fifty
couples, at least initially.
One reason for adopting no fault divorce was to reduce the
number of divorces by desertion, sometimes termed "poor man's
divorce." 49 Lawmakers expected that the no fault law would make
was the leader. Of the two other counties classified as urban, Sarpy (4.2) had
only the tenth highest divorce rate and Dakota (2.9) was not in the upper
quartile. The county with the lowest rate was Logan, which had no reported
divorces in 1977. NEB. STATISTICAL REPORT 1977, supra note 22, at 99-100.
These figures might be misleading in that it is thought that some people es-
tablish urban residency prior to filing for a divorce in order to avoid small-
town social pressure. Statistics Show Rural Marriage Lasts Longer, Lincoln
J., Dec. 13, 1974, at 10, coL 2.
47. Cannon & Gingles, Social Factors Related to Divorce Rates for Urban Coun-
ties in Nebraska, 21 RrRAL Soc. 34 (1956).
48. Schmitt, Age and Race Differences in Divorce in Hawaii, 31 J. MAPm. & FAM.
48 (1969). Forty percent of Nebraska divorces in 1977 involved couples with
no children. Extrapolated from NEB. STATISTICAL REPORT 1977, supra note 22,
at 103.
A recent study concluded that the presence of a young child has a signifi-
cant inhibiting influence on divorce, although the effect of additional young
children and of older children (ages 6-17) was much weaker. Becker, Landes
& Michael, An Economic Analysis of Marital Instability, 85 J. PoLrricAL
ECON. 1141, 1165-66 (1977). The cause-and-effect relationship was found to
work both ways, with couples who feel that they are likely to divorce tending
not to have children. Id. at 1170-72. But see H. Ross & L SAWHILL, TIME OF
TApsrrmoNs 57 (1975) (not finding that "the presence of children has any sig-
nificant effect on [marital] stability").
49. See note 40 supra. Not all extralegal divorces were lacking in ceremony.
Among rural blacks, the custom of jumping over a broom to sanctify a mar-
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divorce simpler and perhaps less expensive.5 0 If the change to no
fault divorce had this effect, the new law should produce a propor-
tionally greater increase in divorces among those with low in-
comes. Although the available records in Nebraska do not reveal
the financial position of the parties, they do denote race, which
national statistics indicate is highly correlated with socio-eco-
nomic status.5 1 Thus, in order to get an indication of any differen-
tial effects the divorce reform law might have on the poor, the
divorce rates for black and white couples were analyzed sepa-
rately. Only couples in which both spouses were of the same race
were used.
riage, see A. HALEY, ROOTS 275 (1976), needed only to be repeated to termi-
nate the relationship. Walker, Beyond Faulkr An Examination of Patterns of
Behavior in Response to Present Divorce Laws, 10 J. FA. L, 267, 281 (1971).
The practice of wife-selling continued as a form of do-it-yourself divorce in
England into Victorian times. See T. HARDY, THE MAYOR OF CASTERBRIDGE
74-80 (Penguin Eng. Lib. ed. 1978) (1st ed. 1886). Although illegal, it was toler-
ated by the legal authorities, at least where the wife had consented to the
transaction, as was usually the case. Menefee, A Halter Around Her Neck, 43
NEW SocY 181 (1978); Mueller, Inquiry Into the State of a Divorceless Society,
18 U. Prrr. L REV. 545, 566-72 (1957).
50. See M. WHEELER, No-FAULT DIVORCE 10 (1974); Isaacs, The Urban Family: Ur-
ban Marriage and Divorce, 1 FAM. LQ., Mar., 1967, at 39, 42.
51. TABLE VI
Selected Characteristics by Race
(Numbers in Thousands)
Selected Characteristics Total White Black
Employment (Persons 16 years &
over-1977)
Percent in civilian labor force 62.3 62.6 59.7
Percent unemployed 7.0 6.2 13.9
Income (1976)
Median income of persons with
income:
Male, 14 years & over $9426 $9937 $5983
Female, 14 years & over $3576 $3606 $3359
Percent below poverty level 11.8 9.1 24.7
Family income (percent)
Under $5000 10.3 8.4 26.1
$5000 to $9999 19.6 18.7 27.3
$10,000 to $14,999 20.2 20.4 18.8
$15,000 & over 49.8 52.5 27.7
Median family income $14,958 $15,537 $9242
U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS,
SER. P-20, No. 324, Population Profile of the United States: 1977, April, 1978,
tbL 30, at 55 [hereinafter cited as Population Profile: 1977].
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B. Method
The observations in these time series were the number of di-
vorces per month over an eight-year period from January, 1969,
through December, 1976. The interruption in the time series was
July 6, 1972, the day Nebraska's no fault divorce law went into ef-
fect. As it was impossible to classify July, 1972, as either before or
after the interruption, it was dropped from the series. In addition,
an extremely high number of divorces was granted during June,
1972. Because such outliers lead to incorrect identification of sta-
tistical models,5 2 June, 1972, also was excluded from the series.
The analyses in this study were composed of forty-one observa-
tions (months) before the interruption and fifty-three after it. The
number of observations before and after intervention was, there-
fore, well beyond the recommended minimum of twenty-five. 53
The data for these time series were collected from official
records, which are maintained by the Department of Health. At
the time of a final divorce decree, the lawyers involved in the pro-
ceeding were to complete a Report of Divorce Form which was
filed with the district court in which the divorce had taken place
and was then sent to the Bureau of Vital Statistics. 54
Some prior studies of divorce have used a ratio of divorces to
population size rather than raw frequencies of divorce.5 5 Such a
ratio index is particularly useful in studies encompassing many
years, during which the population may fluctuate greatly. Since
this study encompasses only an eight-year span, during which the
population size of Nebraska has been relatively stable,5 6 raw fre-
quencies of divorce were used.
The study analyzed all the Nebraska divorce decrees granted
between 1969 and 1976, inclusive. The total number of divorces for
that eight-year period was 36,350. 57 Because a change in record-
keeping procedures can pose a threat to the internal validity of a
study,58 it is important to note that a check on the record-keeping
techniques at Nebraska's Bureau of Vital Statistics showed that
52. Interview with Gene Glass (Nov., 1976).
53. See G. GLASS, V. WILSON & J. GoTrmAN, DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF TIME-SERIES
ExPER S 112 (1975).
54. NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-615 (Reissue 1976) (repealed 1978); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-
616 (Reissue 1976). As of January 1, 1978, the reports must be presented to
the clerk of the district court with the petition. NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-615
(Cum. Supp. 1978).
55. M. RHEINSTEiN, supra note 35, at 299.
56. NEB. STATSTCAL REPORT 1977, supra note 22, at 107. The period under study
marks the beginning of a reversal of a several-decade trend of net out-migra-
tion from Nebraska. Id. See also ECONOMIC ATLAs OF NEBRASKA 2-3, 29-31 (R.
Lonsdale ed. 1977).
57. NEB. STATISTCAL REPORT 1977, supra note 22, at 2.
58. G. GLASS, V. WILSON & J. GOTrmAN, supra note 53, at 59.
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there were no significant changes during the years studied.59
Another potential threat to the validity of this type of research
is the possibility that some other influential event occured at the
same time as the change in the law. According to previous re-
search, the two events most likely to produce dramatic shifts in the
divorce rate are a sudden economic change and the termination of
a major war.60 Various economic indicators for the state of Ne-
braska were inspected and none of them showed any dramatic
changes around the time of the inception of no fault divorce.61 Al-
though troops were returning from Vietnam, the withdrawal was a
gradual process, conducted over several years, rather than an ab-
rupt one. Thus, it appears that there are no critical events which
could explain a sudden change in the frequency of divorce in mid-
1972 except the change in the law.
C. Time Series Analysis
Special statistical procedures are required in order to analyze
time series data because the data points are frequently correlated
with each other. This dependency among observations violates
some assumptions necessary for making accurate statements
about the effects being studied. The goal of these statistical proce-
dures is to identify the nature of the dependency and to correct for
it. Despite the complexities, the statistical models for testing the
intervention effects in the interrupted time series quasi-experi-
mental design have been developed 62 and the necessary computer
programs for these analyses are available.63 The method is useful
for investigating the effects of new social programs, modifications
in old programs, behavioral interventions, or legal changes, where
the dependent variables of interest have been collected in a consis-
tent manner for a period of time before and after the innovation.
The most common types of effects investigated in the inter-
rupted time series quasi-experimental design are changes in the
level of the series, i.e., the series shifts up or down by a constant,
and/or the slope, i.e., the series changes direction at the point of
the interruption.6
59. Interview with Mary Lou Eastman, Dir., Div. of Health Data& Stat. Research,
Neb. Dep't of Health (June 24, 1977).
60. P. JACOBSON, svupra note 37, at 88-96; Elliott, Divorce Legislation and Family
Stability, 272 ANNALS 134, 146 (1950); Isaacs, supra note 50, at 41.
61. ECONOMIC ATLAS OF NEBRASKA, supra note 56, at 2-49.
62. See G. GLASS, V. WILSON & J. GoTIMAN, supra note 53, for the most readable
presentation.
63. C. BowER, W. PADIA & G. GLASS, TMS-Two FORTRAN PROGRAMS FOR ANALY-
SIS OF Tam SERIES ExPERisaNTs (1974).
64. A change in the level of the number of divorces as a function of the change in
the law would mean that the plot of the monthly divorces for the state would
look identical both before and after the change except that the latter plot
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D. Results
Figure 1 shows a plot of the total number of divorces in Ne-
braska per month over the eight years of the study. The statistical
analysis showed that the overall slope of this series increased sig-
nificantly, but that there was no significant change in level or in
slope after the intervention.65 This indicates that during the pe-
riod of time studied, divorces did systematically increase, but that
the enactment of no fault divorce had no discernable effect on that
increase.
would be some constant number higher or lower than the former plot. Such a
change would indicate that the law produced a sudden and continuing
change. A change in slope of the series studied here would mean that after
the change, the divorce rate steadily accelerated or decelerated, that is, the
plot after the change would have a different angle of slope than the plot
before the change. It should be noted that it is very possible to have both a
change in level and in slope. Also, because the divorce rate has climbed con-
tinually over the eight-year period of the study, it is necessary to control for
what will be called "the overall slope." Thus, in the discussion of the analy-
ses of the series, there will be references to changes in level, changes in
slope, and overall slope.
Analyses showed that the dependencies among the observations were
negligible. Thus, the following multiple regression equation was fitted to
each series:
Y = a + b1X1 + b 2 X2 + b3X 3 + E
where Y = number of divorces per month; a = overall level of the series; bl= a
coefficient representing change in the level of the series; Xj= a dummy varia-
ble coded to discriminate between months which were pre- and post-inter-
vention; b2 = a coefficient representing the overall slope of the series; X 2 = a
dummy variable coded to discriminate between each month of the series; b3
= a coefficient representing change in slope of the series; X3 = a dummy vari-
able coded to discriminate post-intervention months from each other and
from pre-intervention months; and E = error. For a discussion of multiple
regression, see J. COHEN & P. COHEN, APPLIED MULTIPLE REGRES-
SION/CoRRELATION ANALYSIS FOR T=u BEHAvORAL SCIENCES 73-120 (1975).
65. When presenting the results of these analyses, what will be presented is a
probability level, p < M, which represents the probability that the effect
being described could have occurred by chance alone. For example, if the
probability associated with a change in level were p < .03, this would mean
that the probability that this change in the level of the number of divorces
occurred by chance alone is less than three in one hundred. That is, it is not
very likely that this change is merely a random event and, therefore, it ap-
pears to be a real difference. Somewhat arbitrarily, social scientists fre-
quently use p = .05 as the critical probability level More specifically, if the p-
value is less than or equal to .05, i.e., the chances are equal to or less than five
out of 100 that this difference is a random event, social scientists are willing to
say that the difference under study is a significant one. If the p-value is
greater than .05, it is felt that the odds are too high that the difference could
be a random one and that, therefore, no real difference exists.
For the total number of divorces in Nebraska, the probability associated
with the overall slope was p < .001; for the change in level, p < .35; for the
change in slope, p <.95.
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Figure 1: Total Divorces in Nebraska
There had been reason to expect that the law would affect
couples in urban counties more than couples in rural counties. 66
Contrary to this expectation, the no fault divorce law did not differ-
entially influence divorce rates in either urban or rural counties.
An overall increase in divorces did occur in both types of counties
across the time period of the study, but that increase was not re-
lated to the inception of no fault divorce.67
Separate analyses were performed for three age groups of hus-
bands and three age groups of wives. For both husbands and
wives who were under thirty years of age there was a significant
increase in the overall slope of the number of divorces, but no evi-
dence of any changes in level or changes in slope at the time of the
interruption.6 8 Thus the change in the law appears to have had no
effect on the divorce rate of these two groups.
For husbands and wives between thirty and fifty years of age,
66. See text accompanying notes 46-47 supra.
67. For urban counties, p < .002 for overall slope; p <.08 for change in level; and
p < .99 for change in slope. For rural counties, p < .001 for overall slope; p <
.99 for change in level; and p < .99 for change in slope.
68. For husbands under 30, p < .001 for overall slope; p <.40 for change in level;
and p < .99 for change in slope. For wives under 30, p <.001 for overall slope;
p < .16 for change in level; and p < .8 for change in slope.
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the pattern was slightly different. Once again the statistically sig-
nificant increase in the overall slopes emerged. While no differ-
ences for change in level were found, for both sexes this effect was
closer to significance than for those under thirty and the direction
of difference suggested that there were more divorces after the
new law was enacted than before. However, in each case there
was an eventual descent in slope as the number of divorces re-
turned to the pre-intervention level.69 Therefore, any rise in di-
vorces due to the new law appears to have been short-lived.
This pattern of temporary effects of the new law was even more
discernible for people who were over fifty years of age, as can be
seen in Figures 2 and 3. Both sexes at this age show an overall
ascending slope,70 a statistically significant rise in the level of the
series, and a statistically significant descending slope following
that rise.7 1 This suggests that, as had been suspected, there was a
No Fault
0
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
Manthy Time Periods
Figure 2: Divorces for Husbands over Fifty Years Old
69. For husbands between 30 and 50 years of age, p < .001 for overall slope; p <
.08 for change in level; and p < .04 for change in slope. For wives between the
ages of 30 and 50, p < .001 for overall slope; p < .15 for change in level; and p <
.04 for change in slope.
It had been hypothesized that this age group would be less affected by the
new law. See text accompanying note 48 supra. This did not prove to be true.
70. For this age group the overall slope was much less pronounced than for the
other groups. For males, p< .08; for females; p < .03.
71. For males over 50 years of age, p < .005 for change in level- and p < .01 for
change in slope. For females, p < .01 for change in level and p < .005 for
change in slope.
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Figure 3: Divorces for Wives over Fifty Years Old
backlog of married people, especially older ones, who were ena-
bled by the inception of no fault to seek divorces which for legal,
financial, or psychological reasons they were unwilling to procure
previously.72
The separate analyses for white and black couples showed that
among white couples divorces have increased over time, but no
statistically significant changes in the level or slope as a function
of the no fault divorce intervention were found.73 On the other
hand, among black couples the level of divorces did increase
significantly as a function of the new law, and this increase seems
to be accelerating,74 as Figure 4 shows. It had been expected that
black couples would be more affected by the change in the law
than white couples 7 5 The reason for this was that one intended
effect of no fault divorce was to make divorce simpler and less ex-
72. See text following note 48 supra. The over 50 category contained compara-
tively few cases and should be interpreted with caution.
73. White couples' data resulted in p < .001 for overall slope; p < .5 for a change
in leve4 and p <.9 for change in slope.
74. Black couples' data resulted in p < .12, an overall slope which was not statisti-
cally significant, p < .05, a rise in level which was statistically significant; and
p < .03, an acceleration of the slope of the number of divorces which was
statistically significant.
75. See text accompanying notes 49-51 supra.
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pensive and, therefore, more attractive and available to people of
low economic status. If race is highly correlated with socio-eco-
nomic status-and there is good reason to believe that it is76-then
these data suggest that this objective of the law has been met.
No Fault
p I I . I I1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
Monthly Time Periods
Figure 4: Divorces for Black Couples
IV. PRIOR RESEARCH
The major finding of this study-that the change in Nebraska's
divorce law from a system based on fault to one based on the irre-
trievable breakdown of the marriage did not significantly influence
the frequency of divorce-is consistent with much of the previous
research on the relationship between divorce laws and marital dis-
solution. The earliest known study, undertaken in Italy in 1882,
compared the separation and divorce rates of various European
countries and concluded that "the frequency of divorces and of
separations in relation to the population or to marriage does not
appear to be greater in countries where legal restrictions make it
easier for spouses to obtain them. ' 77
One year later, a French study noted dramatic differences in
76. See note 51 supra.
77. U. RHEINsTEiN, supra note 35, at 288 (quoting Bodio, Le Separazioni Per-
sonali di Coniugi e i Divorzi in Italia e in Alcuni Altri Stati, 1 ANNALm Di
STATiSTiCA, Ser. 3, at 92 (1882)). For a later Italian study arriving at the same
conclusion, see M. RHEiNsTEIN, supra note 35, at 292 (reporting on A. Bosco,
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the incidence of divorce and judicially-decreed separation between
different parts of a country with a uniform law and startling simi-
larities among regions with different laws. In places where the law
had undergone changes over time the incidence of divorce re-
mained strikingly uniform. The study concluded that the predomi-
nant influence on the rate of divorce and judicial separation was
not law but "the state of the mores. '78 One specific factor that the
French study did find correlated strongly with a low divorce rate
was the high cost of procuring a divorce decree.7 9 More recently, a
1959 Metropolitan Life Insurance Company report showed that
while the substantial jump in the divorce rate in England and
Wales from 1911 to 1947 may have been due to the liberalization of
the law in 1937, significant increases were registered in the years
before the reform, as well as in the years after it.80
In the 1950's, the Chicago Comparative Law Research Center
undertook one of the leading studies of the relationship between
divorce grounds and the divorce rate.81 The study focused on the
1900 and 1938 law reforms in Germany. Before 1900 differing laws
were in operation in various parts of Germany. The Civil Code of
1896, which became effective in 1900 for the whole of the German
empire and made "guilty misconduct" the sole ground for divorce,
was more liberal than some of the prior laws, but much more re-
strictive than others. The 1938 Nationalist-Socialist law was con-
siderably more liberal, permitting divorce whenever disruption of
the marriage relationship could be shown. After comparing the
number of petitions for conciliation in the various regions and the
divorce rate per 100,000 population over the years, the researchers
concluded that the changes in the law had no significant impact in
either promoting or discouraging divorce.82 However, when other
statisticians interpreted the same data by use of a time series
quasi-experiment similar to the one employed in the instant study,
DivoRzi E SEPARAZIONI PERSONAU DI CONIUGI STUDIO DI DEMOGRAFIA COM-
PARATA (1908)).
78. M. RHENsTiN, supra note 35, at 289 (quoting J. BERTLLON, ETUDE
DEMOGRAPHIQUE DU DIVORCE ET DE LA SEPARATION DE CoRPs DANs LEs DIF-
FERiNTS PAYS DE L'EuRoPE (1883)).
79. M. RHEINSTEIN, supra note 35, at 289-90 (reporting on J. BERTILLON, supra
note 78, at 13-14).
80. Elliott, supra note 60, at 140 (reporting on Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., Statisti-
cal BulL, April, 1949, at 1-3). In 1911 the divorce rate in England and Wales
was 2.2 divorces for every thousand marriages. In 1936 the rate had reached
12.9, an increase of almost 500% even though the law permitted divorce only
for adultery. Moreover, even though the laws did not become more lenient
after 1937, the divorce rate rose from 15.2 in that year to 138.5 in 1947. Id.
81. M. RHEINSTEIN, supra note 35, at 292-303 (reviewing E. WOLF, G. Luvx & H.
HAY, DIVORCE AND THE DIVORCE LAw: BASIC PROBLEMS OF DIVORCE IN GER-
mANY (1959)).
82. Id.
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they found that "the effect of the introduction of the new Civil
Code in 1900 is clearly reflected in both the divorce rate and the
petition for reconciliation rate. '83 It should be noted, though, that
in the German study, as in the instant Nebraska analysis,
whatever effects the changes in the law produced appear to have
been temporary. While the immediate result of the enactment of
the 1896 Code was a decline in the divorce rate in those German
states where the law previously had been more liberal, the rate
soon began to climb at the same pace at which it had been escalat-
ing prior to the new law. Whether the rise would have been even
greater without the legislation cannot be answered unequivocally
from the available data.84
Studies in the United States exploring the correlation between
the law of divorce and the divorce rate have produced mixed re-
sults. Walter F. Willcox's turn of the century comparison between
the statutory divorce grounds and the divorce rates of various
states led him to conclude that "the immediate, direct and measur-
able influence of legislation is subsidiary, unimportant, almost im-
perceptible." 85 Conversely, another University of Chicago study
which tried to measure the relationship between the divorce law as
actually practiced in the state and the incidence of marital break-
down-not mere divorce-did find a positive correlation between
the permissiveness of divorce law and the incidence of marriage
breakdown.86 The researcher, Alexander Broel-Plateris, reasoned
that this was not simply because permissive laws create the break-
down of marriages, nor, conversely, because a high incidence of
marriage disruption causes pressure for a permissive divorce law.
Rather, he concluded, the relationship is a synergistic one in which
"a permissive divorce law and a high incidence of marriage disrup-
tion mutually strengthen each other. '87
A 1975 study by two Florida researchers discerned a positive
correlation between the permissiveness of the statutory laws of a
state and that state's divorce rate and an even stronger correlation
between the permissiveness in the implementation of these laws
83. Glass, Tiao & Maguire, The 1900 Revision of German Divorce Laws: Analysis
of Data as a Time-Series Quasi-Experiment, 5 LAW & Soc'y REV. 539, 559
(1971).
84. Id. at 560-61.
85. M. RHEINSTEIN, supra note 35, at 291 (quoting W. WILCoX, THE DIVORCE
PROBLEM: A STUrY IN STATISTICS 61 (Colum. College Stud. in Hist. Econ., &
Pub. Law, No. 1) (2d ed. 1897)). See also A. CAHEN, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF
AMErICAN DIVORCE (1932); J. LIC=TENBERGER, DIVORCE: A STuDY IN SOCIAL
CAUSATION (1909); Lichtenberger, Divorce Legislation, 160 ANNis 116 (1932).
86. M. RHEmiNsmiN, supra note 35, at 444-69 (reporting on A. Broel-Plateris, Mar-
riage Disruption and Divorce Law (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Divi-
sion of Social Sciences, University of Chicago)).
87. M. RHIEINSTEIN, supra note 35, at 469 (quoting A. Broel-Plateris, supra note 86,
at 243).
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and the rate of divorce. The correlation remained even where con-
trolled for the effects of industrialization, urbanization, income, ed-
ucation, ethnicity, Catholicism, and population stability.88
However, in a more recent study, these researchers found little
support for the hypothesis that the adoption of liberal breakdown
provisions in divorce laws has caused the rate of divorce to esca-
late. The divorce rates in no fault states were adjusted to eliminate
increases that probably would have occurred even if there had not
been any changes in the laws of those states. The level of adjust-
ment was based on the increases in the divorce rate which took
place during the same period in states which did not reform their
laws. An interrupted time series analysis of the adjusted divorce
rates revealed that the adoption of no fault had little effect on the
incidence of divorce in the country as a whole. In Nebraska, as
well as in nine other states, the post-reform adjusted divorce rate
actually was lower than the pre-reform rate. In some states there
were statistically significant increases in the divorce rate, but
these were best explained by factors other than the reform of
those states' divorce laws.89
V. WHY MARRIAGES ARE BREAKING UP
If, as the instant study and at least some of the prior research
indicate, divorce legislation plays only a peripheral role in mar-
riage breakdown, other factors must be considered in order to ex-
plain the accelerating divorce rate of recent years. While much
has been written on this subject, embarrassingly little can be said
with any certainty. The incisive 1966 report on divorce issued by
the Archbishop of Canterbury could only conclude that
until much, much more research is done, the social aspects and entail-
ments of divorce will remain matters about which, though not all opinions
are equal, at best only opinion based in inadequate data is possible.
Knowledge and some approximation to certainty on the sociological prem-
ises of judgment in this sphere await the futurePs
Nonetheless some explanations can be tendered. To a degree
88. Stetson & Wright, The Effects of Laws on Divorce in American States, 37 J.
MAnm & FAm 537 (1975). A 1977 Canadian study also found that the law had
an important effect on the divorce rate. Abernathy & Arcus, The Law and
Divorce in Canada, 26 FA. COORDINATOR 409 (1977). Between 1887 and 1968
various Canadian provinces, where previously only Parliamentary divorces
had been available, introduced judicial divorce. That these changes were ac-
companied by large gains in the divorce rate is hardly surprising.
89. Wright & Stetson, The Impact of No-Fault Divorce Law Reform on Divorce in
American States, 40 J. MARR. & FAm. 575 (1978).
90. PUTTING ASUNDER: A DIVORCE LAW FOR CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 169 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as PUTTING ASUNDER]. There was a call at the 1977 annual
meeting of the American Bar Association's Family Law Section for a National
Divorce Center to study the causes and consequences of marital breakdown.
See 3 FAm. L. REP. (BNA) 2686 (1977).
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the legal phenomenon of divorce has replaced the natural phenom-
enon of death as a method by which marriages are ended. The in-
crease in life expectancy 9' combined with the fact that, until
recently, people tended to marry younger 92 means that "the aver-
91. It has been argued that increased longevity is not in itself a significant factor
in the escalating divorce rate:
Fifty years ago a man of twenty could expect to live to be sixty-six; a
woman of twenty could expect to live a bit longer, to age sixty-seven
or sixty-eight. Thirty years later, in 1956, a man of twenty could ex-
pect to live to be seventy and a woman of twenty could expect to live
to be seventy-six. Men had gained about 6 percent, women about 14
percent, in the length of their adult lives. These are not insubstantial
gains. In that same period, however, the divorce rate increased by
about 40 percent, or almost seven times as much as the increase in
adult life for men, three times as much as the increase in adult life
for women. Furthermore, from 1960 to 1971, a period when life expec-
tancy hardly changed at all, the divorce rate increased by more than
70 percent.
R WEISS, MARITAL SEPARATION 5 (1975) (footnotes omitted).
92. The median age at first marriage declined steadily until the late 1950's when it
slowly began to rise, as shown in Table VII.
TABLE VII
Median Age at First Marriage, by Sex:
1890 to 1977
Year Male Female Year Male Female
1977 24.0 21.6 1960 22.8 20.3
1976 23.8 21.3 1959 22.5 20.2
1975 23.5 21.1 1950 22.8 20.3
1974 23.1 21.1 1930 24.3 21.5
1973 23.2 21.0 1920 24.6 21.2
1972 23.3 20.9 1910 25.1 21.6
1971 23.1 20.9 1900 25.9 21.9
1970 23.2 20.8 1890 26.1 22.0
U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURR ENT POPULATION REPORTS,
SER. P-20, No. 323, Marital Status and Living Arrangements: March 1977,
April, 1978, at 2 [hereinafter cited as Marital Status: 1977].
The tendency to marry younger, by itself, helps to account for the increase
in divorce. Teenage marriages, for instance, are twice as likely to end in di-
vorce as marriages which occur in the twenties. Glick & Norton, supra note
18, at 15.
Table VII, supra, demonstrates that there has been a recent trend toward
postponing marriage. Additional indicators of this can be seen in the fact
that the proportion of all women 20 to 24 years old who had never married
increased by more than one half between 1960 and 1977, from 28% to 45%, and
that since 1970 the proportion of men and women 25 to 29 years old who had
never married has increased after showing no significant change between
1960 and 1970. Marital Status: 1977, supra, at 2. This trend, particularly
strong since 1974, has been cited by population specialists as a major reason
the divorce rate now appears to be leveling off. Wall St. J., supra note 25.
It also should be noted, however, that late marriages, i.e., those after age
30, while not as vulnerable statistically as teenage marriages, are less stable
than those entered into by couples in their twenties. Becker, Landes &
Michael, supra note 48, at 1159-60; Glick & Norton, supra note 18, at 16. Those
who marry later may have developed independent living habits that could
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age duration of marriage has doubled since the 19th Century and
marriages are at risk for twice as long as they were. '93 One conse-
quence of this is that many more marriages are being called upon
to meet the needs of the parties over a wide array of life exper-
iences. A spouse suitable to an identity-seeking twenty year old
may seem burdensome to the career-minded thirty year old and
incompatible to the forty year old facing mid-life transition.94
Sociologists and historians report that it is the centrifugal
forces of urbanization, industrialization, and modernization that
have fashioned the modern family.95 Pre-industrial society was
agrarian and patriarchal. Work took place in and life revolved
around the family.96 With the industrial revolution the factory or
office replaced the home as the primary unit of production, the job
replaced the family as the chief determinant of rank and status,
and salaries and pensions replaced inheritance as the main source
of wealth.97 Since kinship was no longer the major unit of social
organization and the intact family no longer an economic neces-
sity, the consequences of severing the connection with one's fam-
ily were less drastic. This uprooting has resulted in a highly
individualistic and mobile society, one in which a married couple
is isolated as never before. Lacking the support of the extended
family and traditional community-centered mores and social con-
create special tensions in marriage. The additional years of education or
work experience that the extra years provide give women, especially, more
options for career development and a greater taste of independence, which
make divorce a more viable alternative should the marriage turn sour. It also
is possible that those who marry later possess personality habits which make
them less promising prospects for both entering into and remaining married.
Id. at 5, 6, 9, 16.
93. LAw COMMISSION, REFORM OF THE GROUNDS OF DIVORCE: THE FIELD OF CHOICE
7 (1966) [hereinafter cited as LAw COMMISSION]. The Law Commission is an
official agency created to study and promote law reform in England.
94. See generally D. LEVINSON, THE SEASONS OF A MAN'S LIFE (1978). Levinson is
an exponent of a new psychological theory which argues that adulthood-like
childhood and adolescence-is a series of predictable developmental stages,
each of which is punctuated by a crisis. Levinson points out that there has
probably never been a society, except perhaps Communist China, in which
the average age of marriage was greater than 25. Those who marry early have
had little experience in forming peer relationships with adults of the opposite
sex and a lasting relationship will result only where it furthers the develop-
ment of both of the partners. At "Age-30 Transition," when they examine
their provisional life-structures, one or both may find their original choices
unacceptable. Thus, the "seven-year itch." Id. at 49-63.
95. Lasch, The Family and History, NEW YoRK REVIEw OF BOOKS, Nov. 13,1975, at
33. See also Lasch, The Emotions of Family Life, NEW YORK REvIEw OF
Booxs, Nov. 27, 1975, at 37; Lasch, What the Doctor Ordered, NEW YoRx RE-
ViEW OF BOOKs, Dec. 11, 1975, at 50.
96. Lasch, The Family and History, supra note 95, at 38.
97. See Glendon, The American Family in the 200th Year of the Republic, 10 FAm.
L.Q. 335, 351-52 (1977).
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trols, the couple must cope with an increasingly impersonal and
complex world on its own.98
These forces of change have had their most profound effect on
women. As the household lost its income-producing role, that
function devolved primarily to the husband. Where one wage
earner could support the family, woman's exclusive role was that
of homemaker and child-rearer.99 However, these forces have also
emancipated her from her former legal, social, and political disabil-
ities. Educated better than ever before and given the promise of
equality, many modern housewives feel frustrated and dissatisfied
with the drudgery and isolation of their assigned role. Sociologist
Jessie Bernard has concluded that a woman's marriage is greatly
different from a man's: his marriage brings him better mental and
physical health and a higher income than single men enjoy while
her marriage inflicts more mental and emotional stress than single
women suffer. °0 0 Being a housewife, Bernard reports, literally
makes women sick.' 0 '
Although still hampered by tradition and discrimination, wo-
men need not be economically dependent on men. As an in-
dependent and educated being, a woman can pursue her own life's
work.102 While this may make married life more tolerable, it also
makes unmarried life more feasible. A wife who is not economi-
cally dependent upon her husband is less likely to endure an un-
happy marriage than is a woman who cannot support herself
outside of marriage.10 3 At the same time society is much less
likely to stigmatize a woman who makes the choice to go it alone.
If the role of the family as an economic and social unit of society
has diminished, the expectation that it will fulfill psychological,
emotional, and interpersonal needs has grown. Marriage is seen as
a haven from the cold and impersonal outside world. In the words
of psychologist Richard E. Farson, "[m]arriage is now burdened
98. See V. PACKARD, A NATION OF STRANGERS (1972). The decline in the stabiliz-
ing influence of even the more conservative religions can be seen by the fact
that the divorce rate for Catholics just about parallels the national rate, 3
FA. L. REP. (BNA) 2032 (1976), and by the recent explosion in divorces
among the clergy. See, Divorce Among Clergy Is a Worrisome Phenomenon,
Milwaukee J., Jan. 7, 1978, at 4, col. 1.
99. F. WEINSTEiN & G. PLATr, THE WISH To BE FREE 145-47 (1969).
100. J. BERNARD, THE FUTURE OF MARR AGE 3-53 (1972).
101. Id. at 48.
102. In 1977,48.4% of the American female population 16 years old and over was in
the labor force. In 1960 the figure was only 37.7%. Population Profile: 1977,
supra note 51, tbL 22, at 40.
103. EUiott, supra note 60, at 146. In addition, the declining birth rate assures that
many young married women have few, if any, children to complicate their
return to unmarried status, should they decide to do so. Becker, Landes &
Michael, supra note 48, at 1181; Glick & Norton, supra note 18, at 5. For the
effect of children on divorce, see note 48 supra.
[VOL. 58:1
NO FAULT DIVORCE
with the expectation that husbands and wives should enjoy intel-
lectual companionship, warm intimate moments, shared values,
deep romantic love, [and] great sexual pleasures."'0 Above all,
despite the fact that it is an institution demanding community and
cooperation, marriage has become a vehicle for the maximizing of
individual self-fufillment and personal happiness. 05 In an era in
which the mass media perpetuates an over-romanticized view of
family life and popular psychologists advise that we should look
out for "number one,"10 6 it is not surprising that many marriages
are not strong enough to bear the weight of excessive expecta-
tions.107
The recent sharp upturn in the divorce rate began in the late
1960's, a period of profound social unrest in which contemporary
values were called into question, women's rights to equality and
independence were vigorously asserted, and new forms of inter-
personal relationships were developed.108 This period also marked
the beginning of the current ferment in divorce reform legislation.
The Nebraska interrupted time series analysis, as well as much of
the other empirical and historical research, indicates that the wide
acceptance of no fault divorce is much more the product of the
same forces that have produced high divorce rates than the cause
of those high rates.
Yet, the effect of the liberalization of divorce laws on the rate of
divorce and marital breakdown cannot be dismissed altogether.
The law itself is part of the cultural climate under which divorce
has flourished. While the direct, measurable influence of legisla-
tion on marital breakdown indeed may be negligible, especially
when the thrust of the legislation runs counter to societal values,
the law's impact may be greater when it is in tune with other social
104. But Why the Epidemic? It Could Be As Simple As Making Do Won't Do, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 5, 1974, at 16, col 1 (quoting psychologist Richard E. Farson).
105. There are no people in the world who make greater demands upon
marriage than Americans do, since they lay greater exactions upon it
and also expect greater psychic satisfaction from it. They do not
make the necessarily right demands, but whether right or wrong,
they don't settle easily for a small fraction.
M. LERNER, AMERICA AS A CIVIIZIATION 595 (1957).
106. R. RINGER, LOOING OUT FOR NUMBER ONE (1977). See also W. DYER, PULLING
YOUR OWN STRINGS (1978); W. DYER, YOUR ERRONEOUS ZONES (1976); M.
KORDA, POWER! (1975); M. KORDA, SUCCESS! (1977); R. RINGER, WINNING
THROUGH INTnIDATION (2d ed. 1974).
107. There is "hardly any activity, any enterprise which is started with such tre-
mendous hopes and expectations, and yet, which fails so regularly, as love."
E. FRoMM, THE ART OF LOVING 4 (1956,.
108. See generally J. BERNARD, supra note 100; S. FIRESTONE, THE DIALECTIC OF
SEX (1971); Ramey, Emerging Patterns of Innovative Behavior in Marriage,
21 FAM. COORDINATOR 435 (1972).
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forces.109 The law is a symbol," 0 and some see the new divorce
laws as symbolizing to "young people particularly to look on mar-
riage as a sociological experiment.""'
The Broel-Plateris study" 2 lends support to the notion that
there is a synergistic relationship between divorce law and the
other cultural elements that have contributed to greater family in-
stability. The fact that Broel-Plateris tried to measure the effects
of the law as it was actually administered, rather than of the law on
the books, gives insight into why the Nebraska study detailed in
this article shows the Nebraska divorce reform legislation to have
had so little impact on the divorce rate-the practice under the
new law does not differ markedly from that under the old.
VI. THE LAW OF DIVORCE-THEN AND NOW
A. "What therefore God has put together, let not man put asunder." 113
Since the Middle Ages 114 the domestic relations laws of the
Western world have been dominated by the Christian belief in the
permanency of the marriage union. Marriage was a religious insti-
tution-a God-given, indissoluble sacrament." 5 Thus, from the
turn of the twelfth century until 1857 absolute divorce was virtually
unknown in English law. While those wealthy enough could ob-
109. Glendon, supra note 97, at 353. See also F. DAvis, H. FOSTER, C. JEFFERY & E.
DAVIS, SocIETY AND THE LAw 55 (1962).
110. Karl LIewellyn has remarked that while direct and indirect legal sanctions
are often ineffective in regulating social mores it is
[n]ot so, we must suspect, with regard to the direct effects of another
aspect of law, which we may term law-in-ideology, measured not by
its sanctions but by itself. For, once law has intervened in marriage
... once it has intervened also as the exclusive authorization of di-
vorce, the law gathers to itself much of the ideological power which
builds around any distinctive symbolization. It is then Law which
makes marriage-as-permanent easy to see, to inculcate, to think
about. It is Law which sets a goal, contains a threat, and urges to a
process--all in terms any youth can understand. To deny power to it
in producing some of what it symbolizes would be to deny power to
the flag or the Constitution in producing national feeling and unity.
Llewellyn, Behind the Law of Divorce: I, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 1281, 1302 (1932)
(emphasis in original).
111. Comment of judge in Judges' Questionnaire, supra note 15.
112. See text accompanying notes 86-87 supra.
113. Matthew 9:6.
114. Prior to the Middle Ages marriage was viewed as an essentially private insti-
tution insulated from the regulatory powers of the state. Under Roman law,
for instance, marriages were internal matters to be handled by the head of
the household. Except for questions of property rights the state exercised no
control over marital dissolution. W. JoHNsoN, supra note 25, at 5; Walker,
supra note 49, at 271.
115. W. FRIEDMANN, LAw IN A CHANGING SocIETY 238-39 (2d ed. 1972).
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tain a legislative termination of their marriages-termed a Parlia-
mentary divorce-those of lesser means had to settle for a divorce
from bed and board granted by the ecclesiastical courts. 116 This
released an innocent spouse from the duty of cohabiting with the
other spouse upon proof of the latter's adultery, cruelty, or unnatu-
ral practices, but did not permit the innocent spouse to remarry." 7
By 1857, when the Matrimonial Causes Act removed jurisdiction
over questions of marriage from the ecclesiastical courts and au-
thorized the civil court to decree absolute divorces, the concept of
llowing divorce only upon the showing of wrongdoing by the de-
fendant spouse had become firmly engrained. The old grounds for
divorce from bed and board were carried over not only into the
English civil law regarding absolute divorce, but into American di-
vorce legislation as well." 8
That divorce was allowed at al was a retreat from the concept
of indissolubility. Besides offending the religious sensibilities of
those who believed that the purpose of marriage was not the pur-
suit of sexual pleasure nor human love and companionship, but
116. Most could afford neither alternative. In the prologue to their casebook
Foote, Levy, and Sander relate the story, first reported by Dean Pound, of the
workingman being sentenced after a conviction for bigamy:
On being asked what he had to say why sentence should not be pro-
nounced, the accused told a moving story of how his wife had run
away with another man and left him with a number of small children
to look after while barely earning a living by hard labor. After wait-
ing several years he remarried in order to provide a proper home for
the children. Mr. Justice Maule shook his head. "My good man,"
said he, "the law did not in any wise leave you without a sufficient
remedy. You should first have brought an action in Her Majesty's
Court of Common Pleas against this man with whom, as you say,
your wife went away. In that action, after two or three years and the
expenditure of two or three hundred pounds you would have ob-
tained a judgment against him which very likely would have been
uncollectible. You should then have brought a suit against your wife
in the ecclesiastical court for a divorce from bed and board, which
you might have obtained in two or three years after expenditure of
two or three hundred pounds. You would then have been able to ap-
ply to Parliament for an absolute divorce, which you might have ob-
tained in four or five years more after spending four or five hundred
pounds. And," he continued, for he saw the accused impatiently
seeking to interpose and to say something, "if you tell me that you
never had and never in your life expect to have so many pennies at
one time, my answer must be that it hath ever been the glory of Eng-
land not to have one law for the rich and another for the poor."
C. FOOTE, IL LEvy & F. SANDER, supra note 26, at x (quoting I. POUND, THE
SPIRrT OF THE COMMON LAw 211-12 (1921)).
117. Walker, supra note .49, at 273.
118. Id. at 273-74. Until 1937 the only ground for divorce in England was adultery.
A wife's adultery was reason enough for her husband to divorce her, but a
wife could obtain a divorce only if her husband's adultery was aggravated by
bigamy, cruelty, or incest. H. CLARKc, THE LAw OF DoMESTic RELATIONs iN THE
UNITED STATES 282 (1968).
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the perpetuation of the race for the glorification of God, n 9 divorce
also was an anathema to those who saw it as eroding "the very
heart and essence of marriage-its permanence for life.' 20 Never
mind that a marriage promised only lifelong unhappiness-"it is
incomparably better that individuals should suffer than that an In-
stitution, which is the basis of all human good, should be shaken,
or endangered.' 2 1 If, despite such heartfelt objections, marriages
were to be dissolved, legislatures were determined to make sure
that they would be terminated only for matrimonial offenses so se-
vere and irreparable as to be considered a breach of the marriage
contract.' 2 2 The divorce would be a repudiation of the offender and
his or her punishment would deter others from committing similar
indiscretions.
B. "A divorce ... must be grounded on a legal fault within the grounds
enumerated in the statutes .... It is not for this court to do what
it deems best for the parties.' 2 3
This philosophy of divorce as a punishment of the party guilty
of grave marital misconduct and as a privilege for the innocent had
been embodied in Nebraska's divorce laws from the time the first
statute on the subject was enacted in January, 1856.124 A divorce
could be obtained for abandonment, adultery, cruelty, desertion,
drunkenness, insanity, three or more years' imprisonment, a sen-
tence of life imprisonment, and physical incompetence at the time
of the marriage.' 25 These were similar to the statutory grounds of
other states. 26 Yet, even the perpetration of one or more of the
enumerated offenses by one of the spouses would not guarantee to
the other the right of divorce. Divorce was a privilege to be en-
joyed only by one who had not committed marital offenses himself
or herself, and only by one who was so gravely injured by the of-
fense of the other that forgiveness was unthinkable. Thus the law
made recrimination and condonation defenses to divorce.
Recrimination would bar a petitioning spouse from obtaining a
119. M. RHEINSTEIN, supra note 35, at 286.
120. Drinan, Reflections on Contemporary Dilemmas in American Family Law, 2
FAm. L.Q. 63, 66 (1968).
121. N. BLAKE, supra note 37, at 58 (quoting T. DwiGHT, THEOLOGY, EXPLAINED AND
DEFINED IN A SERIES OF SERMONS 427 (5th ed. 1828) (Dwight was President of
Yale College).
122. Finlay, Divorce Law Reform: The Australian Approach, 10 J. FAm. 1- 1, 1
(1970).
123. Robinson v. Robinson, 164 Neb. 413, 417, 82 N.W.2d 550, 553 (1957).
124. Act of Jan. 26, 1856, ch. 52, 1856 Neb. Laws 277 (repealed 1972).
125. Act of April 12, 1945, ch. 101, § 1, 1945 Neb. Laws 329 (repealed 1972); Act of
Jan. 26, 1856, ch. 52, § 7, 1856 Neb. Laws 277 (repealed 1972). The statutes are
set out at note 9 supra.
126. ML RHEINSTEIN, supra note 35, at 50-52 (citing 2 C. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY
LAws 34, 70-71 (1932)).
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divorce where the petitioner himself or herself had been guilty of
an offense constituting grounds for a divorce; 2 7 divorce was a rem-
edy available only to the truly "innocent" spouse. Condonation
was the forgiving by one spouse of the marital offenses committed
by the other. Having been forgiven, the offenses no longer consti-
tuted grounds for divorce. This enabled the parties to start anew,
without the previous misconduct hanging over the head of the
guilty spouse. 28
Even if this mechanism were appropriate for the era of its crea-
tion, there was widespread agreement that it was ill adapted to
more modern needs and mores. An English study of the problem
reported "[t] hat the law as it stands is unsatisfactory all the
judges and lawyers who gave us evidence agreed... .As a piece of
social mechanism the present system has not only cut loose from
its moral and traditional foundations; it is, quite simply, inept.' 29
The primary defect in the fault system was that it had more to
do with religious and political philosophy than with the realities of
marriage and divorce. It allowed failed marriages to be officially
dissolved only where the blame for the failure could be placed
squarely on one of the parties. However, while some marital
breakdowns may be due solely to the culpable acts perpetrated by
an unprovoked wrongdoer against a wholly innocent spouse, such
cases are rare.13° Even where there appears to be one clearly
127. See Act of Jan. 26, 1856, ch. 52, § 9, 1856 Neb. Laws 277 (repealed 1972) (set out
at note 10 supra). Although the statute stated that the defense applied where
the complaining party was guilty of the same offense as the respondent, the
Nebraska Supreme Court interpreted it to preclude divorce whenever the
conduct of both parties furnished grounds for divorce, even where one was
grossly more culpable than the other. Studley v. Studley, 129 Neb. 784, 263
N.W. 139 (1935). See generally Gradwobl, The Doctrine of Recrimination in
Nebraska, 37 NEB. L. R.v. 409 (1958).
128. H. CLARK, supra note 118, at 366-67. Condonation was not a bar where subse-
quent to the act of forgiveness the wrongdoer engaged in the same or similar
wrongful acts. The forgiveness was conditioned upon the wrong not being
repeated. Repetition of the offense was said to revive the wrong condoned.
Johnson v. Johnson, 183 Neb. 670, 163 N.W.2d 596 (1968); Wade v. Wade, 183
Neb. 268, 159 N.W.2d 570 (1968); Rickus v. Rickus, 183 Neb. 140, 158 N.W.2d 540
(1968); Fletcher v. Fletcher, 182 Neb. 549, 156 N.W.2d 1 (1968); Gartside v.
Gartside, 181 Neb. 46, 146 N.W.2d 777 (1966); Beck v. Beck, 175 Neb. 108, 120
N.W.2d 585 (1963); Waldbaum v. Waldbaum, 171 Neb. 625, 107 N.W.2d 407
(1961); Workman v. Workman, 164 Neb. 642, 83 N.W.2d 368 (1957); Cowan v.
Cowan, 160 Neb. 74,69 N.W.2d 300 (1955); Wakefield v. Wakefield, 157 Neb. 611,
61 N.W.2d 208 (1953); Hodges v. Hodges, 154 Neb. 178, 47 N.W.2d 361 (1951);
Wright v. Wright, 153 Neb. 18,43 N.W.2d 424 (1950); Eicher v. Eicher, 148 Neb.
173, 26 N.W.2d 808 (1947); Watenkamp v. Watenkamp, 140 Neb. 392, 299 N.W.
491 (1941); Anderson v. Anderson, 89 Neb. 570, 131 N.W. 907 (1911), Heist v.
Heist, 48 Neb. 794, 67 N.W. 790 (1896).
129. PuTrmG ASUNDER, supra note 90, at 32 (emphasis in original).
130. See Bradway, The Myth of the Innocent Spouse, 11 Tur. L. REv. 377 (1937).
Judge Lawrence C. Krell of the District Court in Douglas County, Fourth Ju-
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blameworthy party, it is impossible to know whether the "inno-
cent" spouse's conduct, perhaps intangible or even unintended,
may not have driven the "guilty" spouse to his or her culpable
act.13 1 Furthermore, rarely can the roots of marital breakdown be
found in the statutory lists of acts or omissions which are grounds
for divorce. The alleged grounds are at most only symptoms of a
breakdown which occurred for far more complex reasons, and may
be nothing more than pretexts for escaping from the problems of a
bad marriage.132 Simply, the traditional law of divorce did not rec-
ognize the social and psychological reality that divorce was
not a reward for marital virtue on one side and a penalty for marital delin-
quency on the other; not a victory for one spouse and a reverse for the
other; but a defeat for both, a failure of the marital "two-in-oneship" in
which both its members, however unequal their responsibility, are inevi-
tably involved together.133
dicial District of Nebraska, while testifying on L.B. 820 in front of the Commit-
tee on the Judiciary stated:
[11n the twelve years that I've been on the bench, I believe that I'm
safe in saying that I probably don't remember two divorces in which
there was only fault on one side, if you want to call it fault. I think if
we knew all the facts in every divorce action that there are probably
grounds for almost every marriage to be dissolved or a divorce to be
granted because of grounds for divorce as outlined in our statutes.
Hearings on L.B. 820 Before the Judiciary Comm., 82d Neb. Leg. Sess. 15-18
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
131. Goldstein & Gitter, On Abolition of Grounds for Divorce: A Model Statute &
Commentary, 3 F m. L.Q. 75, 79 (1969).
132. Clark, supra note 17, at 405. 'The grounds for divorce... may be symptoms
rather than really the cause. Extreme cruelty and [other grounds] may ar-
rive really after the marriage has broken down." Hearings, supra note 130, at
27 (testimony of attorney, now judge, Ronald E. Reagan).
As each marriage is unique, each breakdown is caused by reasons
uniquely its own. However, the various studies that have investigated the
real reasons for marital breakdown have been able to draw some general con-
clusions. The description the parties most likely will apply to their troubles
is incompatibility. Maddi, The Effects of Conciliation Court Proceedings on
Petitions for Dissolution of Marriage, 13 J. FAi,. L. 495, 511 (1974).
More particularly the problems often revolve around finances, drinking,
communication difficulties, personality differences, and authority clashes.
See generally W. GOODE, AFrER DIVORCE 123 (1956) (later edition published
under title WOMEN IN DIVORCE); Harnsworth & Minnis, Non-Statutory Causes
of Divorce: The Lawyer's Point of View, 17 MARR. & FA.. LrvmG 316, 320
(1955); Maddi, supra, at 511; Walker, Disarming the Litigious Man: A Glance
at Fault and California's New Divorce Legislation, 1 PAC. L.J. 182, 213-18
(1970); Zuckman & Fox, The Ferment in Divorce Legislation, 12 J. FAM. L. 515,
536-38 (1973). See also the compilation of major complaints in the annual
reports of the Lancaster County Conciliation Court.
Sexual problems are often the result of other marital difficulties but, if
long-standing, sexual dysfunction can be the cause of interpersonal discords.
Masters & Johnson, Sexual Factors in Marital Discord, 8 FAm. L.Q. 225, 230
(1974). But see Gaylord, Something Is Loose in the Marital Woods, 29 A.B.A.J.
1306 (1973).
133. PUtrrmG ASUNDER, supra note 90, at 18.
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The inability of the law to deal with the realities of married life
and marital failure produced paradoxical consequences. While the
law was intended to ensure that divorce would be sanctioned only
when the marital relationship was severely ruptured, the actual re-
sult was that if the technical grounds could be shown, even a viable
marriage would be dissolved. The fact one of the parties had com-
mitted adultery, for example, did not assure that the marriage had
irreparably broken down; 34 yet it was dissolvable without ques-
tion. 35 On the other hand, a marriage that was irrevocably at an
end could not be officially terminated where the requisite fault
could not be shown or where a valid defense, such as recrimina-
tion, existed. In such situations the Nebraska Supreme Court had
no difficulty recognizing its duty as mandated by the legislature; 3 6
it had to deny the dissolution because "[a] divorce.., must be
grounded on legal fault within the grounds enumerated in the stat-
utes .... It is not the province of the courts to grant such decrees
for sociological reasons .... It is not for this court to do what it
deems best for the parties.' 13 7 Where both parties were at fault
"the remedy must be sought by them, not in the courts, but in the
reformation of their conduct.'' 38 While the law would not sanction
a dissolution in these cases, neither could it force the couple to
remain together and re-establish a meaningful relationship. Ap-
parently, if they would not "reform," they were to endure their mu-
tual unhappiness as a punishment for their marital sins.
134. As with most other problems, Americans tend to view infidelity as a
question of mental health, usually as part of the crisis of the middle-
aged male in search for sexual reassurance. A psychiatrist is likely
to say that it is only the compulsive types of infidelity that present a
serious problem, since their compulsiveness makes them self-de-
structive-and therefore destructive of others as well, and of the
whole family pattern. In other words, instead of thinking of infidelity
as a rigid moral category Americans tend to think of it in terms of
what it does to the personality and to the web of relationships. Yet,
this does not mean ... that Americans take it lightly.
M. LEim, supra note 105, at 595-96.
135. "[I]t is personally tragic and socially destructive that the court should be ab-
solutely required, upon proof of a single act of adultery or extreme cru-
elty-perhaps regretted as soon as committed-to end a marriage which may
yet contain a spark of life." REPORT OF THE GoVERNOR's COMmussIoN ON THE
FAMILY 27 (Cal. 1966) [hereinafter cited as CAl REPORT].
136. "Divorce and its incidents are a matter of public concern over which the Leg-
islature has authority. What policies to adopt concerning its regulation are
for it to decide and are not for the courts." Harrington v. Grieser, 154 Neb.
685, 688, 48 N.W.2d 753, 755 (1951), quoted in Detter v. Erpelding, 176 Neb. 600,
614, 126 N.W.2d 827, 834 (1964); Ruehle v. Ruehle, 161 Neb. 691, 698, 74 N.W.2d
689, 693 (1956).
137. Robinson v. Robinson, 164 Neb. 413, 417, 82 N.W.2d 550, 553 (1957), quoted in
Shoemaker v. Shoemaker, 166 Neb. 164, 168, 88 N.W.2d 221,226 (1958); Birth v.
Birth, 165 Neb. 11, 14, 84 N.W.2d 204, 205 (1957).
138. Meffert v. Meffert, 118 Ark. 582, 588, 177 S.W. 1, 3 (1915).
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Even those who were permitted by the divorce laws to end their
marriage did not emerge from the process unscathed. In order to
prove the grounds necessary to procure a divorce the "innocent"
party had to disclose to his or her lawyer and expose in a public
trial some of the most intimate and embarrassing details of mar-
ried life. 13 9 The "guilty" defendant was in the even worse position
of being publicly branded an adulterer, deserter, or maliciously
cruel home-wrecker. Not only did he or she stand guilty of a trans-
gression against his or her spouse, but also of an act against soci-
ety itself, and against one of its principal institutions, marriage.140
As few were anxious to have the blame for the failure of their mar-
riage placed exclusively on their shoulders, or to accept the loss of
property or child custodial rights which often accompanied such
blame, their natural instinct was to contest the issue.14 1 If they did
contest they would become immersed in the accusatorial adver-
sary process' 42 which "exacerbate[d] the aggressive forces... al-
ready undermining the family;"143 induced feelings of bitterness,
acrimony, and resentment; and destroyed the possibility of recon-
ciliation or of having the kind of amiable post-divorce relationship
which can be assuasive to the children.144 This adversary, non-
therapeutic approach to divorce was compounded by the doctrine
of condonation which made the price of an attempted reconcilia-
139. Evidently those sensitive people who were reluctant to air their dirty linen in
public were to resign themselves patiently to continuing an unhappy rela-
tionship. Elliott, supra note 60, at 146.
140. W. JOHNSON, supra note 25, at 103.
141. For many the need for vindication is strong. They will try to manipulate the
marriage counselor, the lawyer, and anyone else who will listen into believing
that the break-up of the marriage was the fault of their spouse. Hearings,
supra note 130, at 35-36 (testimony of Charles Scutter, Dir. of Law Reform &
Litigation, Omaha Legal Services).
142. The accusations and fault-finding began early in the legal process with the
pleadings:
I think from the standpoint of the practicing attorney, what this bill
will do more for reconciliation than anything else is it simply will not
develop an instant acrimony or animosity between the parties. The
present law now requires a practicing attorney who wants to file a
petition.., to go in and say the other party has been guilty of con-
duct which amounts to extreme cruelty or has been guilty of adul-
tery, and it places the defendant in a divorce action under the
present system, as an accused, an immediate accused. He's been ac-
cused of wrongdoing. And the human reaction is to lash out in de-
fense.
Id. at 26 (testimony of Bellevue attorney, now judge, Ronald E. Reagan).
143. Goldstein & Gitter, supra note 131, at 81.
144. "Litigations between husbands and wives exceed in bitterness and hatred
those of any other relationships." L. NIZER, My Lrx iN COURT 153 (1961). To
the extent that an acrimonious divorce proceeding acts as a catharsis for the
allegedly wronged spouse, it serves some useful purpose. On balance, how-
ever, the negative aspects far outweigh the positive. See M. WHNELA, supra
note 50, at 180-81; Zuckman & Fox, supra note 132, at 585.
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tion inordinately high. If marital relations were resumed in the at-
tempt to effectuate a reconciliation and the attempted
reconciliation were to fail, the grounds for the divorce would be
considered condoned and the condonation would constitute a bar
to the divorce action.145
C. "Legislative divorce policy of an era before Nebraska became a state
... may not reflect her modem mood.' 1 46
As the moral climate turned more liberal and individualistic,
many people felt disserved by "a temporal law which followed the
dictates of clerical authority."' 47 Instead of viewing matrimony as
an indissoluble sacrament, they saw it as a human institution, a
bond created through an exercise of free will by a man and a wo-
man who are responsible, but fallible, individuals. Where serious
mistakes are made the parties should be able to rectify them and
live out their lives as joyfully as possible with a minimum of gov-
ernmental intrusion.148
Moreover, while aware that divorce can be harmful to the par-
ties, to their children, and to society,149 many refused to accept the
145. Allgood v. Allgood, 189 Neb. 429,203 N.W.2d 102 (1972); Schwarck v. Schwarck,
175 Neb. 560, 122 N.W.2d 489 (1963); Mislivek v. Mislivek, 172 Neb. 290, 109
N.W.2d 393 (1961); Wetenkamp v. Wetenkamp, 140 Neb. 392, 299 N.W. 491
(1941); Griffith v. Griffith, 77 Neb. 180, 108 N.W. 981 (1906).
In divorce law the quality of mercy is verboten. At no stage of the
proceedings does the law authorize anything akin to it, and if the
plaintiff extends mercy to the defendant, the law punishes him for it.
By the doctrine of condonation, the law presumes to subvert the di-
vine attribute of forgiveness. And thereby the law opens the door to
trickery, perjury, duress; closes the door upon honest attempts at
reconciliation!
Alexander, The Follies of Divorce: A Therapeutic Approach to the Problem, 36
A.BA.J. 105, 168 (1950).
146. Goree v. Goree, 187 Neb. 774, 778, 194 N.W.2d 212, 214 (1972).
147. 1971 Midyear Report and Recommendations of the Family Law Section to the
ABA House of Delegates on the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 5 FAm.
LQ. 133, 139 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 1971 Midyear Report].
148. W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 115, at 239. "[Tlhe general understanding of indi-
vidual liberty today is revolted by the idea that a person can be maintained in
ties as intimate as those of marriage, especially when he no longer accepts
them and they seem intolerable to him." Glendon, Is There a Future for Sepa-
rate Property?, 8 FAM. L.Q. 315,327 n.44 (1974) (quoting BCnabout, La Liberte
Individuelle et le Marriage, 1973 REvuE TMESTRELLE DE DRorr 440, 498).
149. It is asserted by many that divorces are far too numerous in our soci-
ety, that they undermine the foundations of family life, that they gen-
erate instability throughout society and that they leave an ever-
increasing portion of American children without the society and af-
fection of a united family, thereby producing juvenile delinquency,
truancy, and a variety of psychological ills.
Clark, supra note 17, at 403. Psychologist William Glasser has commented
that "[b]ecause divorce is common, many children in our society have no
intact family to help them toward a successful role. These children, with less
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notion that it is an unmitigated evil. Even though studies indicate
that the initial effects of divorce are often traumatic on members of
the family, they also demonstrate that recovery usually is swift.15 0
Furthermore, the most severe consequences come not from the act
of divorce itself, but from the conflicts that precede it. A divorce
which frees the couple and their children from a destructive envi-
ronment, possibly opening the way to new and healthier relation-
ships, 5 1 is probably far less detrimental than continuing the
family involvement, often have a difficult task gaining a successful identity.
Many fail, and hostile about their failure, place a heavy burden on society."
W. GLASSER, THE IDENTITY SocrvTY 133 (1972). One indication of this is that
children of divorced parents are thought to be more prone to divorce. Landis,
The Pattern of Divorce in Three Generations, 34 Soc. FORCES 213 (1956).
For a review of the literature on the effects of parental absence on chil-
dren, including that caused by divorce, see Marino & McCowan, The Effects of
Parent Absence on Children, 6 CmLD STUDY J. 165 (1976). For a major study
of the effects of divorce on children and adolescents, see Wallerstein & Kel-
ley, The Effect of Parental Divorce: Experiences of the Preschool Child, 14 J.
Am. AcAD. CHILD PSYCH. 600 (1975); Kelley & Wallerstein, The Effects of Paren-
tal Divorce: Experience of the Child in Early Latency, 46 Am. J. ORTHOPSYCHI-
ATRY 20 (1976); Wallerstein & Kelley, The Effects of Parental Divorce:
Experiences of the Child in Later Latency, 46 Am. J. ORTHOPSYCHATRY 256
(1976); Wallerstein & Kelley, The Effects of Parental Divorce: The Adolescent
Experience, in THE CHILD Arm His FAMmy 479 (E. Anthony & C. Koupernik
eds. 1974). For a five year longitudinal study of the effects of separation on
the parties and their children focusing on Nebraska, see Boss, Chesser,
DeFrain, Rowe & Woodward, The Family in Separation and Divorce (unpub-
lished work in progress) (joint project conducted by faculty members at Uni-
versity of Nebraska, University of Wisconsin & North Dakota State
University).
150. In 48 middle class families studied by a team of University of Virginia re-
searchers, "there was none in which at least one family member did not re-
port distress or exhibit disrupted behavior, particularly during the first year
after divorce." Heatherington, Cox & Cox, The Aftermath of Divorce, in
MOTHER/CHILD, FATHER/CHIm RELATIoNsms'S 149, 174 (J. Stevens & M. Mat-
hews eds. 1978). Parents exhibited stress in the practical problems of living,
in self-concept and emotional adjustment, and in inter-personal relations.
There also were marked disruptions in parent-child relations. Children were
more dependent, disobedient, aggressive, whining, demanding, and lacking in
affection. Id. "However, by the second year after divorce a process of
restabilization and adjustment was apparent .... Most of the members of
divorced families ultimately were able to cope with many of their problems,
but the course of adjustment was often unexpectedly painful." Id.
Wallerstein's and Kelley's study of children of divorced parents in Califor-
nia, note 149 supra, concluded that while most children, irrespective of age,
are upset at first by their parents' separation, more than half return to normal
development by the end of the first year. Reported in R. WEiss, supra note
91, at 213-17. Goode's study of 425 divorced mothers found that more than
90% thought their children were better off or as well off as a result of the
divorce. W. GOODE, supra note 132, at 307-29.
151. "[M]ost divorced persons.. pay marriage the homage of trying again ......
1M. LERNER, supra note 105, at 597. Data from 1975 indicates that four of every
five divorced persons remarry by middle age. Glick & Norton, supra note 18,
at 8. Partly, if not mostly, because divorced women usually retain custody of
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marriage.152
the children, Becker, Landes & Michael, supra note 48, the remarriage rate is
higher for men, with five out of six remarrying, than for women, with three
out of four remarrying by middle age. 3 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2032 (1976).
However, like the marriage rate, the rate of remarriage has dropped off in
recent years, id., and the divorce rate for second marriages traditionally has
been considerably higher than that for first marriages. Becker, Landes &
Michael, supra note 48, at 1177-78; Monahan, The Duration of Marriage to Di-
vorce: Second Marriages and Migratory Types, 21 MARu. & FAm. LIvING 134
(1959); Monahan, The Changing Nature and Instability of Remarriages, 5
EUGENICS Q. 73 (1958). See generally J. BERNARD, REMARRIAGE (1971).
Post-divorce relationships are not only marital ones. The number of
couples living together without being married nearly doubled from 1970 to
1977. Glick & Norton, supra note 18, at 32. In 1977, 5A% of divorced men and
8.3% of divorced men under 35 were living with an unrelated woman. Id. at
34. 1
152. [W] hat causes the major disturbance to the children is the break-up
of the home and the quarrels that preceded it, and ... once a break-
up has occurred a subsequent legal recognition that the marriage is
dead can do little more harm and may indeed do good. The final
break may lead to a lessening of the bitterness between parents and
may facilitate the establishment of a new stable environment which
is the children's greatest need.
LAw COMMISSION, supra note 93, at 24-25.
A study of 780 high school students in Washington state concluded that
"as a group, adolescents in broken homes show less psychosomatic illness,
less delinquent behavior, and better adjustment to parents than do children
in unhappy unbroken homes. They do not differ significantly with respect to
adjustment in school, church, or delinquent companions." Nye, Child Adjust-
ment in Broken and in Unhappy Unbroken Homes, 19 MARR. & FAm LIvING
356, 358 (1957) (emphasis in original). Moreover, the study found that par-
ents in broken homes adjusted much better individually and to their spouses
than did those in unhappy intact homes. Id. at 361.
Landis compared the attitudes toward marriages and the family of 3000
college students from broken, happy unbroken, and unhappy unbroken
homes. Results indicated that there were no significant differences in self-
evaluations of children from unhappy non-divorced marriages and children
from homes broken by divorce. It was the emotional climate of the home, not
the actual structure of the family, that was found to be most important. Lan-
dis, A Comparison of Children From Divorced and Nondivorced Unhappy
Marriages, 11 FAm. LIFE COORDINATOR 61 (1962).
Burchinal studied families with children in the seventh and eleventh
grades in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, to determine whether there were significant
differences among selected personality characteristics and selected meas-
ures of social relationships among children from unbroken families, one-par-
ent families, and reconstituted families where the custodial parent had
remarried: He concluded that "[i]nimical effects associated with divorce or
separation and, for some youth, with the remarriage of their parents with
whom they were living, were almost uniformly absent in the populations
studied." Burchinal, Characteristics of Adolescents from Unbroken, Broken,
and Reconstituted Families, 26 J. MARm & FAlM. 44, 50 (1964).
Similarly, a recent investigation of 289 third, sixth, and eighth grade chil-
dren found that there were no significant differences in children's self-con-
cepts whether they came from intact, single-parent, reconstituted, or other
types of families. Self-concept, which is a measure of social personal adjust-
ment, was significantly low, however, for children who reported high levels of
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Even though most people regarded fault divorce legislation as
unrealistic, hypocritical, and out-of-date, little relief was provided
by the predominantly conservative state legislatures. 15 3 Instead
the parties, their attorneys, and the courts themselves guided di-
vorce actions safely through the treacherous waters of traditional
divorce grounds and defenses in order to arrive at the desired des-
tination-a relatively quick and painless divorce. In the process
they created a divorce law vastly different from the one ensconced
in the statutes and appellate court decisions. As Justice Traynor
described the resulting situation, "[p] erhaps in no other area has
the discrepancy between law in dogmatic theory and law in action,
evading dogma by fiction and subterfuge, become so marked as in
divorce law.... Rules insensitive to reality have been cynically
circumvented by litigants and attorneys, with the tacit sanction of
the courts." 154
The primary evasionary device 5 5 was the uncontested divorce
which, according to most authorities, accounted for more than
ninety percent of the decrees granted. 5 6 In the vast majority of
family conflict. For all the children in the sample, no matter what the family
type, perceived parental happiness was positively correlated with the chil-
dren's self-concepts. Raschke & Raschke, Family Conflict and Children's Self-
Concepts: A Comparison of Intact and Single Parent Families, - J. MARR. &
FAm. - (1979).
153. See Elliott, supra note 60, at 134.
154. Traynor, Law and Social Change in a Democratic Society, 1956 U. ILL. LF.
230, 236.
155. Another widely used device was migratory divorce, i.e., obtaining a divorce in
another jurisdiction where the law was less strict or more easily evaded. See
note 41 supra. See also N. BLAKE, supra note 37; Freed & Foster, Divorce
American Style, 383 ANNALS 71 (1969). A cheaper way simply was to abandon
one's spouse. See note 40 supra.
156. W. JOHNSON, supra note 25, at 27; H. O'GoRMAN, LAWYERs AND MATRIMONIAL
CASEs 22 (1963); M. PLoscowE, H. FOSTER & D. FREED, FAMILY LAw 313, 344
(2d ed. 1972); M. RHEINSTEni, supra note 35, at 247; Foster, supra note 40, at 55-
56; Walker, supra note 49, at 283.
In 1971, 89.5% of the divorce petitions granted in Nebraska were uncon-
tested. Extrapolated from BUREAU OF VrrAL STATISTICS, NEB. DEP'T OF
HEALTi, STATISTICAL REPORT 1971, at 91 [hereinafter cited as NEB. STATISTI-
CAL REPORT 1971]. Commissions studying divorce laws prior to the recent
reforms reported uncontested rates of 94% in California and 93% in England.
CAL. REPORT, supra note 135, at 16-17; LAw COMMISsION, supra note 93, at 14.
Although the hearings were uncontested, the plaintiff still had to put in his
or her proof. As one judge observed.
Further to impede divorce, the law forbids a decree by default.
That would too patently be divorce by mutual consent. So although
in some 90% of the cases the defendant stays carefully away, the
plaintiff must, nevertheless, put on an exhibition of shadow-boxing
and give the shadow a knockout to the satisfaction of the law. Who-
ever originated the forms and procedures for divorce litigation little
realized that he was setting the stage for a sham battle against the
little man who isn't there.
Alexander, supra note 145, at 107-08.
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cases the decision not to contest was a deliberate one designed to
present to the court just enough corroborated 157 facts to establish
one of the statutory grounds-usually cruelty' 58-while concealing
157. In Nebraska corroboration by other evidence of the parties' testimony as to
the grounds for the divorce was required by statute: "No decree of divorce
and of nullity of a marriage shall be made solely on the declaration, confes,-
sions or admissions of the parties, but the court shall, in all cases, require
other satisfactory evidence of the facts alleged in the petition for that pur-
pose." Act of Jan. 26, 1856, ch. 52, § 38, 1856 Neb. Laws 277 (most recently
codified at NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-335 (Reissue 1968)) (repealed 1972).
While the purpose behind the corroboration requirement was to prevent
collusive or fraudulent divorces, the Nebraska Supreme Court speculated
that the requirement "has generated more collusion and fraud than it may
have prevented." Goree v. Goree, 187 Neb. 774, 777,194 N.W.2d 212,214 (1972).
In the absence of a statute the common law and majority rule is that corrobo-
ration is not generally required, although in certain circumstances it may be
called for. Annot., 15 A.L.R2d 170 (1951).
158. In 1971, 69% of the divorces granted in Nebraska were for cruelty. Extrapo-
lated from NEB. STATISTICAL REPORT 1971, supra note 156, at 90. Nationally,
58.7% of all divorces in 1950 were granted on the ground of cruelty. P. JACOB-
SON, supra note 37, tbL 58, at 121. The figure today in those states still sub-
scribing to the fault theory is thought to be much higher. See M. WHEELER,
supra note 50, at 4 (at least 75%). Before California adopted its irreconcila-
ble differences ground, about 95% of all complaints for divorce in that state
were based on extreme cruelty. Goddard, A Report on California's New Di-
vorce Law: Progress and Problems, 6 FA. L.Q. 405,406 (1972) (citing BUREAU
OF VrrAL STATISTICS, -CAL. DEP'T OF PuB. HEALTH, DIVORCE IN CALIFORNIA 175
(1967)).
The popularity of the cruelty ground stems from its lack of specificity and
from the elasticity with which courts have been willing to interpret it in order
to allow couples to free themselves of unwanted marriages. The rule in Ne-
braska was that
any unjustifiable conduct on the part of either the husband or the
wife, which so grievously wounds the mental feelings of the other, or
so utterly destroys the peace of mind of the other as to seriously im-
pair the bodily health or endanger the life of the other... or such as
utterly destroys the legitimate ends and objects of matrimony, con-
stitutes "extreme cruelty" under the statutes, although no physical
or personal violence may be inflicted, or even threatened.
Berdolt v. Berdolt, 56 Neb. 792, 801-02, 77 N.W. 399, 403 (1898). See also Ste-
vens v. Stevens, 184 Neb. 370, 371-72, 167 N.W.2d 761, 762 (1969); Waldbaum v.
Waldbaum, 171 Neb. 625, 628, 107 N.W.2d 407, 410 (1961); Smith v. Smith, 160
Neb. 120, 121, 69 N.W.2d 321, 323 (1955); Oertle v. Oertle, 146 Neb. 746, 748, 21
N.W.2d 447, 449 (1946); Brown v. Brown, 130 Neb. 487, 489, 265 N.W. 556, 557
(1936); Schmidt v. Schmidt, 120 Neb. 596, 597, 234 N.W. 402, 402 (1931);
Peckham v. Peckham, 111 Neb. 340, 341, 196 N.W. 628, 629 (1923); Ellison v.
Ellison, 65 Neb. 412, 415, 91 N.W. 403, 404 (1902).
While the court found that this test was not met in Benton v. Benton, 180
Neb. 759, 145 N.W.2d 576 (1966) (husband drank and quarreled, particularly
about finances and wife's son); Murphy v. Murphy, 175 Neb. 239, 121 N.W.2d
404 (1963) (wife nagged and argued about finances); and Smith v. Smith, 160
Neb. 120, 69 N.W.2d 321 (1955) (frequent quarreling)-it found sufficient evi-
dence of cruelty in Allgood v. Allgood, 189 Neb. 429, 203 N.W.2d 102 (1972)
(wife constantly nagged and argued with husband); Stevens v. Stevens, 184
Neb. 370,167 N.W.2d 761 (1969) (husband was self-centered and pre-occupied
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from the court any evidence of the plaintiff's recriminatory miscon-
duct which might provide a basis for the court denying the divorce.
The testimony presented was at times perjured, 5 9 but more often
was merely a highly circumscribed version of the truth, expressly
or implicitly agreed to by the parties, 160 which enabled them to get
a divorce while exposing only the smallest possible portion of their
private lives to public scrutiny. The result was a ten minute cha-
rade,' 6 ' stage-managed by the plaintiff's attorney, which beguiled
with satisfying his own desires and exhibited a lack of concern for his child);
and Beals v. Beals, 152 Neb. 364, 41 N.W.2d 152 (1950) (wife kept herself and
the home offensively untidy and accused husband of consorting with other
women). For a good discussion of the cruelty ground replete with cases in
which cruelty was found, sometimes under questionable circumstances, see
M. PLoscowE, H. FOSTER & D. FREED, supra note 156, at 393-433.
The fact that an appellate court occasionally would deny a cruelty divorce
in a contested case is not necessarily indicative of the practice of trial courts
in uncontested cases. As a rule the plaintiff simply testified that the defend-
ant's "cold and indifferent" behavior had caused the plaintiff to become "seri-
ously ill, nervous and upset." CAL. REPORT, supra note 135, at 119. The ease
by which a divorce on the grounds of cruelty could be obtained in Nebraska
was illustrated by Judge Theodore Richling of the Fourth Judicial District in
his testimony before the Legislature's Judiciary Committee: "I have heard it
frequently said and I do not disagree with it, 'What do you need to get a di-
vorce in Nebraska?' 'hree hundred dollars, that's all you need.' And under
our present divorce law, under the extreme cruelty, why that's about right."
Hearings, supra note 130, at 38.
Even where the divorce could be obtained on other grounds, cruelty was
often alleged because testifying as to "mental" cruelty was seen as less in-
criminating and distasteful. Elliott, supra note 60, at 145; Zuckman & Fox,
supra note 132, at 564.
159. It is common knowledge that in a vast number of divorce cases
fabricated evidence is presented to the courts and true evidence is
withheld from them in violation of the principle that in matters of
divorce all relevant facts are to be truthfully presented. Perjured
oaths are sworn not only by witnesses testifying to fabricated acts of
adultery, cruelty or desertion, but also by plaintiffs who depose
under oath that they have always conducted themselves as good and
faithful husbands or wives, as the case may be, or that they have
come into the forum state with the intention of there establishing a
residence.
Rheinstein, supra note 41, at 634. For a description of faked adultery divorces
in New York, see Wels, New York- The Poor Man's Reno, 35 CoREmLL L.Q. 303,
315-18 (1950). One judge has estimated that in Nebraska fault divorces,
"about half the testimony, if not perjured, at least was exaggerated."
Hearings, supra note 130, at 14 (testimony of Judge Lawrence C. Krell).
160. Technically such an agreement would be considered collusion. Divorces
were to be denied if they were sought by collusive means. Act of Jan. 26, 1856,
ch. 52, § 9, 1856 Neb. Laws 277 (most recently codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-
304 (Reissue 1968)) (repealed 1972). As it was highly unlikely that the parties
would raise the defense, it rarely was utilized. See H. CLARK, supra note 118,
at 361-65.
161. According to California attorneys the average uncontested divorce under the
old law took no more than 10 minutes of the court's time. Kay, A Family
Court: The California Proposal, 56 CALim. L. REv. 1205, 1219 (1968). The same
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no one, certainly not the judge who was its principal audience. 162
Obviously, the brevity of time and information that characterized
these hearings precluded any cogent attempt to ascertain whether
a statutory ground for divorce really was present or whether a de-
fense existed, let alone whether the marriage had so broken down
that any attempt to save it would be futile. If society had an inter-
est in preserving marriages, that interest was poorly represented
by a procedure which, in actuality, permitted divorce by consent.
The fact that most divorces were uncontested did not mean that
they proceeded without disputes or difficulties. There often were
serious disagreements among the parties-especially as to prop-
erty settlements, support, and custody-but most were settled
through negotiation in the lawyers' offices rather than through liti-
gation in the courtroom. At times one of the spouses-whether
motivated by greed, spite, or a genuine desire to preserve the mar-
riage' 63-would attempt to prevent the divorce. Where the spouse
was innocent of any statutory wrongdoing or was able to present a
valid defense, the power to block the divorce existed. Yet, if the
other party was persistent enough, the consent of the reluctant
spouse usually could be purchased or coerced.164 Often the ability
was true in England. LAw COmmISSiON, supra note 93, at 31. In 1973 it was
reported that the average hearing time for uncontested divorces in King
County, Washington, was six minutes. Rails, The King County Family Court,
28 WASH. L. REV. 22, 26 (1953).
162. [H]umanity and its concept of justice is not well served by staging a
charade in which the acts [sic] are customarily stretching their con-
cepts of their honor before a judge who must be considered by them
to be either unbelievably naive or cynically cooperative.
Any judge who sits in the uncontested matrimonial term comes to
the conclusion that a great number of divorces would never be
granted if the defendants defend[ed] the actions.
Doe v. Doe, 1 F~m. L. REP. (BNA) 2064 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974).
163. "[A]s often as not, the rare spouse who does appear to contest is actuated by
greed or spite rather than any desire to save the marriage, and another kind
of sin is rewarded." Foster, Spadework for a Model Divorce Code, 13. FAM. L.
11, 17-18 (1961).
164. It is not unusual for a party who wants out of the marriage, whether for good
cause or not, deliberately to engage in behavior that will provoke his or her
spouse to sue for divorce. William Goode has reported that in many cases it
is the husband who first desires to end the marriage and who consciously or
unconsciously adopts a line of behavior which forces the wife to seek a di-
vorce. W. GOODE, supra note 132, at 133.
Recent research has indicated that where no fault divorce has been intro-
duced there is almost a complete reversal in filing patterns, with husbands
taking the initiative in a majority of cases, rather than wives as was the situa-
tion prior to no fault. Whether this represents a permanent alteration in male
and female roles due to the removal of the legal and social stigma attached to
the person being divorced or whether it merely represents a temporary back-
log which eventually will be replaced by a more random or even distribution
between the sexes has not yet been determined. Gunter & Johnson, Divorce
Filing as Role Behavior: Effect of No-Fault Law on Divorce Filing Patterns, 40
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to prevent a divorce, which the traditional grounds and defenses
provided, was utilized solely as a means of extracting financial or
custodial concessions from the other party. There was no guaran-
tee that this powerful bargaining weapon would be wielded only by
the party less at fault or more in need; in fact, there is every reason
to believe that it provided the most leverage in the hands of the
less despairing and the more calculating of the parties. 6 5
The system of divorce that evolved in this country, then, was
actually two systems. The "living law," which reflected the norms
held by a large segment of American society and which permitted
divorce by consent of the parties, was hidden behind the facade of
the official law of divorce for misconduct, which reflected the reli-
gious and moral convictions of a conservative elite.'6 6 While some
may have accepted and even admired this compromise, 167 many
decried the situation for diminishing respect for and confidence in
the legal system. 6 8
Many appellate courts, troubled by the hypocrisy which charac-
terized divorce practice in the trial courts 6 9 and by the duty, im-
J. MAR. & FAM. 571 (1978); Gunter, Notes on Divorce Filing as Role Behavior,
39 J. MARR. & FAm. 95 (1977).
165. It bears noting how frequently divorces are uncontested. In many
cases neither spouse is "innocent," and yet, by agreement, one of
them defaults to ensure a divorce. Thus a strict recrimination rule
fails in its purpose of denying relief to the guilty. Moreover, it exerts
a corrupting influence on the negotiations that precede the entry of
such a default The spouse who more desperately seeks an end to a
hopeless union is penalized by the ability of the other spouse to pre-
vent a divorce through the assertion of a recriminatory defense, and
the more unscrupulous partner may obtain substantial financial con-
cessions as the price of remaining silent.
De Burgh v. De Burgh, 39 Cal. 2d 858, 869, 250 P.2d 598, 604 (1952).
166. See W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 115, at 249; H. O'GoPMAN, supra note 156, at 20-
22; M. Rn rNsTm, supra note 35, at 254; Traynor, supra note 154, at 236.
167. See M. RHErmsTErN, supra note 35, at 254.
168. For example, Judge Henry A. Riederer of Kansas City has commented: 'This
whole area of marriage dissolution is a growing cancer in which we blandly
and blindly participate, without recognizing the obvious great harm to our
profession's real and public image." Riederer, Marriage Dissolution Trends:
An Analysis of a Missouri Bar Survey, 25 J. Mo. B. 549, 550 (1969). For per-
spectives on divorce practices under the former Nebraska law, see Tenney,
Divorce Without Fault- The Next Step-A Modelfor Change, 46 NEB. L. REV.
24 (1967); Comment, Terminating a Marriage in Nebraska, 43 NEB. L. REV. 156
(1963).
169. Judicial annoyance with the improbity of the divorce system is not only a
recent phenomenon. In 1832 the Ohio Supreme Court complained:
Perhaps there is no statute in Ohio more abused than the statute
concerning "divorce and alimony." Perhaps there is no statute under
which greater imposition is practiced upon the court, and more injus-
tice done to individuals.... The hearings are generally ex parte.
Witnesses are examined, friendly to the applicant, and it is almost, if
not utterly impossible for the court, in most instances, to arrive at the
real truths of the case. I would not be understood that there are no
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posed on them by statute, to deny a divorce even in situations in
which one clearly was warranted,170 added their voices to those
calling for reform. On the eve of the 1972 floor debate on divorce
reform in the Nebraska Unicameral, the Nebraska Supreme Court
vacated a trial court's divorce decree, even though it was "reluc-
tant to ... blot out a logical view of practical reality,' 171 because
"the statute leaves us no alternative."' 72 The -supreme court
pointed out that the corroboration statute, "word for word, has re-
mained unchanged since 1866'17 and suggested that "[t]he fact
that the present statute has been in effect for over 100 years might
well suggest a reexamination by the Legislature. Legislative di-
vorce policy of an era before Nebraska became a state may or may
not reflect her modern mood."'7 4
D. "Dissolution of marriage shall mean the termination of a marriage by
decree of a court of competent jurisdiction upon a finding that the
marriage is irretrievably broken."'175
Upon reexamining Nebraska's divorce statutes, the state legis-
lature concluded that a marriage can be dissolved when, and only
when, a court determines that it is "irretrievably broken"' 76 and
that "every reasonable effort at reconciliation has been made."'177
meritorious cases. That there are some such there can be no doubt.
But of the great multitude of cases which are before this court, I am
confident that by far the greater number are not of this class.
Harter v. Harter, 5 Ohio 318, 319 (1832).
170. Not infrequently an appellate court would be forced to overturn a decision of
a trial court judge who, in order to reach what was thought to be an equitable
result, chose to ignore the statutory restrictions and grant a divorce. In Bahr
v. Bahr, 272 Wis. 323, 75 N.W.2d 301 (1956), the Wisconsin Supreme Court
found that recrimination barred the divorce. The court explained that
[u] nder the circumstances we deduce that the [trial] court believed
the marriage was wrecked, considered that it ought to be terminated
and thought that a termination upon the wife's complaint. . . , even
though Mrs. Bahr had seriously erred in her marital obligations, was
the best way out of a bad matter. If that was the court's conclusion
we can find no philosophical fault with its disposition of the matter.
We can only say that the law in Wisconsin, as we read it, does not
permit.
Id. at 326, 75 N.W.2d at 302.
In Simkins v. Sinkins, 198 So. 2d 648 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967), the Florida
District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court which had stated, "I don't
think he has shown any grounds that I am willing to accept at all, but I am
going to divorce them. They both want it, don't they?" Id. at 649.
171. Goree v. Goree, 187 Neb. 774, 778, 194 N.W.2d 212, 214 (1972).
172. Id. at 778, 194 N.W.2d at 214.
173. Id. at 777, 194 N.W.2d at 214.
174. Id. at 778, 194 N.W.2d at 214.
175. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-347 (Reissue 1974).
176. Id. § 42-361.
177. Id. § 42-360.
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The inquiry now would be focused on the state of the marriage re-
lationship itself rather than on the acts and characteristics of the
parties.
In making breakdown the sole criterion for the dissolution of a
marriage and in abolishing the common law defenses and the cor-
roboration requirement, 178 the Unicameral not only cast aside its
century old fault based divorce scheme, but also passed over less
far-reaching divorce reform devices which had been implemented
in other states. These reforms-primarily the revision or elimina-
tion of the traditional defenses 179 and the addition of such non-
178. Act of April 20, 1972, L.B. 820, § 35, 1972 Neb. Laws 246 (repealing prior divorce
law). Not all states which have promulgated no fault divorce statutes have
abolished the common law defenses. In Georgia, which has not repealed
these defenses, the state supreme court has held that where the parties rec-
oncile and live together after filing a petition for divorce which alleges that
the marriage is irretrievably broken, the defense of condonation applies and
terminates the action, even though the reconciliation failed and the couple
again separated. As no subsequent action of the defendant spouse can revive
the no fault claim, a new action must be filed. Woods v. Woods, 241 Ga. 393,
245 S.E.2d 651 (1978); Lindsay v. Lindsay, 241 Ga. 166, 244 S.E.2d 9 (1978).
Compare these decisions to those in states in which the common law de-
fenses have been abolished. E.g., Smith v. Smith, 322 So. 2d 580 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1975); Nooe v. Nooe, 277 So. 2d 835 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Peltola v.
Peltola, 79 Mich. App. 709, 263 N.W.2d 25 (1977); Cowsert v. Cowsert, 78 Mich.
App. 129, 259 N.W.2d 393 (1977) (all holding that instances of sexual inter-
course between the parties which occurred after the commencement of the
dissolution proceedings were not sufficient bases to deny the divorce).
179. Some states, while retaining fault grounds, have expressly abolished some or
all of the major defenses to a divorce action. See, e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A-34-
7 (Cum. Supp. 1978) (abolishing recrimination and condonation, and allowing
divorces to be granted to both parties if each makes out a ground for divorce);
N.Y. DoM. RE- LAw § 171 (McKinney 1977) (limiting recrimination to the
ground of adultery). Others, by statute or case law, have made the applica-
tion of recrimination discretionary. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-3 (1972);
De Burgh v. De Burgh, 39 Cal. 2d 858, 250 P.2d 598 (1952) (where both parties
are at fault the trial court can grant a divorce to either, neither, or both, bear-
ing in mind (1) the prospect of reconciliation, (2) the effect of the marital
conflict on the spouses, (3) the effect of the conflict on third parties, and (4)
comparative guilt). (California subsequently adopted no fault legislation
which abolished the traditional defenses. CAT_ CIV. CODE §§ 4000-5318 (West
1970)).
In other instances the doctrine of recrimination has been replaced by that
of comparative rectitude whereby only the more guilty of the two spouses
would be denied a divorce. See, e.g., Act of April 11, 1972, ch. 220, § 7, 1971 Wis.
Laws 643 (repealed 1978) (court may grant a judgment of divorce "to the
party whose equities on the whole are found to be superior"); KAN. STAT. § 60-
1606 (1976) ("court may grant or refuse a divorce when the parties are found
to be in equal fault"). See also Stewart v. Stewart, 158 Fla. 326, 29 So. 2d 247
(1946).
Where the defense of condonation has not been abolished, some states
have tried to mitigate its negative effect on reconciliation attempts, see text
accompanying note 145 supra, by suspending the divorce proceedings for a
period of time while the parties are allowed to resume living together without
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fault grounds as separation' 80 and incompatibility 81 to the cus-
running the risk that their grounds for divorce will be considered condoned.
See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-836 (1977). Modifying or eliminating these
defenses, of course, does not negate the necessity of proving grounds for di-
vorce.
180. In 1850 Kentucky became the first state to make separation or living apart a
ground for divorce. M. PLoscowE, H. FosTER & D. FREED, supra note 156, at
349. By 1972 some form of this ground was recognized in 28 states. Id. at 353.
While some statutes permit divorce solely upon proof that the spouses
have been separated for the requisite time period, others require that the
separation be voluntary on the part of both parties. A third type of statute
makes divorce available only to the spouse who did not cause the separation,
while a fourth authorizes a divorce only when the parties have lived separate
and apart pursuant to a decree of legal separation or separate maintenance.
Id. at 353-69; Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without Perjury, 52 VA. L.
REv. 32,52-66 (1966). Although all are based on the premise that a separation
of a proscribed length is both a clear indication that the marriage has broken
down and a check on hasty dissolutions, only the first two varieties offer an
escape from the morass of fault finding, and only the first allows a no fault
nonconsensual divorce. Even legislation of the first type is not immune from
court-imposed fault concepts. See, e.g., Byers v. Byers, 223 N.C. 85, 25 S.E.2d
466 (1943) (construing an apparently non-fault separation statute to preclude
divorce where the separation amounts to abandonment).
A major problem with the separation ground has been the length of time
the parties have been required to live apart before being eligible for a divorce.
As recently as 1968, most statutes called for periods of from three to five
years, and Rhode Island's statute required ten. H. CLARK, supra note 118, at
352. While many of the separation periods have been shortened, they still
range from six months, see, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 551 (7) (1974), to five
years, see, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 32-610 (1963), with most being one or two years.
"Gresham's Law" of divorce, note 41 supra, indicates that those couples who
wish to terminate their marriages quickly will find lengthy separation
grounds to be unsatisfactory alternatives to the more rapid fault based
grounds with which they co-exist. For instance, in April, 1972, Wisconsin re-
duced the period of separation necessary to get a divorce under its voluntary
separation statute from five years to one. Act of April 11, 1972, ch. 220, § 3,1971
Wis. Laws 641 (repealed 1978). Where the voluntary separation ground ac-
counted for only 3.5% of Wisconsin divorces in 1970, 2.5% in 1971, and 4.3% in
1972, it shot up to 7.1% in 1973, 8.5% in 1974, and 9.4% in 1975. Extrapolated
from data obtained from Div. of Health, Wis. Dep't of Health & Social Services
(Jan. 5, 1978). Still, more than 86% of all Wisconsin divorces obtained in 1975
were for "cruel and inhuman treatment." Id. See also Rheinstein, supra
note 41, at 642; Comment, Divorce Reform--One State's Solution, 1967 DuKE
L.T. 956, 965 n.58.
Among other questions of interpretation that separation statutes raise,
such as the nature of the separation and when the period of separation is
deemed to commence, is the effect of a reconciliation attempt during the sep-
aration. While the law may draw fine distinctions, see Wadlington, supra, at
75-76, a couple contemplating a try at getting back together could well be put
off by the fear that doing so would turn "the separation clock ... back to
zero." M. WHEELER, supra note 50, at 46.
181. Incompatibility of temperament as a ground for divorce made its way into
American law from Denmark via 1933 legislation in the Virgin Islands, for-
merly a Danish possession. M. PLoscowE, H. FOSTER & D. FREED, supra note
156, at 369. Currently-six American jurisdictions list incompatibility as a ba-
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tomary grounds for divorce-more often than not failed to eradi-
cate the major shortcomings of the fault approach.182 By adopting
the irretrievable breakdown standard the Nebraska Unicameral
provided the "unequivocal legislative mandate"'183 that critics of
previous reform efforts had felt was necessary to assure that di-
vorces could be obtained free from considerations of fault.
184
sis for dissolving a marriage: AlA. CODE tit. 34, § 20(a) (7) (Supp. 1973);
ALAsKA STAT. § 09.55.110(5) (c) (1973); KAN. STAT. § 60-1601(8) (1976); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 125.010(3) (1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-7-1(A) (Supp. 1975); and
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1271(7) (West 1961). In 1973 the Virgin Islands re-
placed incompatibility with a breakdown ground. Act of April 23, 1973, ch.
3418, § 1, 1973 V.L Sess. Laws 45 (codified at V.L CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 104 (Cum.
Supp. 1977)).
The generally accepted definition of incompatibility clearly indicates that
the fault of either party ought to be irrelevant when a divorce is sought on
this ground:
[I] ncompatibility of the temperament... does not refer to... petty
quarrels and minor bickerings [but] ... to conflicts in personalities
and dispositions so deep as to be irreconcilable and to render it im-
possible for the parties to continue a normal marital relationship
with each other.... It is the legal recognition of the proposition...
that if the parties are so mismated that their marriage has in fact
ended as a result of their hopeless disagreement and discord the
courts should be empowered to terminate it as a matter of law.
Burch v. Burch, 195 F.2d 799, 806-07 (3d Cir. 1952).
"Yet, when grafted into an existing divorce statute containing traditional
fault-based grounds and defenses, it was difficult for the courts to avoid the
contagious effects of a concept so deeply rooted in their jurisprudential
thought." Walker, supra note 132, at 200. In particular, courts have had diffi-
culty in resisting the temptation to insist that the blame for the couple's in-
compatibility be laid squarely on the defendant spouse and that the plaintiff
spouse be free of any serious misconduct. See Schlesinger v. Schlesinger, 399
F.2d 7 (3d Cir. 1968) (Virgin Islands incompatibility ground cannot be used
where to do so would reward an unfaithful husband for his marital infidelity);
Shearer v. Shearer, 356 F.2d 391 (3d Cir. 1965) (it is clearly erroneous to award
a divorce under the Virgin Islands incompatibility statute to a husband who
refused to resume his marital relationship with his wife after they had lived
apart for six years and she had sued him for separate maintenance and had
had him jailed for arrearages in support); Clark v. Clark, 54 N.M. 364, 225 P.2d
147 (1950) (trial court has the discretion to deny a divorce, if granting it, in
view of the plaintiffs adultery, would "shock the conscience"). But see Gar-
ner v. Garner, 85 N.M. 324, 512 P.2d 84 (1973) (overruling Clark) (recrimina-
tion is not a defense where a divorce is sought on the grounds of
incompatibility). See also Chappell v. Chappell, 298 P.2d 768 (Okla. 1956)
(the incompatibility ground is inapplicable where only the spouse seeking
the divorce complains of incompatibility). But see Kennedy v. Kennedy, 461
P.2d 614 (Okla. 1969); Waller v. Waller, 439 P.2d 952 (Okla. 1968); Stuart v.
Stuart, 433 P.2d 951 (Okla. 1967); Bessinger v. Bessinger, 372 P.2d 870 (Okla.
1962); Wegener v. Wegener, 365 P.2d 728 (Okla. 1961); Rakestraw v. Rake-
straw, 345 P.2d 888 (Okla. 1959) (all holding that incompatbility does not have
to be mutual).
182. See notes 179-81 supra. Many states which had implemented reforms of this
type have since abandoned them in favor of breakdown statutes.
183. Wadlington, supra note 180, at 52.
184. Id. The Unicameral did not give an unequivocal mandate to eliminate fault
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The new law embraced the notion that "[o] nce a couple has ir-
reconcilably ceased to be committed to one another, once a couple
has irretrievably lost the ability to complement each other as hus-
band and wife, they are in fact divorced."'185 In such cases the
court is "empowered to declare defunct de jure what... is already
defunct defacto.'1 86 By providing a realistic and efficient method
of dissolving broken-in-fact marriages the no fault law freed the
divorce process of much of the collusion, hypocrisy, and embar-
rassment that had characterized it in the past. Aside from this,
however, as had been predicted, it "for the most part change[d]
only the law in the books and [left] the law in practice relatively
unmolested."'187 The minimal effect the no fault law has had on the
divorce rate, as demonstrated by the interrupted time series analy-
sis, is evidence that this prediction was accurate.
L Does the Irretrievable Breakdown Standard Reduce the
Animosity of Divorce?
One of the great attractions of a no fault divorce procedure was
the promise that it would minimize the acrimony, distress, and hu-
miliation that the adversarial fault system engendered and maxi-
mize the possibility of future harmonious relationships among the
parties and their children.188 The prevalent feeling among Ne-
braska district court judges is that it has lived up to this promise.
Two-thirds of those surveyed felt that the change in the law has led
to a lessening in the parties' feelings of animosity toward each
other.189 Furthermore, when asked to identify the law's major
strengths, the attributes most often cited by the judges were the
from such divorce-related issues as alimony and division of property, how-
ever. See note 406 & accompanying text infra.
185. FAmLY LAw REPORTER, DESK GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
ACT 82 (1974) [hereinafter cited as DESK GumIE] (quoting Msgr. Stephen J.
Kelleher).
186. PUTriNG ASUNDER, supra note 90, at 38.
187. Henderson, supra note 13, at 1.
188. Indicative of the intent of the drafters of the no fault law to reduce the hostile
atmosphere of divorce actions are the "psychosemantic" changes the law
makes. King, Marriage, Divorce and Custody Reform in South Dakota, 18
S.D. L. REv. 654, 669 (1973). Thus "dissolution" is used instead of the more
ominous "divorce," NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-347(1) (Reissue 1974); "proceeding"
instead of "action," id. § 42-352; "petition" instead of "complaint," id.; "Peti-
tioner" and "respondent" instead of "plaintiff" and "defendant," id. § 42-353;
and "responsive pleading" instead of "answer," id. § 42-354. One stylistic
change that Nebraska did not adopt, although it was a part of many other
reforms, is the entitling of the proceeding "In re marriage of ,"
rather than the more adversarial " vs. " See, e.g.,
UNimORm MARRAG.E AND DIVORCE ACT § 301(b).
189. Judges' Questionnaire, supra note 15, question 19. Similar responses were
obtained in surveys of California and Iowa judges and attorneys. Goddard,
supra note 158, at 419; Sass, supra note 39, at 636-37.
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elimination of fraud and perjury and the reduction of bitter con-
ffict.190
While admitting that animosity clearly has been reduced dur-
ing the trial itself, one judge felt certain that "there would be no
difference in many cases as far as the feelings and opinions of the
parties toward each other."' 9 1 Certainly, while the accusatory na-
ture of the old procedure greatly exacerbated the acrimony of di-
vorce,192 blame for the hostility exhibited by a divorcing couple
cannot be laid solely on the law.193 Much of it is inherent in the
process of alienation that leads to divorce. 194 A mere change in the
law, no matter how sweet, cannot be expected to neutralize all that
bitterness.
Since fighting over who caused the break-up is futile, "those
190. Judges' Questionnaire, supra note 15, question 22. Parties to the new-style
dissolution proceedings also have been impressed, praising their divorces as
"delightful... absolutely amiable" experiences, in which they do not have to
"spill their guts." No-Fault Law Ending Dishonesty in Divorce, Omaha
World-Herald, Aug. 29, 1978, at 1, col. 4; Lincolnites Defend No Fault Divorce,
Lincoln Star, Nov. 6, 1974, at 21, coL 1. However, some find the proceedings
"too impersonal and coldblooded." Zuckman & Fox, supra note 132, at 517.
See also Elston, Fuller & Murch, Judicial Hearings of Undefended Divorce
Petitions, 38 MOD. L. REV. 609 (1975).
191. Judges' Questionnaire, supra note 15.
192. See notes 139-45 & accompanying text supra.
193. [H]ostility is not engendered by the fact that one of the spouses ac-
cuses the other of excessive drinking, association with someone of
the opposite sex, physical violence, or mental cruelty. Hostility de-
rives from the fact that one of these conditions does exist in the
home; hostility arises because one of the parties does not want a di-
vorce.
Podell, The Case for Revision of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 18
S.D. L. REV. 601, 601 (1973), reprinted in 7 FAM. L.Q. 169, 169 (1973) (emphasis
in original). See also R. LEVY, UNIFoRm MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LEGISLATION:
A PRELmnARY ANALYSIS 71-72 (1969).
194. In marriage and divorce the sequence is as follows: wish-fulfilling
fantasies lead to idealization; one identifies himself strongly with the
object of idealization; reality makes the idealization untenable and
thus shatters the identification; one then turns against the marriage
partner and the marriage relationship, desiring to hurt the one and
destroy the other. "Woe unto you if you are not perfect."
Often the disillusioned one discovers a capacity for vindictiveness
that surprises him. It is usually the one upon whom the divorce has
been forced who strikes back hardest. This person has suffered a ter-
rific ego wound and a great threat to his security and love by the de-
fection of the mate, and the mate has forced the alienation process
too rapidly for him to assimilate it. At length he strikes back with
bitter joy and tries to do something to the mate that will once more
establish him as a person to be reckoned with.
W. WALLER & I. HnIT, THE FAMILy: A DYNAMIc INTERPRETATION 522 (rev. ed.
1951).
This tempo of bitterness may be furthered by friends and sympathizers of
the divorce, who are often more bitter than the parties and who bolster their
friend and disparage his or her mate. Id. at 523-27.
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who want a fight, now use collateral issues as the battle ground."'195
Fights over custody and support are far more prevalent and are
often just as acrimonious and humiliating as those over grounds, if
not more so. These conflicts can be especially fierce when they are
engineered by over-zealous attorneys who, in their desire to win
for their clients, may be unmindful of the bitter price that often
must be paid for victory.196 The economic realities that dictate that
both spouses may be forced to reduce their standard of living after
a divorce also promote interspousal discord.197
Nine of the judges who responded to the survey felt that the
change in the law had led to more disputes on collateral issues.198
They reasoned that under the old law a spouse whose "fault"
would appear to frustrate his or her desire to end the marriage
would have to reach some compromise in order to get a divorce,
while under the new law that person is free to contest child cus-
tody or property matters.199 Approximately one-fourth of the dis-
solution cases reported on in the Judges' Questionnaire were
contested.20 0 As this is a higher percentage than before no fault,2 01
and as most of the contests were on collateral issues, 202 litigation
195. Comment of judge in Judges' Questionnaire, supra note 15. See also Podell,
supra note 193, at 601, 7 F m. L.Q. at 170.
196. While there is sometimes only a fine line between providing the
means to obtain a divorce and providing a method of vindication,
there is a difference. Allowing the second to cloud the first provides a
shallow victory for both client and lawyer. Most often the results are
further litigation requiring further contact with an ex-spouse, which
reopens the old wounds. The very idea of divorce as an act freeing
one person from having to deal with his/her former mate becomes
self-defeating once the process becomes acrimonious. In these situa-
tions, especially if no-fault exists, it must be questioned whether the
lawyers are simply operating in an established adversary framework
or if it is their activities and advice, or lack of it, that create the adver-
sary process-a process which leaves deep emotional scars and im-
pedes, if not prevents, psychological recovery of the men, women,
and children involved.
Johnson, A Special Code of Professional Responsibility in Domestic Relations
Statutes?, 9 FAm. LQ. 595, 598-99 (1975). See also Johnson, What God Has
Joined Together, These Men Put Asunder, SrEN'r LAw., Mar., 1978, at 19;
Sopkin, The Roughest Divorce Lawyers in Town, NE w YORK, Nov. 4, 1974, at
52.
197. R. EIsLER, DISOLUTON: NO-FAULT DIVORCE, MARRIAGE AwD THE FTuRE OF
WOMEN 39 (1977).
198. Judges' Questionnaire, supra note 15, question 20. Of the nine judges who
believed no fault divorce caused more disputes, two sat in Omaha and four in
Lincoln. Id.
199. Id. See also Van Pelt, No Fault Divorce: A Re-examination of Nebraska Law,
54 NEB. L. REv. 27, 45 (1975).
200. Judges' Questionnaire, supra note 15, question 1.
201. In 1971 only 10.5% of the divorce petitions granted in Nebraska were con-
tested. Extrapolated from NEB. STATLSTICAL REPORT 1971, supra note 156, at
91.
202. Only in slightly more than three percent of the contested cases did one of the
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over these issues does seem to have increased. Even so, the inten-
sity of the disputes may have lessened. In fact, more than half the
judges surveyed felt that the more amiable atmosphere of no fault
divorce proceedings facilitated the settlement of collateral is-
sues
2 03
2. How Closely Are Marriages Scrutinized in Order to
Determine Whether They Are Irretrievably Broken?
The weight of opinion is that the Nebraska dissolution of mar-
riage law has succeeded in creating a practical and realistic proc-
ess whereby marriages which are bereft of life can receive a decent
burial. As admirable an accomplishment as that may be, it can be
argued that this is only a part of what the law should achieve. In
addition, "efforts should be made to make sure that the marriage
actually is 'dead' and not viable and.., that some 'live' marriages
are not being pronounced 'dead.' ,04 A law which makes divorce
too easy to obtain and which does not try to save those marriages
which are salvageable can be accused of ignoring society's legiti-
mate interest in marriage stability.205 Divorce laws, the argument
parties deny in court that the marriage was irretrievably broken. Judges'
Questionnaire, supra note 15, question 2.
203. Id. question 20. One judge commented, "In most cases the relief given to
both sides of not having to go through the sometimes painful details of infi-
delities, social behavior, etc., leaves the parties better able to work out more
fairly the important matters of custody-visitation-support-property divi-
sion-alimony, etc." Id.
204. ABA FAMImY LAw SECTION, PROPOSED REVISED UNIFons MARRIAGE AND DI-
VORCE ACT § 302, Comment (adopted by the Family Law Section Council, Nov.
9, 1972), reprinted in 18 S.D. I REV. 693 (1973); 7 FAM,. L.Q. 135 (1973); DESK
GUIDE, supra note 185, at 61 [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED REVISED ACT].
The English Law Commission concluded that a divorce law should seek to
achieve both these objectives:
(i) To buttress, rather than to undermine, the stability of marriage;
and
(ii) When, regrettably a marriage has irretrievably broken down, to
enable the empty shell to be destroyed with the maximum fairness,
and minimum bitterness, distress and humiliation.
LAw COMMISSION, supra note 93, at 10. See also UNiFORm MARRIAGE & DI-
VORCE ACT § 102.
205. [T] he concept of marriage as a social institution that is the founda-
tion of family and of society remains unchanged .... Since mar-
riage is of vital interest to society and the state, it has frequently
been said that in every divorce suit the state is a third party whose
interests take precedence over the private interests of the spouses.
Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 382-83 (Fla. 1970).
The following have been identified as important societal functions that
marriage and the family are expected to fulfll
(1) Provision of an efficient and orderly setting for sexual activity
S.. ; (2) procreation in associationally stable and economically se-
cure circumstances, (3) ... socialization of children ... ,
(4) "post-honeymoon" companionship and mutual psychological
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continues, should not be so lax as to entice people to undertake
marriage lightly and without adequate thought,206 or tempt them
into hasty and frivolous divorces, 207 or otherwise encourage them
to exalt what they perceive to be their greater individual happiness
over the interests of their marital partners and children. 208 Of
course, this contention assumes that divorce laws can have a sub-
stantial effect on marriage stability. This is an assumption which
has neither been conclusively proved nor universally accepted.209
support in time of individual stress... ; (5) economic security and
long run assurance that permits role division in terms of career and
child raising without threat of ultimate destitution for the "at-home
partner" when the job is done, and (6) rudimentary "social
security", i.e., mutual ... economic insurance against economic ad-
versity, as well as the production and raising of children as guaran-
tors of security in old age ....
H. KRAUSE, FAmy LAw 305 (1976) (emphasis in original). See also De Burgh
v. De Burgh, 39 Cal. 2d 858, 864, 250 P.2d 598, 601 (1957); H. KRAUSE, FAMILY
LAW IN A NUTsHELL 26-27 (1977) [hereinafter cited as L KRAUSE, NuTSHELL];
R. LEVY, supra note 193, at 82-87.
206. "Fault helped create the notion of' 'til death do us part'-no fault of 'let's try
it.' Comment of judge in Judges' Questionnaire, supra note 15.
207. Every survey of married couples seems to indicate that in the
overwhelming majority of normally successful marriages one or both
of the partners felt for a period of time that the marriage was a mis-
take and could not work. How many married persons act on this con-
viction and obtain a divorce simply because a quick divorce is
practically advertised by the law as a permanent remedy for marital
unhappiness?
Drinan, supra note 120, at 70.
208. [L]aw in America teaches that the desire of any married person for a
divorce and remarriage has priority over any and all rights which his
marital partner or his children may have acquired to his continued
companionship. American law has consequently embraced the the-
ory that a marriage agreement may be broken if one of its members
thinks that a greater happiness may be found in another situation.
Id. at 66.
209. A great deal has been said and written about the pernicious effect
that easy divorce must have on stability in marriage. In fact there is
no evidence whatever to show that couples enter marriage more
lightly if divorce is legally easy to obtain. Most of the factors that
tend to stability in marriage are already present and operative in the
child, long before he is of an age to be consciously affected by a di-
vorce law.
PtrrrNG ASUNDER, supra note 90, at 147-48. See also notes 36-41, 77-89, 109-11 &
accompanying text supra.
Certainly the state has an interest in safeguarding the integrity of the fam-
ily. Too often, however, purely punitive divorce measures have been ad-
vanced under the guise of protecting society's interest in marital stability.
Accordingly, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws rejected the language proposed by the Family Law Section of the Amer-
ican Bar Association, proclaiming that marriage is a civil contract "in which
the State has an interest" PROPOSED REVISED ACT, supra note 204, § 201. In
the Commissioners' view "that concept has been the source of much of the
artificiality which has characterized the dissolution of marriages which are,
in fact, irretrievably broken." CONFERENCE OF ComuassIoNERs' REPORT, re-
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The traditional fault-oriented divorce laws provided neither an
honest method of ending a failed marriage nor an effective means
of strengthening a salvageable one. The law as written permitted a
marriage to be dissolved when proper grounds were shown, even if
the parties were reconcilable. 210 The law as practiced freely al-
lowed consensual divorces with little or no inquiry into the real
state of the marriage relationship.21 ' The no fault law, with its re-
quirement that the marriage be shown to be irretrievably broken,
could well have established a far more difficult and demanding cri-
terion for marital dissolutions,212 one which would demand a com-
plete bioscopy of the marriage.
This was the goal of many of the advocates of divorce reform.
Studies conducted in England2 1 3 and California214 embraced the
marital breakdown concept, but maintained that the fact of break-
down could be determined only after the marriage "has been sub-
jected to a penetrating scrutiny and the judicial process has
printed in DESK GUIDE, supra note 185, at 54, 56. For the dispute between the
Family Law Section and the Commissioners generally, see Zuckman, The
ABA Family Law Section v. The NCCUSL: Alienation, Separation and
Forced Reconciliation over the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 24 CATH.
U.L REV. 61 (1974).
210. See notes 134-35 & accompanying text supra.
211. See notes 155-65 & accompanying text supra.
212. See Riley v. Riley, 271 So. 2d 181, 185 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (Spector, C.J.,
dissenting); Pu G ASUNDER, supra note 90, at 43.
213. PurriNG ASUNDER, supra note 90. The group appointed by the Archbishop of
Canterbury called for a proceeding which would be "in some respects analo-
gous to a coroner's inquest, in that its object would be judicial inquiry into
the 'death' of the marriage relationship." Id. at 67. In this "procedure by in-
quest," id. at 19, the court would be authorized to inquire into "the acts,
events, and circumstances alleged to have destroyed the marriage." Id. at 67.
The truth of the statements made by the parties would be closely examined,
especially in uncontested cases, which, because of the public interest in the
stability of marriage, could "call for greater care and judicial skill than one
that was contested." Id. at 77. The court would be aided in its investigation
by "advocates" or "forensic social workers," id. at 70, who, among their other
duties, would help the court determine whether there have been "genuine
though unsuccessful efforts by the parties to be reconciled to one another, [or
whether] in the circumstances of the particular case, such attempts could
only be in vain." Id. at 63.
214. CAl. REPORT, supra note 135. The Report of the California Governor's Com-
mission on the Family advocated that a court be empowered to grant a decree
of divorce upon a finding that "the legitimate objects of matrimony have been
destroyed and there is no reasonable likelihood that the marriage can be
saved." Id. at 91. To aid the court in making these determinations the Report
recommended that a Family Court be created in every county in California.
In every case there would be an "initial interview" with a member of the staff
of professional counselors and investigators who would "determine the sus-
ceptibility of the marriage to conciliation services." Id. at 18. On the basis of
an extensive report submitted by the counselor and any other evidence
presented by the parties, the court would determine whether the marriage
should be dissolved.
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provided the parties with all the resources of social science in aid
of conciliation."215 Regarded as intriguing but impractical, neither
of these proposals has been enacted into law.216
Although the English Law Commission had estimated that the
breakdown with inquest approach would call for trials of at least a
half hour for uncontested cases, 217 the average length of an uncon-
tested dissolution hearing in Nebraska is sixteen minutes.21 8 In
the high population centers of Omaha and Lincoln the average is
only seven and one-half minutes.219 While contested cases aver-
age three and three-fourths hours,220 the vast majority of these in-
volve contests over custody, property, or support-not over
breakdown.221 Clearly the Nebraska courts do not conduct "a com-
plete biopsy of the marriage relationship from beginning to
end."222
It is proper that they do not, for the wisdom of the inquest ap-
proach is questionable. The enormous financial burdens imposed
by a system that would subject every marriage brought before it to
a strict scrutiny would not be justified by the limited benefits that
it would yield-the prevention of divorces in the comparatively few
cases in which the parties might be acting precipitately.= Unless
215. Id. at 23.
216. "[Wl e are forced to the conclusion that Breakdown with Inquest, as proposed
by the Archbishop's Group cannot, despite its undoubted attractions and our
sympathy with the principles underlying the Group's approach, be made to
work because of purely practical difficulties." LAW CommissioN, supra note
93, at 35.
California eventually enacted its precedent-setting no fault divorce law.
Family Law Act, ch. 1608, § 8, 1969 Cal. Stats. 3314 (codified at CAL. Crv. CODE
§§ 4000-5138 (West 1970)). However, the measure had been gutted of its sepa-
rate family court and mandatory counseling features. See generally Krom,
California's Divorce Law Reform: An Historical Analysis, 1 PAc. L.J. 156
(1970).
217. LAw CoMMIssIoN, supra note 93, at 30.
218. Judges' Questionnaire, supra note 15, question 4(a). One judge's uncon-
tested hearings averaged less than five minutes, another's between 30 and 60
minutes. Id. A survey of Iowa judges and attorneys reported that uncon-
tested divorce trials in that state averaged between 15 and 20 minutes. Sass,
supra note 39, at 650, 652.
219. Judges' Questionnaire, supra note 15, question 4(a). Douglas County
(Omaha) uncontested divorces averaged nine minutes, Lancaster County
(Lincoln) seven minutes. The average for the rest of the state was 18 min-
utes. Id.
220. Id. question 4(b).
221. See note 202 supra.
222. Desrochers v. Desrochers, 115 N.H. 591, 595, 347 A.2d 150, 153 (1975).
223. Clark, supra note 17, at 406. In the view of the English Law Commission, the
breakdown with inquest approach would greatly increase the length of trials
and concomitantly the requisite expenditures and court stafi Finding the
necessary "forensic social workers" was considered particularly difficult in
view of the shortage of trained people. LAw CoimmssioN, supra note 93, at 33.
In California it was estimated that the compulsory counseling provision
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it were envisioned that the counselors/investigators would be "offi-
cial snoopers ... interviewing perhaps the corner grocer or the
mother-in-law," 224 the facts that comprise the basis for the "pene-
trating scrutiny" would have to be gathered primarily from the par-
ties themselves. It is difficult to imagine that such a procedure
would be effective in unearthing the real reason for the rupture of
the marriage.22 5 Undoubtedly there would be many who would be
reluctant to disclose the intimate facts and details of their married
lives22 and a strenuous effort to overcome this reluctance would
seem to be an unwarranted intrusion on their personal privacy.227
If the parties had settled on a divorce as the best solution to their
marital woes, their testimony, even if honest, would inevitably be
slanted toward the achievement of that goal.228 Furthermore, if the
result of the inquest procedure were the wholesale denial of di-
vorces which were desired by the parties, all the evasionary de-
vices that undermined the policy behind divorce based on fault
doubtlessly would reemerge.
While the Nebraska legislation does not provide for an inquest-
like inquiry into the state of the marriage, it does require that the
trial court "consider all relevant factors" and "after hearing,...
make a finding whether the marriage is irretrievably broken."2 29
The law clearly intends the determination of breakdown to be a
called for by the Governor's Commission would cost California counties
between five million and ten million dollars per annum. Krom, supra note
216, at 171.
224. Bodenheimer, Reflections on the Future of Grounds for Divorce, 8 J. FAM. L
179, 199 (1968) (quoting 27 CAN. PARr.. DEB., SEN. 704 (1967)).
225. Bodenheimer, supra note 224, at 200.
226. Ventilating the whole matrimonial history in public was perceived by the En-
glish Law Commission as even more distasteful and humiliating than the pro-
ceedings under the old fault law. LAw CommIssIoN, supra note 93, at 31-32.
227. Bodenheimer, supra note 224, at 200. See also Goldstein & Gitter, supra note
131, at 78; Seidelson, Systematic Marriage Investigation and Counseling in
Divorce Cases: Some Reflections on Its Constitutional Propriety and General
Desirability, 36 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 60 (1967).
228. Bodenheimer, supra note 224, at 200.
229. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-361 (Reissue 1974) states:
Marriage irretrievably broken; findings. (1) If both of the parties by
petition or otherwise have stated under oath or affirmation that the
marriage is irretrievably broken, or one of the parties has so stated
and the other has denied it, the court, after hearing, shall make a
finding whether the marriage is irretrievably broken.
(2) If one of the parties has denied under oath or affirmation that
the marriage is irretrievably broken, the court shall consider all rele-
vant factors, including the circumstances that gave rise to the filing of
the petition and the prospect of reconciliation, and shall make a find-
ing whether the marriage is irretrievably broken.
The statute was adapted from the UNIFORM LARRIAGE ANID DIvoRa ACT § 305.
The Unicameral did not include all the language of section 305, however. This
has resulted in a statute which has been justifiably criticized as redundant.
Van Pelt, supra note 199, at 33-34.
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judicial function. 23 0 The trial court is not expected to "perform a
ministerial duty of ... merely approving a properly filed peti-
tion,"23' but it is to make an independent 'Judicial decision based
upon evidence presented at the final hearing."232 Since divorces
by consent effectively undermined the courts' duty under the pre-
vious law to award divorces only upon the fault of one party, it is
appropriate to inquire whether, under the no fault law, the role of
the trial judge in determining whether marital breakdown has oc-
curred is truly meaningful or merely a facade.
The phrase "irretrievably broken," like its no fault counterparts
"irreconcilable differences" and "destruction of the legitimate ob-
jects of matrimony," has been severely criticized for its ambiguity
and uncertainty.= Marital breakdown is a conclusional criteria of
doubtful justiciability, providing little, if any, guidance to judges,
practitioners, or the public.234 It is questionable whether complex
230. This section makes the determination of whether the marriage is
irretrievably broken, in all cases, a matter for determination by the
court, "after hearing" which means "upon evidence.".. . The Con-
ference concluded, even as to [uncontested] cases, that the determi-
nation of breakdown should be a judicial function rather than a
conclusive presumption arising from the parties' testimony or from
the petition.
UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acv § 305, Comment
231. Flora v. Flora, 337 N.E.2d 846, 850 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976).
232. Id. See also In re Marriage of McKim, 6 Cal. 3d 673, 679-80, 493 P.2d 868, 871-72,
100 Cal. Rptr. 140, 143-44 (1972); In re Marriage of Walton, 28 Cal. App. 3d 108,
116-17,104 Cal. Rptr. 472,479 (1972); In re Marriage of Franks, 542 P.2d 845,851-
52 (Colo. 1975), stay denied, 423 U.S. 1043 (1976); Ryan v. Ryan, 277 So. 2d 266,
271-72 (Fla. 1973); Riley v. Riley, 271 So. 2d 181, 183 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972);
Laffosse v. Laffosse, 564 S.W.2d 220, 220 (Ky. Ct App. 1978); Desrochers v.
Desrochers, 115 N.H. 591, 594-95, 347 A.2d 150, 153 (1975); Woodruff v. Wood-
ruff 114 N. 365, 367, 320 A.2d 661, 663 (1974); Rodrique v. Rodrique, 113 N.
49, 52, 300 A.2d 312, 314 (1973).
233. "Now the phrase, the term, 'the marriage has broken down irretrievably' is as
broad and as long as the human imagination itself.... I really and truly do
not know what it means." Transcrip4 supra note 14, at 4108 (comment of
Senator Fred W. Carstens). See also M. RanvNsrN, supra note 35, at 367-87;
1971 Midyear Report supra note 147, at 174; Bodenheimer, supra note 224, at
202-03; Foster & Freed, Divorce Reform: Brakes on Breakdown? 13 J. FAM. L
443, 448-52 (1973).
234. "[I]f we have 160 circuit judges in the state, we have just as many potential
interpretations. There are absolutely no guidelines as to what constitutes an
irremediable breakdown." Cowsert v. Cowsert, 78 Mich. App. 129, 133, 259
N.W.2d 393, 395 (1977) (Kelly, P.J., concurring).
But see Tenney, supra note 168, at 45 ("it is doubtful whether the ambigu-
ity of the [author's proposed no fault] statute would pose serious problems
for a judge who, by the time he takes the bench, certainly will be sufficiently
mature and have enough professional and personal experience to apply the
flexible standard with sufficient precision"); Zuckman & Fox, supra note 132,
at 595 n.311 ("certainly, competent judges Will... know an irretrievably bro-
ken marriage when they see it").
To be sure "irretrievable breakdown" is not the only vague formulation
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family interactions can be constrained within strict guidelines,
however. The very fact that the law lacks precision has brought it
praise from courts which believe its flexibility allows each unique
marital relationship to receive individual attention.235 When no
fault divorce legislation has been attacked as unconstitutionally
vague, appellate courts have been unanimous in upholding the
statutes,236 pointing out that the irretrievably broken standard is
"no more susceptible to the charge of vagueness than were the
words, 'extreme cruelty.' -237
with which judges and lawyers have to deal. It has been pointed out that
"unconscionability" is another such term, id., and that juvenile court and do-
mestic relations judges have dealt competently with such concepts as "best
interests of the child" in custody matters, "lack of proper parental care" in
neglect and termination of parental rights petititons, and the principles of
"individualized justice" in deliquency proceedings. Tenney, supra note 168,
at 45-47. The reference to the latter concepts is unfortunate in view of sub-
sequent criticism of the manner in which courts deal with them. See, e.g.,
Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminacy, 39 LAw & CONTEmp. PROB., Summer, 1975, at 226; In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1 (1967) (highly critical of the "clinical" juvenile justice system); Al-
sager v. District Court, 406 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Iowa 1975), affd per curiam, 545
F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976) (Iowa's termination of parental rights statute is un-
constitutionally vague). Contra, State v. A.H., 198 Neb. 444, 253 N.W.2d 283
(1977) (Nebraska's neglect and termination statutes are not void for vague-
ness).
235. The Legislature has not seen fit to promulgate guidelines as to
what constitutes an "irretrievably broken" marriage. It is suggested
that this lack of definitive direction was deliberate and is desirable in
an area as volatile as a proceeding for termination of the marital sta-
tus. Consideration should be given to each case individually and pre-
determined policy should not be circumscribed by the appellate
courts of this State.
Thus, we are hesitant to set forth specific circumstances which
trial courts could utilize as permissible indices of an irretrievable
breakdown of the marital status. Were we to attempt to do so, we
feel that the basic purpose of the new dissolution of marriage law
would be frustrated. Such proceedings would either again become
primarily adversary in nature or persons would again fit themselves
into tailor-made categories or circumstances to fit judicially defined
breakdown situations. It is our opinion that these two problems are
the very ones which the Legislature intended to eliminate.
Riley v. Riley, 271 So. 2d 181, 183 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972). See also In re
Marriage of Baler, 561 P.2d 20, 22 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977); Flora v. Flora, 337
N.E.2d 846, 850 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976); Mattson v. Mattson, 376 A.2d 473, 475-76
(Me. 1977); Desrochers v. Desrochers, 115 N.H. 591, 593, 347 A.2d 150, 152
(1975).
236. In re Marriage of Walton, 28 Cal. App. 3d 108, 104 Cal. Rptr. 472 (1972); Cos-
grove v. Cosgrove, 27 Cal. App. 3d 424, 103 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1972); In re Marriage
of Franks, 542 P.2d 845 (Colo. 1975), stay denied, 423 U.S. 1043 (1976); Ryan v.
Ryan, 277 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 1973); Cowsert v. Cowsert, 78 Mich. App. 129, 259
N.W.2d 393 (1977); Desrochers v. Desrochers, 115 N.H. 591, 347 A.2d 150 (1975).
237. Ryan v. Ryan, 277 So. 2d 266,270 (Fla. 1973). See also Cosgrove v. Cosgrove, 27
Cal. App. 3d 424, 429, 103 Cal. Rptr. 733, 736 (1972); In re Marriage of Franks,
542 P.2d 845, 851 (Colo. 1975), stay denied, 423 U.S. 1043 (1976).
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A law which provides flexibility and individual attention corre-
spondingly is susceptible to a wide variety of judicial interpreta-
tions. Vested with broad discretion, judges might deny or grant
dissolutions in accordance with their personal predilections,
rather than the policies of the statute. Judges who are hostile to-
ward "easy divorce" could well apply concepts carried over from
the fault system in order to block divorces which they find offen-
sive,2 3 8 while those sincerely interested in promoting family stabil-
ity might deny a dissolution in the hope that "therapeutic"
approaches might save the marriage.239 Others, unfettered by spe-
cific criteria with which to measure marital breakdown, might
grant divorces freely upon request.
Available data indicate that granting unbridled discretion to
divorce judges to determine whether a particular marriage has
been irretrievably broken does not lead to the indiscriminate de-
nial of divorces. While published opinions reveal that trial judges
have denied dissolutions because, in their view, the marriage has
not been proven to be irretrievably broken, these denials invaria-
bly have been reversed on appeal.240
Of the approximately 10,000 petitions for dissolution heard by
the thirty Nebraska district court judges who responded to the
Judges' Questionnaire, forty-eight were denied for failure of proof
of breakdown or adequate attempts at reconciliation. 241 Although
a denial rate of under .5 percent is hardly overwhelming, the fact
238. This is what often occurred when divorces were available on living separate
and apart or incompatibility of temperament grounds. See notes 180-81
supra.
239. R. LEvy, supra note 193, at 93-94.
240. Smith v. Smith, 322 So. 2d 580 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Nooe v. Nooe, 277 So.
2d 835 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Riley v. Riley, 271 So. 2d 181 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1972); McCoy v. McCoy, 236 Ga. 633, 225 S.E.2d 682 (1976); Whitmire v.
Whitmire, 236 Ga. 153, 223 S.E.2d 135 (1976); Laffosse v. Laffosse, 564 S.W.2d
220 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); Peltola v. Peltola, 79 Mich. App. 709, 263 N.W.2d 25
(1977); Cowsert v. Cowsert, 78 Mich. App. 129, 259 N.W.2d 393 (1977); Kretz-
schmar v. Kretzschmar, 48 Mich. App. 279, 210 N.W.2d 352 (1973).
241. Judges' Questionnaire, supra note 15, question 3. The number 48 is not exact.
Some of the judges' responses were approximations. The question on the
survey was: "In how many cases did you deny prayer of dissolution?" The
fact that nearly all the 48 cases in which a judge indicated he had denied the
dissolution eventuated in divorce or reconciliation indicates that the judges
correctly understood "deny" to include all situations in which the divorce
was not decreed immediately. In most instances the case probably was con-
tinued pending further reconciliation efforts. One judge responded that he
did not deny any dissolutions when they were still requested after concilia-
tion, thereby suggesting that he continued some cases, even though he "de-
nied" none. As the survey asked the judges to report on the ultimate
resolution of the case-Did the petitioner reconcile? Was a dissolution even-
tually granted?-the assumption is that most of the judges counted all in-
stances of failure to grant dissolution for substantive reasons at the initial
hearing, including continuances, as "denials."
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that some petitions were denied is significant in itself.242 A further
breakdown of these statistics is particularly revealing. Where
twenty-one of the thirty judges granted every prayer of dissolution
that came before them, three judges alone were responsible for
thirty-three of the forty-eight denials.243 The remaining six judges
handed down the other fifteen denials. Clearly there are wide vari-
ations in the way the breakdown standard is being applied. The
concern that some couples whose marriages have broken down are
being denied divorces is lessened considerably by the knowledge
that forty-two of the forty-eight couples whose dissolution peti-
tions were not granted ultimately were divorced. Five of the other
couples were reconciled, leaving only one undivorced couple unac-
counted for.2 " While in certain courts, under certain circum-
stances, there might be considerable delay before a marriage is
legally terminated,25 apparently where a divorce is truly desired,
it eventually will be obtained.
The findings of the Judges' Questionnaire are in sharp contrast
with the image, portrayed in much of the divorce reform legislation
242. The number might have been greater were it not for the fact that "the attor-
neys... do an awful lot of pre-sorting." Comment of judge in id. However,
this is not true in every case. Hubert O'Gorman's study isolated two basic
role definitions of matrimonial lawyers-the "Counselor" and the "Advo-
cate."
The Counselor's definition is one in which the lawyer strives to con-
trol the relationship with his client by defining, to his own satisfac-
tion, the substance of the client's problem, by arriving at his own
judgment as to what constitutes the client's best interests, and by
guiding the client to a solution that is equitable for both spouses. In
contrast, the Advocate's role is one in which counsel accepts the cli-
ent's definition of the problem as well as the client's proposed solu-
tion. Furthermore, lawyers who adhere to the Advocate's role tend to
see successful professional role performance as a victory over the op-
posing spouse. While most of the informants defined their role in
matrimonial actions as that of Counselor, a substantial minority, al-
most one out of three, defined their role as Advocate.
H. O'GoRMAN, supra note 156, at 163-64. A 1974 survey of 31 Lincoln attorneys
concluded that 25 would be classified as "Counselors" and six as "Advo-
cates." Embacher & Johnson, A Study of the Attorney's Role in Counseling
Dissolution of Marriage Clients (1974) (unpublished manuscript on file with
Alan Frank, College of Law, University of Nebraska). "Counselors" would be
far more likely than "Advocates" to screen their clients.
243. Two Lincoln-based judges denied 10 dissolutions each. An out-state judge, a
firm-believer in the therapeutic/counseling approach, denied 13. Of the more
than 2500 dissolution petitions heard by four Omaha judges, only one was
denied, whereas four Lincoln judges disallowed 25 out of more than 3700 peti-
tions. Judges' Questionnaire, supra note 15, question 3.
244. Id. question 3(d).
245. In some instances even a delay in granting a justified divorce can be damag-
ing. Extending the period of uncertainty can add to the emotional trauma of
the parties and frustrate their desire to arrange a new ordering of their per-
sonal affairs. See Gbrecki, Divorce in Poland-A Socio-Legal Study, 10 ACTA
SOCIOLOGICA 68, 73, 80 n.3 (1967).
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and appellate decisions,4  of the trial court as an active "oversee-
ing participant ' 247 in the breakdown determination. The dispatch
with which hearings are conducted 2 6 and the overwhelming pro-
portion of cases that end in divorce 249 indicate that most uncon-
tested2 50 divorces are handled perfunctorily.
3. Does No Fault Divorce Permit Divorce by Consent?
All but one of the judges surveyed agreed that if there has been
adequate counseling, where both of the parties maintain that the
marriage is irretrievably broken and that they are unwilling to re-
sume the marital relationship, or where one of the parties so states
and the other does not deny it, the marriage is irretrievably broken
and should be dissolved.25 1 Although many judges demand more
extensive evidence,252 apparently the parties' own conclusion that
their marriage is irreparably ruptured is regarded as the best, if
not the definitive, evidence of marital failure.253 This is not sur-
prising in view of the fact that breakdown is a highly subjective
determination 254 often incapable of corroboration 255 by objective
246. See notes 231-32 supra.
247. In re Marriage of McKim, 6 Cal. 3d 673,679,493 P.2d 868, 871, 100 Cal. Rptr. 140,
143 (1972).
248. See notes 217-21 & accompanying text supra.
249. See notes 241-45 & accompanying text supra.
250. Although the survey attempted to ascertain how many of the divorces which
were denied or delayed were ones in which one of the parties denied that the
marriage was irretrievably broken, the responses were not detailed enough to
permit statistical analysis. However, it appears that most, but not all, of the
reported denials were in cases in which breakdown was contested. Judges'
Questionnaire, supra note 15, question 3.
251. Id. question 5(a).
252. The one judge who answered question 5(a) in the negative stated that he
"require[s] a statement of fact as to the nature of the problem. The...
statements in the question are legal conclusions." Id. Another district court
judge has written that the statement of one or both parties under oath that
the marriage is irretrievably broken "is probably conclusive" and that further
evidence on the specific problems burdening the marriage "is probably not
necessary," although it is "helpful to the court particularly in determining
whether efforts to effect a reconciliation have been made." Van 1Pelt, supra
note 199, at 31-32. A third judge, who answered "yes" to the survey question,
admitted that his desire for more information is "to some degree a matter of
curiosity." Judges' Questionnaire, supra note 15. See also notes 254 & 256
infra.
253. See also LAw ComuassIoN, supra note 93, at 36.
254. One question frequently addressed by the commentators and cases is
"whether [the breakdown] standard is subjective or objective: Must the con-
ditions exist in the form of observable acts and occurrences such as marital
quarrels or separation of the parties, or is irreconcilable differences a state of
mind?" Comment, The End of Innocence: Elimination of Fault in California
Divorce Law, 17 U.C.L.A. L REV. 1306,1319 (1970). While the appellate courts
instruct the trial judge that no fault divorce does not mean divorce by con-
sent, they also indicate that "the central inquiry should be a subjective,
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proof.25 6 Since in most cases the parties' testimony will be the
only evidence before the court, it is difficult to imagine on what
basis the court could find the marriage not to be irretrievably bro-
ken, unless the parties' testimony was tentative or incredible.257
Indeed, it would seem that any evidentiary hurdles erected by the
courts could be easily surmounted by spouses, who, having agreed
to procure a divorce, could manufacture and "prove" the required
rather than an objective one." Riley v. Riley, 271 So. 2d 181, 183 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1972). But cf. Ryan v. Ryan, 277 So. 2d 266, 271 (Fla. 1973) (emphasizing
the need for an inquiry into all the surrounding facts and circumstances).
Perhaps the best articulation of the proper mix of objective and subjective
elements can be found in In re Marriage of Dunn, 13 Or. App. 497, 511 P.2d 427
(1975), interpreting that state's irreconcilable differences statute. Ol. REv.
STAT. § 107.025(1) (1977):
[O]nce the existence of a difference or differences claimed by the
petitioner to be irreconcilable has been established,... the test our
statute contemplates is (1) whether or not such difference is one that
reasonably appears to the court to be in the mind of the petitioner an
irreconcilable one, and (2) based upon that difference, either alone or
in conjunction with other differences established by the evidence,
whether or not the court concludes that the breakdown of the partic-
ular marriage is irremediable.
In re Marriage of Dunn, 13 Or. App. 497, 501-02, 511 P.2d 427, 428-29 (1975). See
also Henderson, supra note 13, at 14-15 (analogizing to the standard of negli-
gence for an adolescent child).
255. Nebraska's no fault legislation eliminated the necessity for corroboration.
Act of April 8, 1972, LB. 820, § 35, 1972 Neb. Laws 246 (repealing NEB. REV.
STAT. § 42-335 (Reissue 1968)). See note 157 supra.
Of the states adopting the breakdown approach to marriage dissolution,
only Iowa continued to require corroboration. Its corroboration requirement
recently was repealed, however. Act of May 20, 1976, ch. 1228, § 10, 1976 Iowa
Acts 496 (repealing IowA CODE § 598.10 (1975)). See also Craft v. Craft, 226
N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1975); In re Marriage of Collins, 200 N.W.2d 886 (Iowa 1972); In
re Marriage of Boyd, 200 N.W.2d 845 (Iowa 1972).
256. One form of objective proof of marital failure is the improper acts which
formed the basis for granting a divorce under the previous fault law. Only 11
of the 30 judges who responded to the survey thought evidence of misconduct
should be admissible to show that the marriage had broken down and only
nine said they did admit such evidence. Judges' Questionnaire, supra note
15, questions 7(a), 8(a). The concern is that relying on such evidence would
convert no fault divorce into the equivalent of the old law. See also Com-
ment, Kentucky No Fault Divorce; Theory and the Practical Experience, 13 J.
FAM L 567, 571-72 & n.23 (1973) (majority of Kentucky judges surveyed
agreed that evidence of fault should not be introduced to show breakdown).
But see Sass, supra note 39, at 643-44 (16 out of 20 Iowa judges surveyed ad-
mit fault evidence in an effort to determine whether marital breakdown is
irretrievable).
A California provision allowing evidence of specific acts of misconduct to
be admitted where it is determined by the court to be necessary to establish
the existence of irreconcilable differences was repealed recently. Act of April
18, 1975, ch. 35, § 1, 1975 Cal. Stats. 59 (repealing CAL Civ. CODE § 4509 (West
1970)). A similar Oregon statute remains on the books. OR. REv. STAT. §
107.036(2) (1977).
257. See UNiORm MARR AGE AND DIVORCE AcT § 305, Comment
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manifestation of marital breakdown.258 It is still divorce by con-
sent, this time under a veneer of breakdown rather than fault.
Although consensual divorce may be the prevalent form of ter-
minating marriage relationships in fact, few legislatures have been
willing to pierce the breakdown veneer and openly permit divorce
by agreement.5 9 Nonetheless, some jurisdictions, by legislation or
judicial decree, have acknowledged frankly the consensual nature
of marriage dissolutions. While not sanctioning divorce by consent
per se, a Colorado statute creates a presumption of breakdown
when both spouses aver that their marriage has broken down or
when one party so avers and the other does not deny it. Unless
this presumption is controverted by evidence, which is highly un-
likely, the court must dissolve the marriage.2 60 Divorce courts in
several states are authorized to grant consent divorces where both
parties stipulate that their marriage has irremedially dis-
integrated, or where one party's affirmation of breakdown is not
contested, and where no issues of property, support, and custody
remain unresolved.261 Nowhere in the United States, however, is
258. Comment, supra note 254, at 1323 n.122. See also In re Marriage of Collins, 200
N.W.2d 886, 890 (Iowa 1972) ("In truth, if it were demonstrated the parties
were in collusion to bring about a termination of the marriage relationship, it
would further evidence the fact of the marriage breakdown.").
259. For instance, although the Family Law Committee of the Colorado Bar Asso-
ciation "generally agreed that consent divorce on a no-fault basis would more
accurately reflect the realities of the day," it concluded that "the legislature
was not prepared to accept such an extreme change." 1971 Midyear Report
supra note 147, at 172.
260. COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-110(1) (1973). Delaware has a similar statute. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1517(a) (Supp. 1977). However, it still is incumbent on the
Delaware trial court to evaluate all the evidence and satisfy itself that the
marriage is irretrievably broken. Wife J. v. Husband J., 367 A.2d 655, 657 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1976).
261. Act of Aug. 21, 1978, ch. 508, § 2, 1977-1978 Cal. Legis. Serv. 1624 (to be codified
at CAL. CrV. CODE § 4550) (effective Jan. 1, 1979) (childless spouses, who have
been married less than two years and have no real property, less than $5,000
in personal property, and less than $2,000 in debts, and who have divided
their assets and have waived all rights to spousal support, may file a joint
petition for summary dissolution of their marriage on the grounds of irrecon-
cilable differences; when six months have expired either party may apply for
a final judgment dissolving the marriage); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46-48(a)
(West 1978) (where both parties have stipualted that their marriage has bro-
ken down irretrievably and at least one party has so testified in open court
and where the couple has submitted an agreement concerning custody, sup-
port, and division of property, the court shall dissolve the marriage); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 93-5-2 (Supp. 1977) (upon the joint bill of the husband and wife
or an uncontested bill of complaint, the court may dissolve a marriage for
irreconcilable differences without proof or testimony, where the court has
found that the parties have made adequate and sufficient provision by writ-
ten agreement for the custody and maintenance of their children and for the
settlement of property rights); Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3105.63 to .64 (Page
Supp. 1977) (where both spouses petition for the dissolution of their marriage
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divorce by consent recognized more openly, although not by that
name, than in Washington and Wisconsin. Under those states' no
fault statutes a trial court is required to grant a decree of dissolu-
tion where both parties affirm that their marriage is irretrievably
broken, or, in Washington, where one party so affirms and the
other does not deny it.262 Thanks to a liberal judicial interpreta-
tion of its irretrievable breakdown statute, Georgia's no fault law is
almost as permissive. The Georgia Supreme Court has ruled that
judgments on the pleadings or summary judgments of divorce are
to be awarded without hearing where both parties allege that their
marriage is irretrievably broken or one party so alleges and the
other either does not contest or seeks a divorce on other
grounds.263 The most comprehensive piece of judicial legislation,
and execute an adequate separation agreement providing for division of
property, alimony, child custody, and child support and where they both ac-
knowledge under oath in court that they seek the dissolution and are satis-
fied with the agreement, the court shall grant a decree of dissolution); OR.
REV. STAT. § 107.095(4) (1977) (where the parties are co-petitioners or the re-
spondent is in default and where support or custody of minor children is not
involved, the court may enter a decree of dissolution based upon an affidavit
of the petitioner, setting forth a prima facie case); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-
801(1) (Supp. 1978) (where the respondent has been personally served and
where the parties have made adequate and sufficient provision by written
agreement for custody, support, and property settlement, an uncontested bill
of complaint for divorce may be taken as confessed without testimony as to
the facts constituting irreconcilable differences or any attempts to reconcile
such differences). See also 2 FAm. I- REP. (BNA) 2600 (1976) (a procedural
rule of the New York Appellate Division, First Department, allows parties
living in New York or Bronx counties to dispense with court appearances in
uncontested divorce actions; evidence is presented by affidavit); Matrimonial
Causes Rule, 1977 STAT. INsT. No. 344 (in England, where the petitioner's affi-
davit of marital breakdown is undefended, the court may decree a judgment
of divorce without the appearance of either party; where children under 16
are involved, the husband or wife must appear to satisfy the court that cus-
tody and support arrangements have been properly made). See also NA-
TIONAL COUNCIL ON FAMILY RELATIONS, TASK FORCE REPORr. DIVORCE AND DI-
VORCE REFORM 11-12 (1973) (where there are no children of the marriage and
where division of property and spousal support have been agreed upon, the
parties should be free to dissolve their marriage by registration).
262. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.090.030(1) (Supp. 1977); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
247.12(2) (a) (West Supp. 1978). Compare id. ("the court, after hearing, shall
make a finding that the marriage is irretrievably broken") (emphasis added)
with NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-361(1) (Reissue 1974) ("the court, after hearing,
shall make a finding whether the marriage is irretrievably broken") (empha-
sis added).
Wisconsin also requires participation in counseling sessions. WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 247.081(1) (West Supp. 1978). An early draft of the Uniform Marriage
and Divorce Act contained a scheme similar to those of Washington and Wis-
consin. See Levy, Introduction to a Symposium on the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act, 18 S.D. L. REV. 531, 534, reprinted in 7 FAm. L.Q. 405, 409 (1973).
263. Savage v. Savage, 241 Ga. 454, 246 S.E.2d 310 (1978); Adderholt v. Adderholt,
240 Ga. 626, 242 S.E.2d 11 (1978); Leachmon v. Leachmon, 239 Ga. 780, 238
S.E.2d 863 (1977); Sims v. Sims, 239 Ga. 451, 238 S.E.2d 32 (1977); Strickland v.
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however, was that drafted by the Puerto Rico Supreme Court,
which held that the failure of Puerto Rican law to provide for di-
vorce by mutual consent constituted a violation of the right of pri-
vacy guaranteed by the Commonwealth's constitution.264
Whether openly acknowledged, buried under the ponderous
morality of fault, or covered by the mantle of objectivity provided
by the breakdown ground, the essentially consensual nature of
most divorce proceedings remains unaffected. As the Nebraska in-
terrupted time series analysis demonstrates, the divorce rate is
also uninfluenced by cosmetic changes in the law which do not al-
ter the fundamental nature of divorce practice.
4. Does No Fault Divorce Permit Divorce upon Unilateral
Demand?
It has been asserted, however, that no fault statutes go beyond
previous enactments in that they "convert the system from one
where divorce most often is a matter of mutual consent into one
where it is available upon unilateral demand."26 5 Much of the data
Strickland, 239 Ga. 448, 238 S.E.2d 30 (1977); Lindsey v. Lindsey, 238 Ga. 685,
235 S.E.2d 6 (1977); Dickson v. Dickson, 238 Ga. 672, 235 S.E.2d 479 (1977); Ad-
ams v. Adams, 238 Ga. 326, 232 S.E.2d 919 (1977); Anderson v. Anderson, 237
Ga. 886, 230 S.E.2d 272 (1976); Goulart v. Goulart, 237 Ga. 174, 227 S.E.2d 52
(1976); Loftis v. Loftis, 236 Ga. 637, 225 S.E.2d 685 (1976); Whitmire v. Whit-
mire, 236 Ga. 153, 223 S.E.2d 135 (1976); Little v. Little, 236 Ga. 102, 222 S.E.2d
384 (1976); Hodges v. Hodges, 235 Ga. 848, 221 S.E.2d 597 (1976); Marshall v.
Marshall, 234 Ga. 393, 216 S.E.2d 117 (1975); Friedman v. Friedman, 233 Ga.
254, 210 S.E.2d 754 (1974).
264. Ferrer v. Commonwealth, - P.R.R. - (1978), reprinted in 4 FAro. L. REP.
(BNA) 2744 (1978). The relevant provisions of the Puerto Rico Constitution
were derived from the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.
The court concluded that
[t]he constitution of the Commonwealth protects the rights of
Puertoriquenos to safeguard their dignity and their intimate life in
divorce proceedings by means of the expression of a mutual decision
to be divorced on the common acknowledgement of irreparable
breakdown of the bond of matrimonial cohabitation.
... The parties do not have to express reasons for their decision
if in their judgment they have arrived together at the sad realization,
and need not reveal painful details of their intimate lives. We cannot
force the parties to live apart for two uninterrupted years as the only
means of exercising their right of privacy and the inviability of
human dignity.
Id. at-, 4 FA L, REP,. at 2746. See also Comment, Are Fault Requirements in
Divorce Actions Unconstitutional?, 16 J. FAM. L. 265 (1978).
While the court intimated that the commonwealth could take steps to as-
sure itself that the joint decision to seek a dissolution is not the product of
haste or collusion, it did not spell out any mechanism or standards for doing
SO.
265. Foster & Freed, supra note 233, at 446. See also PROPOSED REVISED ACT,
supra note 204, § 302, Comment (breakdown approach without standards or
guidelines "inevitably will lead to divorce upon demand of one party"); H.
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obtained through the Nebraska Judges' Questionnaire supports
this contention. While most of the dissolution cases which were
delayed temporarily were ones in which one of the parties main-
tained that the marriage had not irretrievably broken down,2 6 6 all
or nearly all of the cases in which a reconciliation was not effectu-
ated after further counseling eventuated in divorce.267 In fact, this
survey of nearly 10,000 dissolution cases failed to reveal a single
instance in which it could be said with certainty that a divorce
which was desired by even one of the spouses was ultimately re-
fused.2 68
Twenty-seven of the thirty judges who responded to the ques-
tionnaire felt that where there has been adequate counseling and
where one of the parties maintains that the marriage is irretriev-
ably broken and that he or she is unwilling to resume the marital
relationship, the marriage is irretrievably broken and should be
dissolved, even if the other spouse insists that the marriage has
not failed irremediably.2 69 To refuse to grant a divorce under such
KRAUSE, NUTSHELL, supra note 205, at 274, 297,302; Abrahams, Book Review, 8
FAM. L.Q. 429,429 (1974); Foster, Divorce Reform and the Uniform Act, 18 S.D.
IL REV. 572, 588 (1973), reprinted in 7 FAro. LQ. 179,197 (1973); Glendon, Mar-
riage and the State: The Withering Away of Marriage, 62 VA. L REV. 663, 705
(1976); Goddard, supra note 158, at 120; Podell, supra note 193, at 601, 7 FAM.
L.Q. at 169; Sass, supra note 39, at 637 (quoting Iowa judges and attorneys);
Brief for Appellant at 35, Dewey v. Dewey, 192 Neb. 676, 223 N.W.2d 826 (1974),
supplemental opinion, 193 Neb. 236, 226 N.W.2d 751 (1975).
266. See note 250 supra.
267. See text accompanying note 244 supra.
268. In an Iowa survey "neither the judges nor the attorneys reported a single
contested case in which the petition for dissolution was denied." Sass, supra
note 39, at 641. But cf. M. WHEELER, supra note 50, at 39 (in Texas, where
divorce can be obtained on the grounds that the marriage has become unsup-
portable, a few contested divorces have been denied "where the marriages
are of long standing and the separation has been short").
269. Judges' Questionnaire, supra note 15, question 5(b). See also Van Pelt,
supra note 199, at 34 ("as a practical matter, if one party insists that the mar-
riage is irretrievably broken, even if the other attempts to contradict this as-
sertion, most courts would find the marriage to be irretrievably broken,
particularly after a contested trial").
Similar attitudes have been noted in other no fault jurisdictions, M.
WHEELER, supra note 50, at 22 (California); Abrahams, supra note 265, at 429
(Florida). See also Riley v. Riley, 271 So. 2d 181, 184 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972)
("If one marital partner has made the considered decision that the relation-
ship should be terminated, perhaps it might properly be said that the marital
relationship has broken down."); McCoy v. McCoy, 236 Ga. 633,634,225 S.E.2d
682, 683 (1976); Harwell v. Harwell, 233 Ga. 89, 91, 209 S.E.2d 625, 627 (1974);
Kretzschmar v. Kretzschmar, 48 Mich. App. 279, 285, 210 N.W.2d 352, 355
(1973); Desrochers v. Desrochers, 115 N.H. 591, 594, 347 A.2d 150, 152 (1975).
But see In re Marriage of Franks, 542 P.2d 845, 852 (Colo. 1975), stay denied,
423 U.S. 1043 (1976) ("Where the parties do not agree as to the breakdown of
the marriage, it is imperative for the court to weigh all the evidence and make
its own independent determination of that fact."); Ryan v. Ryan, 277 So. 2d
266, 271 (Fla. 1973) (denying that "the judge becomes nothing more than a
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circumstances would "just create more problems" since "it takes
two to consummate and also to maintain a marriage" and "there is
no point in trying to force a person to remain married when he or
she has no desire to do S0. '"270 Indeed, it is difficult to imagine what
evidence a respondent spouse could introduce to counter the im-
pressive demonstration of marital breakdown which is exhibited
when one of the parties to a marriage steadfastly insists that the
relationship has come to an end. The strained and hostile atmos-
phere and the ugly courtroom confrontation that would attend a
contest over whether marital breakdown has occurred would only
further evidence the fact that it had.271
Even if the survey results reflect an increasing tendency to
place "the burden of resolving or terminating marital conflicts
squarely upon the parties"2 72 themselves and a "diminishing will-
ingness of the State to be involved in the matter of marital termi-
nation,"273 divorce on demand remains even more unpalatable
politically than divorce by mutual consent. Only in the state of
Washington does the divorce court not have discretion to refuse to
terminate a marriage when one spouse tenaciously insists that it
has come to an end. The dissolution hearing takes place at least
ninety days after the commencement of the action. If one of the
parties denies that the marriage is irretrievably broken, the court
may either make a finding that the marriage is irretrievably broken
and dissolve the marriage, refer the parties to a counseling service,
or continue the case for not more than sixty days. When the case
is returned to court following a continuance or referral, if either
party continues to allege that the marriage is irretrievably broken,
the judge must enter a decree of dissolution.274 The role of the
ministerial officer receiving the 'irretrievably broken' message and... being
... compelled to drop this legislative guillotine upon the marriage, thus ex-
cising the troublesome mate from the petitioner because the petitioner has
subjectively and unilaterally determined that his marriage is irretrievably
broken").
270. Comments of judges in Judges' Questionnaire, supra note 15.
271. In reviewing divorce trials in Cracow, Poland, where a marriage could be dis-
solved upon a showing that it had broken down completely and permanently,
sociologist Jan G6recki observed that the hostility engendered during the
trial of contested cases often served as an effective demonstration of the de-
gree of breakdown. Grecki, supra note 245, at 72.
272. Holman, A Law in the Spirit of Conciliation and Understanding: Washing-
ton's Marriage Dissolution Act, 9 GONZAGA L. REv. 39, 56 (1973).
273. Glendon, supra note 265, at 704.
274. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.090.030(3) (Supp. 1977). See generally Holman,
supra note 272. Other formulations similar to the Washington statute have
been proposed. The California Governor's Commission, although advocating
that all petitions for dissolution be subjected to a "penetrating scrutiny," see
notes 214-15 supra, recommended that where the family court refused to
grant a dissolution at the divorce hearing, the proceeding should be contin-
ued for 90 days, after which the court would be required to dissolve the mar-
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court is more "declaratory record-keeping" than "adjudicatory."275
If under no fault laws marriages are explicitly or implicitly ter-
minable at will, it would be reasonable to expect that the imple-
mentation of such laws would be accompanied by a significant
upsurge in the divorce rate. As the instant Nebraska study demon-
strates, this is not necessarily true, primarily due to two factors.
First, only in a very few cases is there a genuine contest over the
grounds for divorce. According to the survey of Nebraska district
court judges, only in slightly over three percent of the contested
cases, which translates into only .75 percent of all the cases
brought to trial, did one of the parties deny in court that the mar-
riage was irretrievably broken.276 While this low figure undoubt-
edly is reflective of the fact that there are "many situations in
which one party gives up the contest somewhere along the line be-
cause he or she realizes it is hopeless, '277 the high number of un-
riage if one or both of the parties still desired to terminate the relationship.
CAT. REPORT, supra note 135, at 92-93.
An early draft of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act also required the
court to find the marriage irretrievably broken if one of the parties so alleged
under oath and if there were no minor unemancipated children of the mar-
riage. If there were children, the court could (1) find the marriage to be irre-
trievably broken, (2) dismiss the petition, or (3) adjourn the hearing for six
months. If the matter was adjourned and if one of the parties stated at the
adjourned hearing that the marriage was irretrievably broken, the court was
to dissolve the marriage. If the petition was dismissed, a new dissolution pro-
ceeding could be commenced six months later. Levy, supra note 262, at 534-
35, 7 FAm. L.Q. at 409-10.
In Manning v. Manning, 237 Ga. 746, 229 S.E.2d 611 (1976), the Georgia
Supreme Court held that a husband was entitled to a summary judgment of
divorce based on his affidavit in which he swore that the separation between
him and his wife was complete and permanent, that he was unwilling to live
with her, and that there was no possibility whatsoever of a reconciliation.
The wife had filed a counter-affidavit in which she swore that the marriage
was not irretrievably broken and that a reconciliation was possible. In Dick-
son v. Dickson, 238 Ga. 672, 235 S.E.2d 479 (1977), the court recanted this posi-
tion, holding that "[i]f respondent fies an affidavit expressing respondent's
opinion that the marriage is not irretrievably broken, and that there are genu-
ine prospects for reconciliation, then summary judgment should be denied."
Id. at 675, 235 S.E.2d at 482.
Cf. Galbut v. Garflnkl, 340 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1976) (it was error for the trial
judge to grant a divorce without considering the deposition of the hospital-
ized respondent-wife who denied that the marriage was irretrievably broken
and who felt that the marriage could be saved); Brown v. Brown, 561 S.W.2d
374 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (if a spouse, who is in default for failing to file an
answer to the original petition that sought a dissolution of the marriage, fies
an objection before the interlocutory decree becomes final, and the objection
alleges that the marriage is not irretrievably broken, the trial court must hold
a hearing on the breakdown issue).
275. See Goldstein & Gitter, mupra note 131, at 98.
276. Judges' Questionnaire, supra note 15, question 2.
277. Comment of judge in id. Even under the fault system, a spouse who really
wants to preserve the marriage may choose not to contest because of lack of
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contested divorces under both the fault and no fault systems 278
indicates that there are relatively few cases in which consent is not
given, however begrudgingly. Second, even prior to no fault di-
vorce, de facto unilateral divorce was widespread because "a per-
sistent individual who wants a divorce [could] get one by
purchasing or coercing the consent of the other spouse."279 The
party more eager for a divorce might have to buy his or her way out
by making concessions on custody, property, or support but, in the
end, if persevering, he or she would usually succeed.280
Of course, there were some cases under the old law in which
divorce-seeking husbands or wives were neither able to secure
their spouses' consent to terminate their marriages nor obtain co-
ercive divorces because they either lacked grounds or were
stymied by an available defense. The change to a no fault system
allowed them finally to escape from their unwanted relationships.
While there were not enough of these situations to make a statisti-
cally significant impact on the divorce rate as a whole,281 they
probably do account for the findings of the time series analysis
that the change in the law produced a rise in the divorce rate for
couples over thirty years of age,282 and particularly for couples
over fifty.283 Once the backlog of these cases was exhausted, how-
ever, the divorce rate dropped back towards the pre-intervention
level.284
5. Are More Objective Standardsfor Irretrievable Breakdown
Needed?
However insignificant or transitory their effect on the rate of di-
vorce has been, the ease with which unilateral divorces can be ob-
tained under the irretrievable breakdown ground is troubling to
many. While it is true that under a no fault system one spouse can
no longer keep the other tied to a dead marriage, it is also true that
funds to hire an attorney, ignorance of his or her rights, a feeling of helpless-
ness and resignation, or coercion by the other spouse. Bodenheimer, supra
note 224, at 205.
278. See note 156 & accompanying text supra. But see note 277 supra.
279. Glendon, supra note 97, at 346-47; Glendon, supra note 265, at 704. See also
note 164 & accompanying text supra.
280. H. KRAUSE, NUTs ELL, supra note 205, at 289-91; Bodenheimer, supra note 224,
at 180, 182; Wheeler, supra note 29, at 612. Some jurisdictions, which allow
divorce after prescribed periods of separation or living apart, also, in effect,
permit divorce by unilateral demand. See note 180 supra.
281. See note 65 & accompanying text supra.
282. See note 69 & accompanying text supra.
283. See notes 70-71 & accompanying text supra. The no fault divorces of those
couples who failed to seek a marriage dissolution under the old law because
they resented the name-calling and fault-finding it entailed, also are responsi-
ble for the increase in the divorce rate for these age groups.
284. See note 72 & accompanying text supra.
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the breakdown ground allows the party who has engineered the
destruction of the marriage to impose a divorce on a spouse who
does not want one.2 5 In addition to the blow to the ego that one
who is sued for divorce suffers, the price that might have to be paid
in an unwanted divorce proceeding, in terms of the loss of custody
of one's children, the loss of one's home, and the loss of one's other
property and income, can be devastating.28 6 Particularly tragic can
be the fate of the wife in a long-term traditional marriage. At mid-
life she can find that she has been summarily dismissed from the
job as housewife and homemaker at which she has worked for a
decade or more and for which she may have sacrificed a career of
her own.2 7 She has little to show for the years she invested in her
285. Under the majority view a wrongdoing husband can come home
every Saturday night for five years, drunk and penniless because of
skirt-chasing, gambling, or some other misdeeds; then, he may beat,
bruise and abuse his wife because he is unhappy with himself, and
then he will be permitted to go down and get a divorce on printed
forms purchased at a department store and tell the trial judge that
the marriage is "irretrievably broken". Or, the offending wife, after
jumping from bed to bed with her new found paramours, chronically
drunk, and when at home nagging, brawling and quarreling, all
against the wishes of a faithful husband who remains at home nur-
turing the children, is permitted to divorce her husband who does not
desire a divorce, but rather, has one forced upon him, not because of
anything he has done, but because the offending wife tells the trial
court that her marriage is 'irretrievably broken".
Ryan v. Ryan, 277 So. 2d 266, 278 (Fla. 1973) (Robert, J., dissenting).
See also In re Marriage of Walton, 28 Cal. App. 3d 108, 119, 104 Cal. Rptr.
472, 481 (1972) (while it may be true that "the elimination of the fault concept
is unjust and unfair because it permits a spouse guilty of morally reprehensi-
ble conduct to take advantage of that conduct in terminating marriage against
the wishes of an entirely unoffending spouse" and while this "may be offen-
sive to those steeped in a tradition of personal responsibility based on fault,
j * * [i]t is not the province of courts to inquire into the wisdom of legislative
enactments"); Roberts v. Roberts, 200 Neb. 256, 263 N.W.2d 449 (1978), appeal
dismissed, 99 S. Ct. 60 (1978) (whether the petitioner's relationship with the
woman in whose home he took up residence is meretricious is not relevant,
as it is apparent that the marriage is irretrievably broken).
It is doubtful, however, whether there are many instances in which one
party is entirely blameless for the conditions that caused the marriage to fail.
See notes 130-31 & accompanying text supra.
286. In In re Marriage of Franks, 542 P.2d 845, 852 (Colo. 1975), stay denied, 423
U.S. 1043 (1976), the respondent husband unsuccessfully argued that the fact
that wives have been awarded custody of children in the vast majority of
cases demonstrates that Colorado's irretrievable breakdown statute uncon-
stitutionally discriminates against men.
287. Karl Llewellyn viewed one of the functions of marriage to be to assure that
support for women in their older years be "in decent measure independent of
continuing sex charm." He felt marriage acts as "[o]ld age insurance, of a
sort. [A] wife.. . is not simply to be fired... even under [the] most ruth-
less individualistic capitalism." Llewellyn, supra note 110, at 1290 (footnote
omitted). See also note 205 supra.
Unlike the situation in some other cultures, the widowed or divorced are
not readily reabsorbed into their original families in Western societies. PuT-
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marriage, except the financial provisions of a divorce decree.2 88
Inequitable results of this type, as well as the perceived need to
better protect the interests of the children of the marriage, have
led critics of the irretrievable breakdown standard to call for the
addition to no fault statutes of "some brake, some objective proof
of marriage breakdown." 289 Accordingly, statutory schemes have
been drafted which specify that a marriage will be deemed irre-
trievably broken only after a stipulated period of separation or
upon proof of serious marital discord or misconduct.290
There is little agreement on how long a period of separation
TIG ASUNDER, supra note 90, at 167. Consequently, the state increasingly has
become involved in efforts to alleviate the plight of "displaced homemakers."
See, e.g., The Nebraska Equal Opportunity for Displaced Homemakers Act,
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 42-1301 to 1309 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
288. It has been argued that a wife acquires a legally cognizable property interest
in the social and economic benefits of her marriage when she has made sub-
stantial contributions to a marriage of long duration. A change in the law
should not be applied to her marriage retroactively so as to subject her to
being "fired" at her husband's whim. The situation has been analogized to
that in Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), in which the court held that a
university instructor, who had held his job for a number of years, could claim
a "liberty" or "property" interest protected'by the fourteenth amendment in
his continued employment, if he could demonstrate from the circumstances
of his service and from other relevant facts, that a de facto tenure system
existed. Brief for Appellant at 8-12, Buchholz v. Buchholz, 197 Neb. 180, 248
N.W.2d 21 (1976). See also L EisLER, supra note 197, at 14. The Nebraska
Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that while a wife has a legiti-
mate interest in her status as a married woman, this interest does not consti-
tute property under the fourteenth amendment or under NEB. CONST. art 1, §
3, and that a wife has no vested interest in the state's maintaining in force the
grounds for divorce that existed at the time of the marriage. Buchholz v.
Buchholz, 197 Neb. 180, 181-83, 248 N.W.2d 21, 22-23 (1976). See also In re Mar-
riage of Walton, 28 Cal. App. 3d 108, 113, 104 Cal. Rptr. 472, 476-77 (1972); Hop-
kins v. Hopkins, 540 S.W.2d 783, 786 (Texas Ct. App. 1976).
289. Foster & Freed, supra note 233, at 452.
290. Exemplary of a formula that combines both separation and misconduct deft-
nitions is the revision of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act proposed by
the Family Law Section of the American Bar Association. The applicable sec-
tion provides:
(a) The [ court shall enter a decree of dissolution of
marriage if
(2) the court finds that the marriage is irretrievably broken,
which finding shall be established by proof (a) that the parties have
lived separate and apart for a period of more than one year next pre-
ceding the commencment of this proceeding, or, (b) that such seri-
ous marital misconduct has occurred which has so adversely affected
the physical or mental health of the petitioning party as to make it
impossible for the parties to continue the marital relation, and that
reconciliation is improbable ....
PROPOSED REVISED AcT, supra note 204, § 302.
Although they did not adopt the proposed changes, the Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws did bow somewhat to the demand for
more definitive standards. Section 302 of the Uniform Act now provides:
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must be before it constitutes objective proof that the marriage is
no longer viable. While it has been reported that most marriage
counselors would agree that if an estranged couple does not recon-
cile within three to six months, chances are they never Will,29 1 an-
other commentator has termed a one-year period "the rock bottom
minimum.' 292 Statutes which require periods of separation before
dissolutions under the irretrievable breakdown standard can be
decreed call for durations varying from sixty days293 to five
years.294 The dilemma is that short periods of separation accom-
plish little except to assure that the decision to seek a divorce is
not made with undue haste, a feat which a waiting period2 95 can
achieve just as well, while lengthy periods can be unduly burden-
some where prompt relief is desirable. Lengthy separation periods
are frequently circumvented by fabricating evidence, using alter-
native grounds,29 6 or "migrating" to more sympathetic states.
(a) The [ ] court shall enter a decree of dissolution of
marriage if:
(2) the court finds that the marriage is irretrievably broken, if
the finding is supported by evidence that (i) the parties have lived
separate and apart for a period of more than 180 days next preceding
the commencement of the proceeding, or (ii) there is serious marital
discord adversely affecting the attitude of one or both of the parties
toward the marriage ....
UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT § 302. This version of the Uniform Act
has been enacted only in Montana. See MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 48-
316(1) (b) (Cum. Supp. 1977). In the view of one commentator "the change
was merely cosmetic: The 180 day period is so short as to render the 'living
apart' requirement next to meaningless, and the 'marital discord' ground is
phrased so broadly that anything will go." H. KRAUSE, NUTSHELL, supra note
205, at 300.
291. Foster & Freed, supra note 233, at 452.
292. Bodenheimer, supra note 224, at 217.
293. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.170(1) (Baldwin 1973) (there must be a finding that
the marriage is irretrievably broken; a 60 day separation does not in itself
prove breakdown).
294. Divorce Rdform Act, 1969, c. 55, § 2(I) (e) (England). Where both parties want
the divorce the period is two years. Id. § 2(I) (d).
295. See notes 317-32 & accompanying text infra. Requiring a period of separation,
however, might have the advantage of acquainting the parties with what it
will be like to be divorced.
296. For example, in 1976 it was reported that less than 10% of the divorce decrees
in Massachusetts had been obtained on the ground of an irretrievable break-
down of the marriage. H. KRAUSE, NUTSHELL, supra note 205, at 298. This is
understandable as the required waiting period before a divorce could be de-
creed onthat ground was at least 10 months if pursuant to an agreement filed
with the court, and two years in nonconsensual cases. Act of Nov. 19, 1975, ch.
698, § 2, 1975 Mass. Acts 866 (amended 1977). The periods were subsequently
shortened to at least 6 months for consensual divorces and one year for non-
consensual divorces. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 208, §§ 1A, 1B (West Supp.
1978). In all cases the decree does not become final for another six months.
Id. § 21.
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Moreover, merely dressing up a separation ground in the guise of
breakdown does nothing to alleviate the many problems of inter-
pretation that traditionally have plagued separation statutes,297 in-
cluding the effect that the resumption of cohabitation in an
attempt to reconcile will have on the running of the separation pe-
riod.29 8
Some jurisdictions which have insisted on more objective
standards for determining whether marital breakdown has oc-
curred disallow all divorces where the parties have not lived apart
for the requisite length of time or where there has not been serious
marital discord or misconduct.299 Others require specific proof of
297. See note 180 ,supra. See also Wife S. v. Husband S., 375 A.2d 451 (DeL 1977) (a
divorce on the ground that the marriage was irretrievably broken, as evi-
denced by the fact that the parties were voluntarily living separate and apart,
was improperly granted where the separation was not mutually voluntary);
In re Marriage of Uhls, 549 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (although the par-
ties continued to live in the same house, their lives were separate enough to
qualify them for a divorce under a breakdown statute requiring that the
couple live separate and apart for 24 months); Santos v. Santos, [1972] Farn.
247 (C.A.) (under an English statute requiring the parties to live apart for a
continuous period of at least two years, a mere physical separation will not
suffice; the petitioner must also show that during the separation he or she
considered the marriage to be over and never intended to return).
298. See note 180 supra. Some states, which make separation an element in deter-
mining whether marital breakdown has occurred, allow the separation period
to be suspended for a time while the parties attempt a reconciliation. See,
e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 247.082 (West Supp. 1978); Divorce Reform Act, 1969, c.
55, §§ 3(3) to 3(5) (England). Even where such statutes exist it cannot be
said that forcing couples to separate before they can get a divorce promotes
reconciliation. For some couples it may be difficult to separate, even though
all the other incidents of marriage have been forsaken. Among the reasons
advanced as to why the parties might feel compelled to remain under the
same roof are "economic necessity, stubbornness, jockeying for position as to
possession of house and contents." In re Marriage of Uhls, 549 S.W.2d 107, 112
(Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
299. In Minnesota a "court may make a finding that there has been an irretriev-
able breakdown of the marriage relationship if the finding is supported by
evidence of any of the following": (1) a "course of conduct detrimental to the
marriage relationship of the party seeking the dissolution;" (2) imprison-
ment; (3) habitual alcoholism or chemical dependency- (4) commitment for
mental illness; (5) one year separation under a decree of separate mainte-
nance; (6) "[s]erious marital discord adversely affecting the attitude of one
or both parties toward the marriage." MInN. STAT. ANN. § 518.06 (West Supp.
1978).
In England irretrievable breakdown is the sole ground for divorce, but
breakdown can be established only by satisfying the court of one or more of
the following- (1) "the respondent has committed adultery and the petitioner
finds it intolerable to live with the respondent"; (2) "the respondent has be-
haved in such a way that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live
with the respondent"; (3) two years continuous desertion by the respondent;
(4) living apart for a continuous period of at least two years where both par-
ties consent to the divorce; (5) living apart for a continuous period of five
years. Divorce Reform Act, 1969, c. 55, §§ 1, 2(1). The adoption of similar cri-
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this sort only where there is a contest over whether the marriage
has broken down irretrievably.300 Although it has been held that,
even under a statute that requires a demonstration of serious mar-
ital discord, "'fault' is not determinative of whether the marriage
should be dissolved,"30 1 the "objective criteria" which have been
fashioned "come perilously close to traditional fault grounds. '3 02
It may be laudable to attempt to assure "that a spouse, who by his
or her action makes the life of the other spouse intolerable, [does]
not profit by his or her own wrongdoing and thereby obtain a disso-
lution of the marriage over the objection of the other perhaps inno-
teria by Nebraska was urged by Senator Fred W. Carstens. Transcrip supra
note 14, at 4109.
The English Act is a "breakdown" statute in the sense that more than a
wrongful act is required, the act must lead to the destruction of the marriage
relationship. In requiring a wrongful act or lengthy separation, however, the
Divorce Reform Act makes it difficult to dissolve many broken marriages. In
theory, even proof of one of the five facts is not conclusive. The court can still
deny the divorce if it decides that the marriage has not broken down irretriev-
ably. Divorce Reform Act, 1969, c. 55, § 2(3). "In practice, however, [the proof
of] such facts almost always will conclude the matter." Rosenbaum, supra
note 24, at 367. In practice, too, uncontested divorces are easily procured. See
Matrimonial Causes Rule, 1977 STAT. INST. No. 344, discussed at note 261
s-upra. See also PROPOSED REVISED ACT, supra note 204, § 302; UNIFORM MAR-
RIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 302 (both set out at note 290 supra).
300. The facts which must be shown under Missouri's "no fault" law in order for
the court to find that the marriage has broken down irretrievably are the
same as those required by English law, as set out at note 299 supra, with the
following exceptions: (1) one or more of the guidelines need be satisfied only
if one of the parties denies that the marriage is irretrievably broken and (2)
the required periods of desertion (six months) and living separate and apart
(12 months if by mutual consent, 24 if not) are shorter. Mo. ANN. STAT. §
452.320 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
301. Gummels v. Gummels, 561 S.W.2d 442, 443 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978). The court
noted that the guideline of the Missouri statute, requiring that the respon-
dent behave in such a way that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected
to continue to live with the respondent, refers to the respondent's behav-
ior-not misbehavior. "It will suffice if the behavior of one spouse, combined
with the attitude and behavior of the other, indicates a reasonable likelihood
the marriage cannot be preserved." Id. at 443. The court granted the dissolu-
tion based on the wife's testimony that only she disciplined the children
while her husband consoled them and would not "back her up," that the par-
ties were unable to communicate or "iron out" their differences, and that she
could not live with him and no longer loved him. Id. at 443.
It has been suggested that the similar English law has caused a shift in
emphasis from culpability or moral turpitude to responsibility for the break-
down of the marriage. The concern now is not with guilt but with causation.
Finlay, Reluctant But Inevitable: The Retreat of Matrimonial Fault, 38 MOD.
L REV. 153, 156 (1975).
302. H. KRAUSE, NusHELT, supra note 205, at 297. See also Rosenbaum, supra
note 24, at 374 ("the sort of behavior envisaged by [the second English]
guideline... is in many ways similar to that covered by the old matrimonial
offenses of cruelty and constructive desertion").
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cent spouse. '30 3 However, it is disturbingly reminiscent of the
discredited past to hear the Missouri Court of Appeals refuse to
dissolve a marriage which "may well be beyond saving."304 Even
though it was "but delaying the inevitable," the court felt it had no
choice because "we as an appellate court, construe and apply the
law, we do not make it."305
Proposals that would similarly restrict the ease with which a
divorce can be procured when one spouse does not want the mar-
riage terminated and does not believe it to be irretrievably broken,
have been introduced frequently in the Nebraska Legislature.30 6 It
would be tempting to support the philosophy behind these sug-
303. In re Marriage of Mitchell, 545 S.W.2d 313, 318 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976). Missouri
not only protects innocent spouses from unwanted divorces, but guilty ones
as well. Under Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.305(2) (Vernon 1977), if either party re-
quests a decree of legal separation rather than a decree of dissolution, the
court must refuse the dissolution and grant the legal separation. See also
Smith v. Smith, 561 S.W.2d 714 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); McRoberts v. McRoberts,
555 S.W.2d 682 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
304. In re Marriage of Mitchell, 545 S.W.2d 313 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
305. Id. at 320. Mitchell concerned an eleven-year marriage that had produced two
children. The petitioner had separated from his wife on two occasions. After
the first separation, the wife admitted her need to seek psychiatric counseling
and the husband admitted that he had had intercourse with another woman.
In the course of the marriage both had received marital counseling. The peti-
tioner stated that for the past three or four years he had no longer loved his
wife; the respondent had realized that something was wrong with the mar-
riage for five years. The couple had had "quarrels" or "discussions." The
wife was unhappy that her husband was away so often and so late at night,
the husband that the wife never read or attempted personal growth. The
couple's difficulty appears to have been largely one of growing incom-
patability, probably not fully attributable to the fault of either party. The
Missouri Court of Appeals concluded, however, that "[tihe behavior in this
record which would make life intolerable is essentially petitioner's, not re-
spondent's." Id. at 320. For similar decisions under the English statute, see
Finlay, supra note 301, at 156-66; Rosenbaum, supra note 24, at 371-76.
306. IB. 284, 85th Neb. Leg., 1st Sess. (1977) (marriages of more than 15 years'
duration shall not be dissolved unless both parties testify that the marriage is
irretrievably broken or the parties have been legally separated for five years);
L.B. 913, 84th Neb. Leg., 2d Sess. §§ 2, 10, 13 (1976) (in marriages of more than
10 years or marriages in which there are unemancipated children, if the re-
spondent has denied that the marriage is irretrievably broken or has asked
for a legal separation, the court shall enter a decree of legal separation if it
finds that the petitioner has created the major part of the conflict within the
marriage; also the parties may enter into an interspousal marriage contract
that, among other things, establishes the conditions under which the mar-
riage may be dissolved); L.B. 394, 83d Neb. Leg., 1st Sess. § 8 (1973) (if one of
the parties denies that the marriage is irretrievably broken, the marriage can
be dissolved only upon a finding that the respondent spouse has engaged in
specified wrongful conduct which includes, inter alia, adultery, abandon-
ment, personal violence upon petitioner, nagging for conduct above reproach,
failure to provide the homemaking spouse with a standard of living commen-
surate with the financial means available, or refusing to perform for an ex-
tended period his or her share of the household duties as previously agreed
to in a written agreement so that petitioner's mental or physical health is
impaired).
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gested reforms, if not the proposals themselves, if it could be as-
sured that they would operate to the benefit of only those spouses
who reasonably and sincerely thought that their marriages were
salvageable. Unfortunately, this would not be the case. The moti-
vations that lead one to try to hold onto a marriage that his or her
spouse no longer wants are varied and complex; while a sincere
desire to preserve the relationship obviously is one-spite, greed,
pity, and self-delusion are also strong possibilities. 307 Behind the
tenacious resistance of many of those who fight the divorce is a
deep-seated but unconscious desire to break off the relationship,
combined with an unwillingness to accept the responsibility for
ending it.308
A framework for the dissolution of marriage that makes a con-
tested unilateral divorce exceedingly more burdensome to procure
than a mutually agreed to uncontested proceeding, can subject the
resisting spouse to relentless pressure to discontinue his or her
opposition, no matter what its motivation. More significantly, the
ability of one spouse to delay and complicate the divorce by pre-
cipitating a fight over whether breakdown of the marriage has oc-
curred can be a powerful and dangerous weapon in unscrupulous
hands, even if the capacity to actually prevent the divorce is lack-
ing.3 09 To those for whom the divorce process is a traumatic expe-
rience, and there are many,3 10 even an exorbitant price may not be
too much to pay for an expeditious proceeding. The result can be a
settlement of financial and custodial issues advantageous to the
307. See note 163 supra.
308. The person who plays the active role must take upon himself the
full responsibility for breaking the relationship, and this is a real bur-
den, but he is helped in his struggle by the continued opposition of
the other. The person who plays the passive role usually suffers
more intensely because he has very likely reached a lesser point of
alienation and because the severance of the relation, coming as it
does at the will of the other party, constitutes a great ego thwart and
threat to his security as well as a denial of love; nevertheless, he is
enabled to continue his life because of the virtuous feeling which he
has; he has really a deep, unconscious desire to break the relation-
ship, and he is put in the fortunate position of one who is able to
realize his desires without taking the responsibility for them. At the
same time, the person in the active role requires the active opposi-
tion of the other; this opposition gives him a feeling of security and
enhances his ego.
W. WALLER & R HILL, supra note 194, at 521. Should for some reason the
person in the active role drop his or her agitation for divorce, the opposing
spouse often will recommence the arrested alienation process and may even
become the divorce seeker. Id. at 522.
309. See note 165 & accompanying text supra.
310. See generally W. GOODE, supra note 132, at 182-88; R. WEiss, supra note 91,
at 47-68; Chiriboga & Cutler, Stress Responses Among Divorcing Men and
Women, 1 J. DIVORCE 95 (1977).
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more cunning and less desperate of the parties3 n' and the trans-
forming of a law designed to protect innocent spouses into one
which aids the avaricious.
In short, efforts to temper the defects of the pure breakdown
principle by engrafting onto it so-called objective testing standards
produces a system with different, but equally troubling, deficien-
cies. As Professor Homer H. Clark, Jr. has said:
Either we accept the view of psychologists that fault is irrelevant to di-
vorce or we do not. If we abandon the notion of fault, then we will have to
tolerate the granting of divorces to some plaintiffs who appear to the un-
trained, moralistic eye as unworthy; and some spouses who would like to
remain married, for whatever reason, will have to accept a divorce. There
does not seem to be any device which would enable us to have it both
ways. If fault is permitted to enter the case at all, then it seems likely that
the defects of the existing system will follow 3 1 2
Faced then with this "choice of evils, 31 3 we would tend to agree
with the Archbishop's Group that "of the alternatives available to
contemporary society a law based on breakdown would be the
lesser evil by a very considerable way."3 1 4 This law places the ulti-
mate burden of restoring or interring an ailing marriage on the par-
ties. 'The state, however, should take steps to assure that their
decision rests upon adequate knowledge and reflection. 3 15
311. While the settlement agreement is subject to the review of the court, its
terms, except for those providing for the custody and support of minor chil-
dren, are binding upon the court unless it finds the agreement to be uncon-
scionable. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-366(2) (Reissue 1974). See also Paxton v.
Paxton, 201 Neb. 545,270 N.W.2d 900 (1978); Weber v. Weber, 200 Neb. 659, 265
N.W.2d 436 (1978); Prochazka v. Prochazka, 198 Neb. 525, 253 N.W.2d 407
(1977). When asked in the judges' survey to indicate in approximately what
proportion of cases they ordered significant changes in agreed-to property
settlements, 26 of 30 judges responded that they made significant changes in
5% or less. Two judges said they altered 25%, but these figures, as well as at
least some of the others, referred mainly to changes in the amount of child
support. Even including these higher figures, the average of the percentages
was less than five. Judges' Questionnaire, supra note 15, question 16. It is
doubtful that these figures would change significantly under a lesser stan-
dard of review. Without adversary testimony most judges would not alter
property settlements unless they appeared to be patently unfair.
312. Clark, supra note 17, at 408-09.
313. PurNG ASUNDER, supra note 90, at 56.
314. Id. at 56. But see Llewellyn, Behind the Law of Divorce: 11, 33 COLUm. L. REV.
249, 281:
There is no 'Just" solution when one partner calls for freedom and
the other for her earned and vested rights. With all its hardships, I
see no hope of saner compromise than in the theory of the typical
American rules of law: if there be in the defendant no marriage-fault
of reasonably serious character, and if he or she remains determined
to hang on, an "innocent" spouse's interests plus those of a going
though creaking concern outweigh the adversary interest.
315. "[U]nwarranted speed and intemperate decisions have been designated as
pitfalls to avoid in 'no-fault' divorce proceedings." In re Marriage of Baier, 561
P.2d 20, 23 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977).
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E. "No decree shall he entered. . . unless the court finds that every
reasonable effort to effect reconciliation has been made. '31
6
L Waiting Periods
The brakes Nebraska has chosen to apply in order to discourage
hasty and ill-considered dissolutions are the imposition of a sixty-
day waiting period following service of process before a suit for
divorce can be heard,3 17 and a requirement that every reasonable
effort to effect reconciliation be made before a divorce can be
granted.318
Many states have enacted mandatory waiting or "cooling-off'
periods in efforts to assure that marriages will not be dissolved
precipitately. Waiting periods provide time to reflect on both the
chances of rebuilding the marriage and the consequences of termi-
nating it. Counseling can be sought and a reconciliation perhaps
effected before the legal battle heats up in earnest. If a divorce is
still desired after the expiration of the statutory period, a dissolu-
tion can be granted with greater confidence that the marriage in-
deed has broken down.3 19
It can be argued that a cooling-off period of a longer duration
than the sixty days provided by Nebraska law would better serve
these objectives. 3 20 The Nebraska judiciary, however, seems more
than satisfied with the current provision, with all thirty judges who
responded to the survey indicating they thought sixty days to be
the appropriate length.3 2 1 In fact, the state bench has demon-
strated little tolerance for appreciably longer waiting periods. As
first enacted, Nebraska's no fault law mandated an interval of six
months between service of process and hearing, but provided that
it could be waived if the court determined that conciliation efforts
had failed.322 All but one of the district court judges routinely
waived the waiting period after two months had passed.323 Conse-
quently the statute was amended and the waiting period reduced
316. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-360 (Reissue 1974).
317. NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-363 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
318. NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-360 (Reissue 1974).
319. See generally H. CLAcK, supra note 118, at 387-88; Elliott, supra note 60, at 136;
Goldstein & Gitter, supra note 131, at 90-91.
320. Among those states which have waiting periods, the lengths vary from 20
days, e.g., Fla. STAT. ANN. § 61.19 (West Supp. 1978); IDAHO CODE § 32-716
(Supp. 1978), to one year, MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 208, § 1B (West Supp.
1978) (see note 296 supra), with most being from 30 to 90 days.
321. Judges' Questionnaire, supra note 15, question 15. This was the only ques-
tion in the survey on which there was unanimous agreement.
322. Act of April 8, 1972, LB. 820, § 17, 1972 Neb. Laws 246 (repealed 1974).
323. Marriage & Divorce Law Subcomm. of the Judiciary Comm. of the Neb. Leg.,
Proposed Alternative Amendments to the Nebraska No-Fault Divorce Law,
Preliminary Report (Oct. 1973).
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to sixty days.324
It is impossible to establish a cooling-off period which would be
appropriate for all circumstances. Where the filing of a petition for
dissolution was the result of an impetuous decision, more time
might be needed, both to allow for reconsideration and to permit
the respondent spouse, who may not have been prepared for the
decision, to recover from the trauma and decide how to respond.32
Of course, the statutory waiting period is only a minimum and the
pre-hearing interval can be extended by the parties and their attor-
neys, or by the court.326 Where the decision to divorce has under-
gone a long gestation period, as is usually the case,327 further delay
may not be necessary and could be harmful. Once the hard deci-
sion to get out of the marriage finally has been made, there is an
understandable need for finality and stability, which can be
achieved only after the completion of the divorce process. 323
324. Act of Mar. 22, 1974, LB. 1015, § 3, 1974 Neb. Laws 1040 (codified at NEB. RV.
STAT. § 42-363 (Cum. Supp. 1978)). There is no provision allowing the court to
waive the 60 day period, although one has been proposed for cases in which
no children are to be affected by the decree. L.B. 163, 85th Neb. Leg., 1st Sess.
(1977).
325. William Goode has reported that where the time between the final decision to
divorce and the filing of the suit is short, trauma is likely to be high. Many of
these cases are ones in which one party simply "announced" that he or she
wanted a divorce. W. GOODE, supra note 132, at 193.
326. It should be noted that Goode found that the precipitate divorce, in which
one party suddenly demands a dissolution and insists on getting it quickly,
usually moves rapidly through all the stages. Id. at 179-80.
327. "Divorces [characteristically] are preceded by a long period of conflict and
the final action is the result of a decision and action process that lasts on the
average about two years." Id. at 137.
328. See note 245 supra. Unfortunately the process is not fully completed until
the decree becomes final, six months after it was rendered. NEB. REV. STAT. §
42-363 (Cum. Supp. 1978); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-372 (Reissue 1974). There is
little justification for this interlocutory period. It is doubtful that many
couples who fail to reconcile before the hearing do so afterwards, and those
that do can always remarry. While the interlocutory period does prevent a
divorcee from remarrying with unseemly haste and does provide a time dur-
ing which the court can correct mistakes, these benefits hardly outweigh the
needless prolonging of uncertainty nor the many problems that a six month
post-decree wait can engender. One problem is that if one spouse dies during
the interlocutory period, the other will inherit or take a statutory forced share
of the estate, no doubt contrary to the wishes of the deceased. See, e.g., In re
Bassett's Estate, 189 Neb. 206, 201 N.W.2d 848 (1972). Another is that some
people, not understanding that their marriage is still in effect, enter into void
second marriages before the interlocutory period expires. See, e.g., Copple v.
Bowlin, 172 Neb. 467, 110 N.W.2d 117 (1961) (because the parties married one
day too early the "wife" of six years was not entitled to workmen's compensa-
tion benefits for herself and her daughter from a previous marriage when the
"husband/stepfather" died). See also C. FooTE, R. LEvy & F. SANDER, supra
note 26, at 1092 n.76; Henderson, supra note 13, at 10-11.
If the Unicameral does not see fit to repeal the interlocutory period, it
should provide that marriages celebrated during the six-month period are
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It is not unusual for divorce actions to be dropped during the
waiting period.32 Whether this can be ascribed in large measure
to the ameliorative effect of the enforced delay is uncertain. Even
if the waiting period is responsible for a number of reconciliations,
it is difficult to know how many will be lasting.330 The general feel-
ing is that such periods are helpful,33 ' but that they are much more
effective when counseling resources are available to aid the couple
in seriously exploring the prospects for reconciliation. 3 2
2. Reconciliation Attempts
The requirement of Nebraska's no fault dissolution of marriage
law that all efforts to effect reconciliation be made serves two re-
lated functions: (1) inducing the couple to seek professional coun-
seling which can aid them in reaching a reconciliation or in
determining that divorce is the proper measure; and (2) providing
the court with a standard which can aid it in determining whether
a marriage has irretrievably broken down. 333
Prior legislation 334 had authorized conciliation courts to be es-
validated if the parties are living together as husband and wife when the di-
vorce becomes final, at least where the marriages were entered into in good
faith by one of the parties. Cf. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-375 (Reissue 1974)
(prohibiting annulments of voidable, but not void, marriages when the par-
ties cohabit after the impediment is removed).
329. Of the 421 divorce petitions filed in Lancaster County during the first six
months of 1970,23.3% were dismissed. Letter from Kandra Hahn, Clerk of the
District Court, Lancaster County, to Alan Frank (Oct. 30, 1978). See also LAN-
CASTER COUNTY CONCIIATION COURT, 1972 ANNUAL REPORT 1 [hereinafter
these reports will be cited as CONCIIATION CT. REP.], estimating that one out
of three petitions for divorce are not carried through to the decree stage. This
is about the national average. P. JACOBSON, supra note 37, at 119 (25%); Alex-
ander, The Family Court-An Obstacle Race?, 19 U. Prrr. L. Rsv. 602, 608
(1958) (30%). Not all of these are reconciliations. Some petitions are with-
drawn or dismissed for want of prosecution even though the couple has sepa-
rated. P. JACOBSON, supra note 37, at 119.
330. See Johnstone, Divorce Dismissals: A Field Study, 1 KAN. L. REV. 245 (1953)
(reporting that only 30 out of a randomly selected 47 couples whose divorce
action had been dismissed were still living together one to seven years after
the dismissal- in 44 of the cases the reason for the dismissal was reconcilia-
tion).
331. "[T]he principal success of the [Iowa] act, it appears to me, is the provision
of the ninety-day waiting period, giving the parties time to seriously consider
the matter." Sass, supra note 39, at 640 (quoting Iowa attorney).
332. See CAL. REPORT, supra note 135, at 23-24; Conway, To Insure Domestic Tran-
quility: Reconciliation Services as an Alternative to the Divorce Attorney, 9 J.
FAM. L. 408, 419 (1970) (without reconciliation services "[i]nstead of 'cooling-
off' many couples 'stew"').
333. "A finding of irretrievable breakdown is a determination that there is no rea-
sonable prospect of reconciliation." UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT §
305(c).
334. Conciliation Court Law, ch. 228, 1965 Neb. Laws 654 (codified at NEB. REv.
STAT. §§ 42-801 to 823 (Reissue 1974)).
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tablished in counties in which the district courts determined that,
due to the social conditions and number of domestic relations
cases, they were necessary for "the full and proper consideration
of such cases" 33 5 and to "provide means for the reconciliation of
spouses and the amicable settlement of domestic and family con-
troversies. '3 3 6 To date conciliation courts have been established in
Douglas and Lancaster Counties. Prior to the filing of a divorce
action,3 37 or while such action is pending,33 8 either or both spouses
can invoke the jurisdiction of the court. If no divorce action is
pending, the filing of a petition for reconciliation precludes the in-
stitution of a dissolution proceeding until thirty days after the peti-
tion is heard.3 39 In addition, the trial court is empowered to
transfer a divorce action to the conciliation court.340 In counties in
which no conciliation court has been established, the judge may
refer the parties to qualified marriage counselors, family service
agencies, or other qualified persons or agencies if there appears to
be some reasonable possibility of effecting reconciliation.3 41
The results of the survey of Nebraska district court judges pro-
vide a fascinating glimpse at the variety of ways in which these
conciliation mechanisms are employed. For the state as a whole,
in only somewhat more than half the cases did the parties see mar-
riage counselors or the equivalent before the dissolution hearing.
In Lancaster County, however, counselors were consulted prior to
trial in ninety-five percent of the cases. The average for the rest of
the state was slightly over thirty percent, with some judges report-
ing that in as few as five percent of the cases did the parties have
the benefit of counseling 4 2
Clearly in Lancaster County the mandate that every reasonable
335. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-803 (Reissue 1974).
336. Id. § 42-801.
337. Id. § 42-812.
338. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-821(2) (Curn. Supp. 1978).
339. Id. § 42-821(1). The hearings actually are conferences with the conciliation
counselor and are confidential NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-810 (Reissue 1974).
340. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-822 (Reissue 1974). Whether a case comes to the concili-
ation court by petition or by a transfer from the district court, priority is given
to those cases in which there are minor children whose welfare may be ad-
versely affected by the dissolution of the marriage and in which there are
reasonable prospects of reconciliation. Id. §§ 42-811, 42-822. Where no chil-
dren are involved or where help in securing a settlement is the main motiva-
tion, applications for conciliation proceedings are accepted only if the work of
the court in cases involving children will not be seriously impeded. Id. § 42-
823.
341. Id. § 42-360. Cases generally are referred only when at least one of the parties
believes that the marriage can be saved. Comment of judge in Judges' Ques-
tionnaire, supra note 15. In 1977,17 cases were referred by the domestic rela-
tions court to the Lancaster County Conciliation Court. 1977 CONCILIATION
CT. REP., supra note 329, at 13.
342. Judges' Questionnaire, =upra note 15, question 12. The figures for individual
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effort to effect reconciliation be made has become the equivalent of
compulsory counseling,3 4 3 with attorneys advising their clients not
to appear before the court unless they have consulted a counselor
at least once." The value of many of these consultations is open
to question.3 4 5 Outside Lancaster County, while a visit to a coun-
judges from outside Lancaster County range from 90% to 5%. No judge in
Douglas County reported a pre-hearing counseling rate higher than 50%.
343. In some states counseling is compulsory. For example, until 1977 a Maine
statute provided: "When the alleged cause is irreconcilable marital differ-
ences, a divorce shall not be granted unless both parties have received coun-
seling by a professional counselor ... ." Act of Oct. 3, 1973, ch. 532, 1973 Me.
Acts 932 (amended 1977). In Connecticut, if either spouse or the counsel for
any minor children of the marriage requests conciliation, each party must
attend at least two consultation sessions with a conciliator. CoNN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 46-41 (West 1978).
See also In re Marriage of Penney, 203 N.W.2d 380 (Iowa 1973) (court held
that because under IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.16 (West Supp. 1978) counseling is
mandatory unless waived by both parties, the conciliation procedures must
be complied with when the wife refused to waive them, even though the
couple had been separated for more than five years, pre-fling counseling had
not been successful, and the differences between the parties were deep-
seated). But see Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.320(2) (Vernon Supp. 1978) ("No court
shall require counseling as a condition precedent to a decree, nor shall any
employee of any court, or of the state or any political subdivisions of the
state, be utilized as a marriage counselor.").
The arguments against mandatory counseling can be summarized as fol-
lows: (1) government-coerced counseling infringes on individual choice and
personal liberty as well as the privacy of the intimate marriage relationship;
(2) those who voluntarily participate in a reconciliation program are more
amenable to therapy and more willing to explore honestly the sources of
their marital problems and possible solutions; coercion only creates resist-
ance; (3) scarce counseling resources should be channeled toward those
cases in which need is great or chances for success high; they should not be
wasted on people who are just going through the motions; (4) as much of the
mandatory counseling will not be successful, the efficacy of marriage counsel-
ing in general will be called into question. Baum, A Trial Judge's Random
Reflections on Divorce: The Social Problem and What Lawyers Can Do About
It, 6 J. FAM. L 61, 81-83 (1966); Baum, Law and Social Work- Marriage Coun-
seling, A Case in Point, 3 J. FAm. L. 279,284-85 (1963); Conway, supra note 332,
at 423; Seidelson, supra note 227, at 89-93. See also PurrNG AsUNDER, supra
note 90, at 151 ("Most of our witnesses were agreed that various schemes
which have been tried in foreign countries, requiring compulsory attendance
of parties to a divorce suit before some form of conciliation agency or tribu-
nal, had proved in the end to be a routine and useless formality."). But see
Foster, Conciliation and Counseling in the Court in Family Law Cases, 41
N.Y.U. L REV. 353, 379-81 (1966).
344. Most of the judges polled agreed that if the petitioner had seen a marriage
counselor once and still believed that the marriage was irretrievably broken
they normally would not require the petitioner to undergo further attempts at
reconciliation. Judges' Questionnaire, supra note 15, question 14.
345. The pro forma nature of much of this counseling is revealed by the following.
Through 1977 about 80% of all referrals to the Lancaster County Conciliation
Court have come from attorneys. Extrapolated from 1977 CONCLIATION CT.
REP., supra note 329, at 13; 1976 id. at 16; 1975 id. at 16; 1974 id. at 15; 1973 id. at
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selor might be required in particular instances, less strenuous ef-
forts to effect a reconciliation appear to be sufficient in the
majority of cases. This is consistent with the Nebraska Supreme
Court's opinion in Condreay v. Condreay,M a case in which the
respondent was an inmate in the Nebraska Penal Complex.347 In
Condreay the court held that, even when the respondent spouse
denies that the marriage is irretrievably broken and no counseling
has taken place, a court may refuse a request to refer the case to a
counselor for conciliation 4 and may make a finding that every
reasonable effort to effect reconciliation has been made,349 if recon-
ciliation does not appear to be feasible.
Whether the counseling that does take place is effective in reha-
bilitating infirm marriages is difficult to determine. 350 Some advo-
cates of legislatively-created, court-directed conciliation
procedures claim that such services are "extra-ordinarily effective
in a great number of cases,"35 ' but many lawyers and judges in-
18; 1972 id. at 18; 1971 id. at 17; 1969-1970 id. at 6. Since 1973 about 75% of the
cases which were heard by the Lancaster County Conciliation Court were
filed while a divorce action was pending. 1977 id. at 16. In about 60% of the
cases neither spouse had received previous professional counseling. Extra-
polated from id. at 16; 1976 id. at 19; 1975 id. at 19; 1974 id. at 18; 1973 id. at 12;
1972 id. at 11; 1971 id. at 12; 1969-1970 id. at 7. As a rule the conciliation
court-which offers short-term, crisis-oriented counseling--allows each
couple no more than two appointments. 1977 id. at 5. According to one judge,
in about 75% of the cases one or both of the parties does not have any real
desire for reconciliation. Judges' Questionnaire, supra note 15. Usually the
only evidence introduced at the divorce trial about reconciliation efforts is
the testimony of one or both of the parties.
346. 190 Neb. 513, 209 N.W.2d 357 (1973).
347. Condreay obviously is an extreme case. The husband had been charged with
rape, sodomy, kidnapping, and assault. Certainly reconciliation was impossi-
ble "unless plaintiff is an unusally forgiving person." Id. at 515,209 N.W.2d at
358. Nevertheless, counseling does not seem to be required as a rule in many
courts in Nebraska.
348. Accord, Putnam v. Fanning, 495 S.W.2d 175 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973).
349. Accord, McCoy v. McCoy, 236 Ga. 633, 225 S.E.2d 682 (1976); Flora v. Flora, 337
N.E.2d 846 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975); Kretzschmar v. Kretzschmar, 48 Mich. App.
279, 210 N.W.2d 352 (1973).
350. The healing of an ailing marriage is a difficult task. Once the process of alien-
ation has begun, it
goes on remorselessly, as if it were some Frankensteinian monster
which the couple has created and now would gladly destroy ....
... Even the attempts at reconciliation usually end by impover-
ishing the relationship, for they end in renewed disagreement, and
then it seems to each that the other has somehow broken faith. Once
the process is underway, whatever either of the couple does is wrong.
W. WALLER & R. Hnu, supra note 194, at 519-20.
Reconciliation attempts have the best chance of success when at least one
party wants the marriage to continue. Counseling can be a useful face-saving
device, allowing people to back away from a hasty decision without looking as
if they were backing down. M. WHEELER, supra note 50, at 116.
351. Baum, A Trial Judge's Random Reflections on Divorce: The Social Problem
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volved in divorce practice believe that in most instances reconcilia-
tion efforts are futile.352 Some conciliation courts have
disseminated data that demonstrate that their programs have suc-
ceeded in inducing a significant number of discordant couples to
settle their differences and resume their marriages.353 These re-
ports must be read with care, for they frequently are statistically
unsophisticated 4 and may fail to take into account the number of
divorce actions which are dismissed without court or conciliator
and What Lawyers Can Do About It, 6 J. FAM. L. 61, 67 (1966). See also Elkin,
Conciliation Courts: The Reintegration of Disintegrating Families, 22 FAM.
COORDINATOR 63 (1973); Foster, supra note 343.
352. In a survey of Iowa judges, 10 judges thought conciliation was successful only
"sometimes," 3 indicated it was "seldom" successful, and 6 believed it
"never" succeeded. None thought it succeeded "always" or "often." Sass,
supra note 39, at 642, 650. A 1974 poll of 31 Lincoln attorneys found 6 who
believed reconciliation attempts were "usually futile," 11 who said they were
"often futile," 14 who agreed that they were "occasionally successful," and
none who felt that they were "often successful" Embacher & Johnson, supra
note 242, at 8, 36.
Iowa attorneys have expressed concern about the low rate of success of
Iowa's reconciliation provisions and have indicated that the procedures fre-
quently have been invoked solely for the purpose of delay. Sass, supra note
39, at 642. A Kentucky survey found few judges who had significant success
with conciliation efforts. Comment, supra note 256, at 573. New York matri-
monial specialists were similarly unimpressed with the results achieved by
the state's short-lived Conciliation Bureau. McLaughlin, Court-Connected
Marriage Counseling and Divorce-The New York Experience, 11 J. FAM. L.
517, 529 (1971); Comment, New York's New Divorce Law: Beyond the Sixth
Commandment, 5 COLUM. J.L & Soc. PROB., Aug., 1969, at 1, 8.
Some detractors regard conciliation programs as merely the price that has
to be paid to mollify critics of liberalized divorce grounds. See R. LEvy, supra
note 193, at 118-20; Seidelson, supra note 227, at 62-63; Turner, supra note 29,
at 75.
353. See, e.g., Baum, supra note 351, at 67 (in 1961 and 1962 over half the couples
who had contact with the Wayne County [Michigan] Circuit Court Marriage
Counseling Service were reconciled, and of the couples who completed coun-
seling, two-thirds were reconciled); Krom, supra note 216, at 160 (reporting
Judge Pfaf's testimony that there was a 64% reconciliation rate for cases sub-
mitted to the Los Angeles Court of Conciliation); Hansen, And Time Went By,
TRIAL JUDGES' J., Oct., 1965, at 8 (after adoption of statewide conciliation pro-
cedures the proportion of divorce cases dropped in Milwaukee County, Wis-
consin, went from 39% to 48%). Other reports have not been as optimistic.
See, e.g., the New York experience reported in McLaughlin, supra note 352.
354. "You can make reconciliation rates say anything you want them to, depend-
ing on what you base them." M. WHEELER, supra note 50, at 107-08 (quoting
Dorothy Maddi). See also C. FOOTE, R. LEv & F. SANDER, supra note 26, at
1094-95 n.81.
In recent years the Lancaster County Conciliation Court has reported that
over 50% of the couples petitioning for conciliation in a given year were not
divorced by the end of that year. 1977 CONCILIATION CT. REP., supra note 329,
at 5, 7, 22; 1976 id. at 8. As these figures admittedly did not consider that the
divorce actions of many of these couples would not be heard until the next
year, they are of little value.
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intervention,35 5 the self-selected nature of the group that has re-
ceived counseling,356 and the transient nature of many reconcilia-
tions.35 7
Data measuring the effectiveness of Nebraska's conciliation
procedures are scarce. A Lancaster County Conciliation Court fol-
low-up study revealed that as of May 23, 1975, sixty percent of all
couples who had some contact with the Lancaster County Concili-
ation Court, including those who withdrew their petitions prior to
the initial conference, had been granted a decree of dissolution. 358
How many of the forty percent that were not yet divorced procured
a decree after May 23, how many were reconciled,359 how many
reconciliations lasted an appreciable length of time, and how many
reconciliations would have occurred without the aid of the concilia-
tion court is unknown.
Of the forty-eight couples whom the Judges' Questionnaire in-
dicated had failed to receive a decree of dissolution at the initial
divorce hearing360 and who presumably were referred for further
355. See note 329 supra.
356. See Maddi, supra note 132. This sophisticated study of the Los Angeles Con-
ciliation Court found that "the interlocutory decree rate of couples who
sought the services of the Conciliation Court was significantly lower than that
of couples who did not seek such services . . . ." Id. at 549. However, the
difference between the rates may well have been due to the self-selected na-
ture of the group that petitioned for conciliation, rather than the impact of the
conciliation court experience. Much of the difference between the rates evap-
orated when controlled for certain characteristics, e.g., desire for counseling,
duration of marriage, presence of children, length of marriage. Moreover,
since less than 5% of the total sample filed petitions for conciliation, the im-
pact of this group's lower decree rate on the total decree rate was negligible.
Id. at 549.
357. But see 1972 CONCILIATION CT. REP., supra note 329, at 1 ("Follow-up studies,
although not refined, indicate that approximately 87% of those who have used
the Husband-Wife Agreement are still together following the conciliation
conference efforts."); Elkin, supra note 351, at 67 (three out of four couples
reconciled through the Los Angeles Conciliation Court were still living to-
gether one year later). The source of the figures cited in the Lancaster
Couhty Conciliation Court Report is not identified. It is not clear whether
these figures are from Lancaster County or even from Nebraska.
358. Extrapolated from 1974 CONCILIATION CT. REP., supra note 329, at 9, 14. Of
those who completed the counseling process in 1974, 72.9% were divorced as
of May 23, 1975. Id. at 14.
359. If the parties reconcile they are encouraged to sign a 30-page Husband-Wife
Agreement, which is set out in part at 5 W. MooRE, NEBRASKA PRACTIcE § 4148
(Supp. 1978). The agreement contains clauses on, e.g., "Nagging" and 'The
Importance of Love-Making," as well as a "Family Prayer." The document is
incorporated in a court order and, in theory, is enforceable by the contempt
sanction. Id. For the use of such agreements in other jurisdictions see C.
FooTE, R. LEvY & F. SANDER, supra note 26, at 1093-94 & nn.79-80; M. WHEELER,
supra note 50, at 109-10; Elkin, supra note 351, at 66-67; Henderson, Marriage
Counseling in a Court of Conciliation, 3 FABi L.Q. 6, 10-11.
360. See note 241 & accompanying text supra.
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counseling, only five were known to have reconciled.3 61 While this
is a late stage in the divorce process to be attempting conciliation,
these couples probably were selected because chances for recon-
ciliation were promising.
Even when counselors are consulted before the hearing, it
might be too late for them to use their skills effectively if the di-
vorce process already has begun,362 although many reconciliations
do occur after one of the spouses has filed suit. 3 6 3 From 1973 to
1977, about seventy-five percent of the petitions for reconciliation
in the Lancaster County Conciliation Court were filed while a di-
vorce action was pending36 4 and about eighty percent were filed
after the couple had separated.3 65 Although a sizeable minority of
couples who employ the services of the conciliation court do so
while the parties are still living together and prior to the initiation
of any dissolution proceedings, the court would like to see this
361. Judges' Questionnaire, supra note 15, question 3(d). The ultimate resolution
of one case was not reported. One out-state judge, who regards the provi-
sions enabling judges to order counseling as the strength of the Nebraska no
fault divorce process, referred 11 couples for counseling, two of whom recon-
ciled. He reported that in another year, eight out of nine referrals resulted in
reconciliations. Id. The power to continue cases or refer them for concilia-
tion can be abused if used indiscriminately, although this judge's relatively
successful record indicates that this is not the case here. The provision of
Washington's no fault law, requiring entry of a decree if one party still main-
tains that the marriage is irretrievably broken after the expiration of a spe-
cific time period for reflection and counseling, see note 274 & accompanying
text supra, has been praised for tempering " [a]ny unwarranted judicial opti-
inism regarding the usefulness of delay or counseling." Holnan, supra note
272, at 44.
362. Marriage Guidance Councils are unanimous in saying that their
chances of success are greatest if their help is sought at an early
stage in disputes between husband and wife. These chances are
greatly diminished by the time that either party has resorted to legal
advice, and have dwindled almost, but not quite, to vanishing point
by the time that a petition is fied.
LAw ComMassioN, supra note 93, at 17. A number of Iowa judges and attor-
neys have attributed that state's lack of success with its conciliation proce-
dures to the fact that the required counseling comes too late in the divorce
process. Sass, supra note 39, at 642.
363. 'The filing of a divorce action is all too often a desperate cry for help and does
not always represent a true desire to terminate the marriage. When this
anguished cry is not heard or heeded, all too often we find the tragedy of the
unnecessary divorce." 1969-1970 CONCIIIAMN CT. REP., supra note 329, at 3.
See also H. O'GoRmAN, supra note 156, at 99; Rals, supra note 161, at 26 ("at
least half the people who start divorce suits are really hoping something will
stop them' before it is too late"); Sass, supra note 39, at 652 (according to the
averaged responses of Iowa attorneys to a survey question, 43% of marital
complainants are actually seeking help for their marriages and not dissolu-
tions).
364. 1977 CONcMunON CT. REP., supra note 329, at 16.
365. Extrapolated from 1976 id. at 25; 1975 id. at 25; 1974 id. at 24.
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number substantially increased.366
High quality, sympathetic, and understanding counselors are
essential to an effective conciliation program. Twenty-two of the
judges who responded to the survey felt that there were counsel-
ing or conciliation services in their district to which they confi-
dently could refer the parties.&3 67 Some among the eight who
lacked confidence in their local mental health facilities were em-
phatic in their displeasure, labeling the counseling provided "al-
most never effective" and "uniformly ineffectual" and dismissing
the few private counselors available as too expensive. 368 Even
among those judges who responded favorably, there was some dis-
satisfaction. Included in both groups were judges who indicated
that few of the couples who appeared before them had received
any counseling at all.369 If counseling and conciliation are to be the
major brakes on improvident divorces under Nebraska's irretriev-
able breakdown statute, it is obvious that the professional mental
health services available to many rural Nebraskans must be up-
graded.3 70
Saving marriages is not the only function that conciliation
courts and other mental health professionals involved in the di-
vorce process are asked to fulfill. Initially, their goal is to help the
spouses clarify what it is they really want to do and to aid them in
366. See text accompanying notes 387-88 infra.
367. Judges' Questionnaire, supra note 15, question 13.
368. Id. In some cases, when the need for counseling is pressing, out-state
couples may be referred to counselors in Lincoln and Omaha. Id.
369. See note 312 & accompanying text supra.
370. Many attorneys "counsel" their divorce clients. Others feel that this is not
their proper role. Few have had the training that would equip them for com-
prehensive marriage counseling. As effective counseling often requires the
participation of both parties, an attorney's participation in this process raises
many ethical questions. See generally J. AREEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
FAMILY LAw 343-68 (1978); V. CHURCH, BEHAVIOR, LAw AND REMEDIES: INTRO-
DUCING THE JuRO-PSYCHOLOGIST (1965); H. FREEMAN & H. WEIHOFEN, CLINIcAL
LAW TRAINING-INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING 169-240 (1972); IL O'GoRmAN,
supra note 156, at 145-51; M. WHEELER, supra note 50, at 113-15; Alexander,
Public Service by Lawyers in the Field of Divorce, 13 Omo ST. L.J. 13 (1952);
Callner, Boundaries of the Divorce Lawyer's Role, 10 FAM. L.Q. 389 (1977);
Conway, supra note 332; Embacher & Johnson, supra note 242; Harper &
Harper, Lawyers and Marriage Counseling, 1 J. FAm. L. 73 (1961); Johnson,
supra note 196; Marder, The Need for an Expanded Role for the Attorney in
Divorce Counseling, 4 FAM. LQ. 280 (1970); Mussehl, From Advocate to Coun-
selor: The Emerging Role of the Family Law Practitioner, 12 GONZAGA L. REV.
443 (1977); Steinberg, The Therapeutic Potential of the Divorce Process, 62
A.BA.J. 617 (1976); Walzer, The Role of the Lawyer in Divorce, 3 FAM. L.Q. 212
(1969); Watson, The Lawyer as Counselor, 5 J. FAM. L 7 (1965). See also Di-
vorce Reform Act, 1969, c. 55, § 3(1) (England) (a soliciter acting for a peti-
tioner for divorce is required to certify whether he or she has discussed the
possibility of reconciliation with the petitioner and has given the petitioner
names and addresses of persons qualified to help effect a reconciliation).
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exploring the various ways through which these goals can be
achieved. As part of this process "a great deal of the Counselor's
energy and efforts are devoted to helping frightened, suspicious
and frustrated humans unburden themselves. '37 1 If the decision is
made to seek a divorce, the counselor's task is to help the family
terminate the marriage with dignity; with a minimum of trauma,
hatred, and bitterness; and with as little pain as possible inflicted
on the children. At this stage it is important that the parties focus
their attention away from the problems of the past and toward the
roles they will be assuming in the future. Conciliation courts can
assist in this process by helping the parties settle the collateral
issues of custody, visitation, property, and support in a manner
which will minimize tensions and facilitate healthy relationships
among the former spouses and their children. Moreover, it is felt
that the insights gained through this process will reduce the risks
of failure should either party marry again.3 72
It is widely believed that the services conciliation agencies pro-
vide are beneficial. Counseling or conciliation procedures of one
form or another have been incorporated into most recent divorce
reform legislation. Yet, these programs are rarely funded or
staffed at a level that enables them to fulfill effectively all of the
various missions that have been assigned to them.3 7 3 The dissatis-
faction with the available counseling facilities expressed by many
of the judges who preside over courts in the less-populated coun-
ties of Nebraska attests to this predicament.3 7 4
The problem is not confined to rural areas, however. Through-
out its history the Lancaster County Conciliation Court has been
plagued with monetary and staffing problems. 3 75 During the
court's first five years it operated without a full-time director, first
using volunteers and later employing a part-time counselor.37 6 It
now has a full-time conciliation counselor,3 7 7 but in 1977 the court's
limited budget would not allow him to attend the annual meeting
of the Association of Family Conciliation Courts or participate in
any continuing education programs.37 8
371. 1977 CONCIIATON CT. REP., supra note 329, at 7.
372. See generally M. WHEELER, supra note 50, at 115-16; Baum, supra note 351, at
67-68; Elldn, supra note 351, at 64.
373. "Until now few legislatures have really put their money where their plati-
tudes are." U. WHEELER, supra note 50, at 116.
374. See text accompanying notes 367-68 supra.
375. The Douglas County Conciliation Court has had similar problems. Report-
edly the county board has failed to appropriate adequate funds. Hearings,
supra note 130, at 42 (testimony of Senator J. James Waldron).
376. 1969-1970 CONCILIATON CT. REP., supra note 329, at 20.
377. The court had no conciliation counselor during the first four months of 1976.
See 1976 id. at 3; 1975 id. at 3. During the first three months of 1976 no ap-
pointments for counseling were made. 1976 id. at 1.
378. 1977 id. at 1.
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Although "the Conciliation Court is most productive when it be-
comes immediately available in a time of crisis,"379 by 1973 "the
waiting period prior to the first counseling contact [had been]
stretched beyond any reasonable understanding of crisis-centered
counseling."3 8 0 In August the delay was nine weeks and the vast
majority of consultations were limited to one session.38 ' Through
the implementation of new procedures designed "to accommodate
more families and shorten the waiting period,"38 2 the delay has
been reduced to "a comfortable ten days to two weeks, '383 al-
though the short-term nature of the court's counseling program
usually permits only two appointments.38 Further indication that
the situation has improved can be found in the fact that in 1977
forty-one percent of the families served by the Lancaster County
Conciliation Court did not have any minor children,38 5 even though
these cases are to be accepted only when "the work of the court in
cases involving minor children will not be seriously impeded. 3 86
While the Conciliation Counselor has expressed the wish that
the court "could provide help for marital difficulties much earlier
than is presently the case,3 8 7 it has been forced to "wait until the
damage is extensive before [its] help is sought because couples
were unaware of [its] services." 38 8 Placing brochures in public
places where troubled couples are likely to see them might help
remedy this problem, but "distribution and replacement of the
brochures would be a near impossible task,"3 89 as funds to publi-
cize the court's services have not been forthcoming.3 90 Another
concern is that "[v] ery few families receive any post-dissolution
counseling in the important areas of child visitation or custody,"3 9'
even though such counseling "is often a necessity if children are to
have healthy and happy relationships with divorced parents," and
"may be advisable in order to achieve an effective and happy fu-
ture marriage for one or both of the spouses. '3 92
In view of this record it is highly unlikely that Nebraska would
ever initiate an extensive statewide counseling program in an ef-
fort to reduce the divorce rate. Considering the enormous cost and
379. 1973 id. at ii
380. Id. at 6.
381. Id.
382. 1975 id. at 6.
383. 1976 id. at 5.
384. 1977 id. at 5.
385. Id. at 22.
386. NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-823 (Reissue 1974). See note 340 supra.
387. 1977 CONCILIATION CT. REP., supra note 329, at 1.
388. Id.
389. 1976 id. at 5.
390. 1977 id. at 1.
391. Id. at 5.
392. Id. at 6.
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doubtful efficacy of such a program,393 this is for the best. If, how-
ever, Nebraska is concerned that decisions to continue or termi-
nate a marriage be informed and reflective and that the harmful
effects of divorce be minimized, it should take steps to assure that
well-publicized, competent, and affordable marriage and divorce
counseling services are available to all those who want them
throughout the state.
F. "It is the intent of the legislature that a spouse who has been handi-
capped socially or economically by his or her contributions to a mar-
riage shall be compensated for such contributions at the termination
of the marriage. . . ., 394
Five of the judges who responded to the Judges' Questionnaire
felt that there conceivably could be some circumstances under
which they would deny a petition for the dissolution of a marriage
even though the marriage was irretrievably broken and every rea-
sonable effort to effect reconciliation had been made.395 While the
discretion to deny a divorce, even where the requisite showing of
breakdown has been made, exists in England 396 and a few other
393. Although there may be other reasons for supporting or establish-
ing a conciliation service similar to the one examined in this study,
the impact on the overall decree rate is not one of them ....
[U]nless legislatures are willing to fund conciliation programs with
large staffs capable of serving a significant portion of the population
seeking divorce, the impact on the decree rate is bound to be mini-
mal. Nor is it clear that serving a larger portion of the divorce-seek-
ing population would have a significant impact.
Maddi, supra note 132, at 551-52 (footnote omitted).
394. Act of Oct. 15, 1977, ch. 105, § 1, 1977 Wis. Laws 560.
395. Judges' Questionnaire, supra note 15, question 6.
396. (1) The respondent to a petition for divorce in which the peti-
tioner alleges [that the parties to the marriage have lived apart for a
continuous period of at least five years immediately preceeding the
presentation of the petition] may oppose the grant of a decree nisi on
the ground that the dissolution of the marriage will result in grave
financial or other hardship to him and that it would in all the circum-
stances be wrong to dissolve the marriage.
(2) Where the grant of a decree nisi is opposed by virtue of this
section, then,-
(a) if the court is satisfied that [the petitioner has no other
ground for divorce], and
(b) if apart from this section it would grant a decree nisi,
the court shall consider all the circumstances, including the conduct
of the parties to the marriage and the interests of those parties and of
any children or other persons concerned, and if the court is of opin-
ion that the dissolution of the marriage will result in grave financial
or other hardship to the respondent and that it would in all the cir-
cumstances be wrong to dissolve the marriage it shall dismiss the
petition.
(3) For the purposes of this section hardship shall include the
loss of the chance of acquiring any benefit which the respondent
might acquire if the marTiage were not dissolved.
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countries,3 97 no such power is conferred by a Nebraska statute.3 98
Those jurisdictions which have enacted provisions of this type
have done so, in part, out of concern for the spouse, who through
no fault of his or her own, is deprived of the status of a married
person because the outrageous conduct of his or her spouse has
destroyed their marriage. 3 99 Like measures of a similar nature dis-
cussed previously,40 0 such hardship clauses resurrect many of the
evils of fault divorce and vest trial judges with wide discretion,401
without providing the objecting spouse with any appreciable bene-
fit.
The main motivation behind these statutes is the economic pro-
tection of the unoffending spouse and the minor children.40 2 This
is a legitimate and serious concern. A wife, for instance, who has
devoted most of her married years to the maintenance of the home
and family and who thus has not developed the skills and experi-
ence she needs to viably support herself, should not be forced to
suffer economic deprivation because her husband has become dis-
enchanted with their marriage and divorces her against her will. 40 3
Divorce Reform Act, 1969, c. 55, § 4. See also the standard proposed by the
English Law Commission:
The Judge may in his discretion refuse to grant a divorce if satis-
fied that, having regard to the conduct and interests of the parties
and the interests of the children and other persons affected, it would
be wrong to dissolve the marriage, notwithstanding the public inter-
est in dissolving marriages which have irretrievably broken down.
L&w CoMIISsIoN, supra note 93, at 53.
397. See, e.g., those discussed in M. RHEiNsTEIN, Supra note 35, at 342-46.
398. Cf. Abney v. Abney, 374 N.E.2d 264, 270 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978) (the Indiana Dis-
solution of Marriage Act "gives the trial court no alternative but to grant a
dissolution once it finds an irretrievable breakdown of the marriage" even
where "the effect of the dissolution will be to terminate benefits which are
advantageous to one of the parties").
399. See PurnNG AsuNDER, supra note 90, at 48-56; LAw CoMMIssIoN, supra note
93, at 21-23.
400. See notes 289-315 & accompanying text supra.
401. '"The effect of this position is to add to a rule having no standards an excep-
tion having no standards, and thus to augment the court's discretion enor-
mously." Clark, supra note 17, at 406-07.
402. See Pu'rrNG ASUNDER, supra note 90, at 46-48; LAw ComMssIoN, supra note
93, at 20-21, 23-26, 50-51. As to the protection of children in England, see the
Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act, 1970, c. 45, § 17 (the court is pre-
cluded from granting a decree absolute unless satisfied that the arrange-
ments for the welfare of the children of the parties have been made, if it is
practicable to do so, and that such arrangements are satisfactory or the best
that can be devised under the circumstances).
403. See, e.g., Abney v. Abney, 374 N.E.2d 264 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978) (the wife, who
was suffering from severe rheumatoid arthritis requiring costly medical treat-
ment, had the assistance she was receiving through her husband's military
benefits terminated when he divorced her). For the history of this unfortu-
nate case, see also Abney v. Abney, 360 N.E.2d 1044 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977); Ab-
ney v. Abney, 61 Tenn. App. 521, 456 S.W.2d 364 (1970); Abney v. Abney, 222
Tenn. 160, 433 S.W.2d 847 (1968).
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The appropriate solution, however, is not the adoption of discre-
tionary and unwieldly hardship exceptions to no fault divorce
grounds,404 but the reformation of the laws of property and sup-
port.405
A detailed discussion of property and support is beyond the
scope of this article. It should be mentioned, however, that the
adoption of no fault divorce statutes has had a significant impact
on these economic issues. In many, though not all, of the states
which have embraced the new divorce reforms, the advent of no
fault divorce also has brought about no fault alimony and property
division.40 6 Moreover, the irretrievable breakdown standard has
destroyed whatever ability one spouse had under the old law to
block the granting of a divorce decree. When that power was in the
hands of the economically weaker of the parties, which was usu-
ally the wife, she was able to use it to extract valuable financial
concessions from her husband and guarantee herself an equitable
settlement. Even so, the demise of this system, which bordered on
blackmail, is not to be mourned. It was subject to enormous
abuses and produced as many unjust settlements as just ones.40 7
404. "[Ilt is offensive to decency and derogatory to respect for family ties to pre-
serve the legal shell of a dead marriage for purely monetary considerations."
LAw CoMbIssION, supra note 93, at 21.
405. "[Ihf present inequities were successfully ironed out, the economic argument
against allowing the party responsible for the breakdown of a marriage to
petition would be reduced to insignificance." PUrrNG ASUNDER, supra note
90, at 48.
Equitable support and property laws would not solve all problems, how-
ever. Where resources are not plentiful, divorce, and subsequent marriage,
can impose financial hardships on all. Strict enforcement of hardship clauses
would in effect impose a "means test" for remarriages--allowing the rich, but
not the poor, to remarry. H. KRAUSE, NUTSHLi, supra note 205, at 362. Cf.
Zablocki v. Redhail, 98 S. Ct. 673 (1978) (a Wisconsin statute, providing that
parents having children not in their custody whom they are obligated to sup-
port maly not remarry without demonstrating that they have complied with
all support orders and that their children will not become public charges,
violates the fundamental right to marry).
406. See generally Comment, Alimony Considerations Under No-Fault Divorce
Laws, 57 NEB. L REV. 792 (1978); Annot., 86 A.L.R.3d 1116 (1978). In which of
these groups Nebraska falls remains unclear. In Theye v. Theye, 200 Neb. 206,
263 N.W.2d 92 (1978), three of the justices of the Nebraska Supreme Court,
one of whom wrote the opinion of the court, indicated that the relative fault of
the parties in bringing about the breakdown of the marriage was a proper
factor to consider when awarding alimony. The other four justices, in an
opinion concurring in the result, disagreed. One of those four has since re-
tired. See also Magruder v. Magruder, 190 Neb. 573, 209 N.W.2d 585 (1973).
For the pre-Theye responses of the Nebraska trial judges as to whether they
admit evidence of misconduct with respect to alimony and the division of
property, and whether it ought to be admitted, see Judges' Questionnaire,
supra note 15, questions 7 & 8, set out in the appendix.
407. See notes 163-65, 309-11 & accompanying text supra.
[VOL. 58:1
NO FAULT DIVORCE
A more equitable solution would provide for laws which protect
economically dependent spouses by assuring that upon divorce
their legitimate needs will be met and their direct and indirect con-
tributions to the earning power and property of the other spouse
will be recognized and compensated.4 8
VII. CONCLUSION
In repealing Nebraska's fault divorce laws and substituting a
procedure based on the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage,
the Nebraska Unicameral made a fundamental change in the
state's official outlook towards marriage, divorce, and the family.
That such a dramatic shift in philosophy produced no statistically
significant change in the state's overall divorce rate and brought
about few substantial alterations in the manner in which divorces
are procured serves to demonstrate the inconsiderable impact
that the statutory grounds of divorce have on marriage stability.
While the divorce rate has skyrocketed in recent years, this phe-
nomenon is better explained as the product of the same social
forces that produced no fault divorce laws than as the result of
such laws. When the virtues of patience, understanding, and sacri-
fice are held in higher regard than they are in today's inward-look-
ing society, perhaps the divorce rate will drop significantly. No law
408. The factors that Nebraska courts are to take into consideration when award-
ing alimony and dividing property are set out at NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-365
(Cum. Supp. 1978):
When dissolution of a marriage is decreed, the court may order pay-
ment of such alimony by one party to the other and division of prop-
erty as may be reasonable, having regard for the circumstances of
the parties, duration of the marriage, a history of the contributions to
the marriage by each party, including contributions to the care and
education of the children, and interruption of personal careers or ed-
ucational opportunities, and the ability of the supported party to en-
gage in gainful employment without interfering with the interests of
any minor children in the custody of such party.
The Nebraska judges' survey asked the judges to rate 16 factors on a scale
of 1 to 5, according to how important they believed each to be in the awarding
of alimony. While the responses demonstrate a lack of uniformity among the
individual judges, the overall results show that the judges regard the non-
economic contributions of a homemaking spouse and the sacrificing of one's
own career as significant determinants in the allocation of spousal support.
Fault considerations were ranked last. See Judges' Questionnaire, supra
note 15, question 10, set out in the appendix.
The Nebraska Supreme Court also has shown that it believes the contribu-
tions of the spouse who is not the primary wage earner to be an important
factor. See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 199 Neb. 394, 259 N.W.2d 24 (1977) (a wife
who made substantial financial contributions through the early years of the
marriage, who after the divorce would be caring for the minor children of the
parties, and whose earning capacity, although substantial, was not as great
as her husband's, should have been awarded alimony in addition to a prop-
erty settlement).
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can induce such attitudinal changes, but divorce laws can and
should minimize the pain and acrimony of the divorce process,
make competent marriage and divorce counseling available to all
who desire it, and distribute equitably the economic and social
costs of marital breakdown.
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APPENDIX
JUDGES' QUESTIONNAIRE ON NEBRASKA'S
DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE LAW
Total Tabulation Sheet
NAME: JUDICIAL DISTRICT,
1. Approximately how many dissolution of marriage cases did
you hear within the past year? (If you did not hear domestic
relations cases during a substantial portion of the past year,
please indicate the approximate number of cases you heard
for the most recent one-year period that you sat on the
domestic relations bench.)
a) uncontested cases 7600 (approximately)
(i.e., no contested issues)
b) contested cases 2400 (approximately)
2. In approximately what proportion of the contested cases did
one of the parties deny in court that the marriage was
irretrievably broken? 3.3%
3. In how many cases did you deny the prayer of
dissolution? 48
a) How many because of failure to prove irretrievable
breakdown of the marriage? *
i) where one of the parties denied that the marriage
was irretrievably broken? *
ii) where neither party denied the marriage was
irretrievably broken? *
b) How many because every reasonable effort to effect
reconciliation had not been made? *
i) where one of the parties denied that the marriage
was irretrievably broken? *
ii) where neither party denied the marriage was
irretrievably broken? *
c) How many for other reasons? *
(Please specify reasons)
d) What was the ultimate resolution of those cases where
you denied the prayer of dissolution? (i.e., did the parties
reconcile, was a dissolution eventually granted, etc.?)
• Data too incomplete to report.
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42-dissolution granted
5-reconciled
1-unknown
4. What is the average duration in time of a dissolution hearing
in your courtroom
a) in an uncontested case? 16 minutes
b) in a contested case? 3 3/4 hours
5. a) Where there has been adequate counseling and where
one or both of the parties state that the marriage is
irretrievably broken and that they are unwilling to
resume the marital relationship and no one has denied
that the marriage is irretrievably broken, do you feel that
under the law the marriage is irretrievably broken and
should be dissolved?
Yes 29 No 1
b) Where there has been adequate counseling and where
one of the parties states that the marriage is irretrievably
broken and that he/she is unwilling to resume the marital
relationship, but the other party has denied that the
marriage is irretrievably broken, do you feel that under
the law the marriage is irretrievably broken and should
be dissolved?
Yes 27 No 3
6. Where you have found the marriage to be irretrievably broken
and that every reasonable effort to effect reconciliation has
been made, are there any circumstances under which you still
would deny the dissolution?
Yes 5 No 25
If yes, please indicate what those circumstances are?
7. Do you admit evidence of misconduct of the parties with
respect to:
a) breakdown of the marriage? yes 9 no 20
b) alimony? yes 11 no 18
c) distribution of property? yes 9 no 20
d) child support? yes 10 no 19
e) child custody? yes 28 no 1
8. Do you think that evidence of misconduct should be admitted
with respect to:
a) breakdown of marriage? yes 11 no 19
b) alimony? yes 15 no 14
c) distribution of property? yes 14 no 15
d) child support? yes 11 no 19
e) child custody? yes 29 no 1
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9. Although there are variances among cases would you say that
on the average you award the wife
a) 1/3 or less of the marital property? 0
b) approximately 1/2 of the marital property? 28
c) 2/3 or more of the marital property? 0
10. How important do you believe each of the following factors to
be in the awarding of alimony? (Rate each on a scale of 1 - 5, 1
being of great importance and 5 of no importance.)
of great of no
importance important importance
1 2 3 4 5
rank
mean order
a) what money or property
each brought into the
marriage
b) social position and living
standard of each party
before the marriage
c) duration of the marriage
d) number of children, their
respective ages, physical
or mental conditions, and
parental needs
e) net worth and present
income of each party
f) misconduct of each
spouse
g) present physical and
mental health of each
party
h) ages and life expectancy
of each party
i) earning capacity of each
party including ability of
the supported party to
engage in gainful employ-
ment
j) present standard of living
of each party
k) how the marital property
was acquired and the
effort of each in doing so
1) what each party gave up
for the marriage includ-
ing interruption of ca-
reers and educational op-
portunity
m) what each gained from
the marriage including
social status and career
and educational oppor-
tunity
n) non-economic producing
contributions to the
marriage such as child-
rearing and homemaking
4 10 3 2 2.41 8
4 7 8 8 3.64 14
4 6 0 1 L69 4
1 6 2 12 3.39 13
9 6 4 0 0
1 2 1 5 19
L48 2
4.39 16
4 7 0 0 L62 3
7 8 1 1 2.03 5
5 4
5 14
0 L44 1
1 2.59 10
5 10 3 2 2.45 9
8 12 1 1 2.34 7
6 16 0 3 2.72 11
2 2.10 6
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o) any extraordinary sacri-
fice, devotion, or care by
either spouse in further-
ance of a happy marriage
or in preservation of the
marital relationship 6 8 6 6 3 2.72 11
p) the desire of each to end
the marital relationship 5 1 4 6 13 3.72 15
11. When a minor child is involved an attorney should almost al-
ways be appointed to represent the child's interest?
Yes 4 No 26
12. In what percentage of cases have the parties seen marriage
counselors or the equivalent before appearing before
you? 55.5%
13. Are there counseling or conciliation services in your district to
whom you can confidently refer the parties?
Yes 22 No 8
14. If the petitioner testifies that he/she has seen a marriage
counselor once and that the petitioner still believes that the
marriage is irretrievably broken would you normally require
the petitioner to undergo further reconciliation attempts?
Yes 5 No 24
If yes, please indicate what more you would normally
require.
15. Do you believe the 60-day waiting period between service of
process and trial...
a) . .. is too long? 0
b) ... is the appropriate length? 30
c) ... is too short to prevent impetuous divorces? 0
16. In approximately what proportion of cases have you ordered
significant changes in agreed-to property settlements? 4.6%
17. In cases where financial issues are contested do you order the
parties to submit a financial statement?
Yes 24 No 6
(If yes and you use a standard form would you please attach a
copy of that form.)
18. Are the laws of Nebraska sufficient to obtain the necessary
financial data from the parties?
Yes 28 No 2
If no, what changes would you recommend?
19. Has the no-fault dissolution of marriage procedures led to a
change in the parties' feelings of animosity toward each other
as compared to Nebraska's previous law?
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a) animosity generally has lessened 20
b) no change 7
c) animosity generally has increased 1
20. In your opinion has no-fault led to easier settlement of collat-
eral issues or more disputes?
a) easier settlements 17
b) no change 4
c) more disputes 9
i) as to financial matters 8
ii) as to custodial matters 7
iii) other (please specify) 0
21. Do you play a more active role in contested dissolution of mar-
riage cases than in other civil cases?
Yes 21 No 9
If yes, how?
a) ask more questions 17
b) try to save the marriage 8
c) press for settlement 7
d) other (please specify) 0
22. Would you say that the present statutory approach to the dis-
solution of marriage is working well?
Yes 24 No 5
If yes, what are the major strengths?
If no, what are the major problems?
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